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MAPPING THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT:
LEGAL ASPECTS OF MODULARIZATION AND
DIGITALIZATION
ANDREA OTTOLIA & DAN WlELSCH
The Article highlights the language of the digital and the principle
of modularization as the basic concepts which the further development of
the information environment will have to pivot around, regardless of how
conflicts between freedom and control are temporarily solved. Perceiving
both the computer and the Internet as complex systems, the authors look at
how modular design of these systems freed the functionality of
applications from the physicality of infrastructures, describe the
evolutionary gains adhering to modularity, and how to preserve them -
elaborating on the issues of access to the cable platform for broadband
Internet and to virtual networks for computer technology. Their second
focus shows how digitalization of information makes possible the merger
of content and its protection. Especially through the use of DRM systems,
private actors can create right enforcement mechanisms independent of
the State. The legal system therefore faces new and more complex
relations between private will and public sovereignty. In such a merged
system it is harder to maintain freedom - much like in the fusion of
function and infrastructure.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the era of digital language and networks the traditional
model of the liberal State is challenged by the rise of a pervasive
information environment. This Article tries to disclose the forces
which underlie central developments of such environment.
We look at two elements of the digital environment, namely the
principle of "modularization" and the language of the "digital". The
focus will be on the phenomena based on those elements: the
modularization of information systems and the digitalization of
information. In other words, we are more engaged in describing design
2003-2004
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parameters, rather than solving design problems. To name the
parameters of potentiality at the same time will provide a basis for an
analysis of the trade-offs attached to specific design choices. So our
approach does not imply that we would not take a stand in the
pertaining discussions. In fact, we do make prescriptive arguments.
But our focus is to highlight the basic concepts that the further
development of the information environment will have to pivot around
- regardless of how the conflict between freedom and control is
temporarily solved.
Part II concerns the principle of modularity in the development
of the Information Society. Used as a concept to manage complex
systems, especially in technological design, modularity refers to the
"decomposition" of a given system by grouping its elements into a
smaller number of subsystems or "modules" whose elements are
strongly connected among themselves and relatively weakly connected
to elements in other units.1 Put in this way, the concept of modularity
contains the idea of interdependence within and relative independence
across modules.2 This principle of modularity has been applied with
great success to technological systems. In two subparts we will show
how modularity shapes the basic devices of the Information Society:
the computer and the Internet. Both are perceived as complex systems
which build on vertically related networks. The Internet is looked at as
a modularized communication network based on physical connection,
while the computer is composed of compatible modules which often
adhere to common standards constituting virtual networks. Perhaps
the most important result of the implementation of the principle of
modularity in these systems was that the functionality of an
application was separated from direct control over any physical
infrastructure (hardware or transmission grids) necessary to perform
the application (e.g., the rise of operating systems for computers, and
the introduction of standard Internet protocols). This evolutionary
gain provided for a relatively independent exploration of (social and
technological) possibilities on each vertical level of modularity (layer)
within the system.
Part III concerns the digitalization of information. One
consequence of this digitalization is that information is
"homologized": every type of information can be resolved into a
number string consisting of different permutations of one and the same
two digits as basic units. This has important effects on the relation
1 The idea of decomposability in modular design can be found in
HERBERT A. SIMON, The Architecture of Complexity, in 106 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 467, 474-75 (1962).
2 For a description of the concept of modularity, see CARLISS Y.
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between information and its protection. Traditionally, copyrightable
content was structurally distinct from the means of its protection: the
right was distinct from its enforcement. But now DRM systems are
building on the structural identity of "protected information" and
"protecting information" in the digital environment; they merge
content and protection. In providing for right enforcement
mechanisms independent from the State, DRM systems present the
possibility of a privatization of the law - a phenomenon below
described as "juridical particularism." This notion does not describe,
in this context, a tendency to an imposition that may be undertaken by
private parties through meta-legal constraints, but refers to the
(inevitable and not necessarily negative) shifting of the legal system to
more complex and unsystematic relations between private will and
public sovereignty, between who creates the legal constraint and who
enforces it.
II. MODULARIZATION IN INFORMATION
SYSTEMS AND ACCESS TO NETWORKS
A. OVERVIEW
Networks are becoming more and more important as society
transforms into an information society. In fact, networks, together
with the digitalization of information which provides for their
"homologization," are the constituent factors of this development.3
This increased importance pertains to both types of the
presently described networks, actual networks and virtual networks.
Actual networks - with communication networks as the most relevant
with respect to information - are built on physical interconnection in
order to enable the transmission of information. Virtual networks, by
contrast, are solely constituted by positive feedback effects of
horizontal and vertical compatibility around common standards. In a
"virtual network" participants are linked together by complementarity
3 For the idea of "homoligization" of information, see James Boyle,
A Politics ofIntellectual Property, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 91 (1997).
4 This distinction is used by antitrust scholars to indicate that network
effects are not confined to cases of communication between users on the network. See
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in Software Markets, in COMPETITION,
INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL
MARKETPLACE 29, 32 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1998); Daniel
L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic Network Industries, 43 ANTITRUST
BULL. 859, 861 (1998).
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of products and adherence to common technological standards, rather
than by physical interconnection.5
From a legal perspective, the problems with networks often
concern competitors seeking access. Therefore, the law of antitrust has
some familiarity with the phenomenon of networks, but in the past the
law has just perceived the horizontal dimension of networks.
Somehow neglected in the discussion is the vertical dimension. Yet it
seems that we have to take into account this perspective if we want to
determine the proper governance rules for networks in accordance
with their social functions, whether these are the explicit rules enacted
by the legislator or the rules found by courts from case to case. Why
should a vertical perspective on networks matter?
Both types of networks appear as parts of modularized complex
systems. Most important, "the Internet" and "the computer" can be
looked at as such complex systems. "Modularization", grossly
speaking, is the splitting up of a system into different interoperable
layers of technology, often - but not necessarily - accompanied by a
shift of functionality to the "end" of the system.6 The consequence of
this is that the "higher" located, directly applicative parts can be
designed with fewer constraints, allowing for more sophisticated
applications. On the other hand, what is in fact possible is framed by
the architecture of the underlying, "lower" level. Lower level
architectures determine the field of possibilities in higher levels.
In the constitution of these levels or layers of the two
modularized systems - the Internet and the computer - networks are
playing a central role, especially when they function as platforms
other, "higher," layers of the system are built on. In this case one
might speak of "information platforms, 7 or "systems technology."'
5 See Richard N. Langlois, Technology Standards, Innovation, and
Essential Facilities: Toward a Schumpeterian Post-Chicago Approach, in DYNAMIC
COMPETITION AND PUBLIC POLICY 193, 195 (Jerry Ellig, ed., 2001).
6 We will use both expressions, depending on which feature we wish
to highlight. The language of "platforms" has the advantage of indicating that there
are information applications built on top of them which essentially rely on the
underlying facility/technology. The language of "systems technology" indicates that
technological modules constitute a "whole" in their interplay and thus are ultimately
parts of an integrated system.
7 Philip J. Weiser, Networks Unplugged. Towards a Model of
Compatibility Regulation Between Information Plaforms (2001) (paper presented at the
29th Annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference), available at
http://arxlivorg/html/cs CY/0109070 [hereinafter Weiser, Networks Unplugged]
which is an earlier version of Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual
Property Policy, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 534 (2003)), p. 4, uses the term "to refer to any
standard for an information product that other companies rely on to supply a
complementary product", noting that "in most cases, that complementary product
OTTOLIA & WIELSCH 179
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This Article will focus on the cable network as a platform for
broadband Internet (11.3) and on "virtual" networks in the industry for
computer technology (11.4). It will examine how their function as
platforms for applications relying on them - their vertical function - is
affecting the governance of these platforms. In other words, an
extension of the perspective into the vertical dimension enables the law
to assess the role of networks in the relationship of information infra-
and superstructures.
It will show that under certain circumstances the law might
require access to network property to take account of its function as
information infrastructure. With this form of legal assistance each
layer in a modularized system may be able to evolve free from
constraints by adjacent layers, realizing the evolutionary gains
attached to greater variation. Ultimately, it becomes visible that
institutional design and network governance in the given examples are
linked to technological architecture.
The argument in this Part will start with the observation that
the evolution of the two complex systems - the Internet and the
computer - was positively influenced when functionality was freed
from control of the infrastructures or platforms. This was the moment
in which modularity could unfold. In both sectors this conscious
realization of modularity happened in historically contingent ways. In
the telecommunications industry it was the result of a public policy
decision whereby AT&T was urged by agencies to allow the
attachment of foreign devices to the network. Whereas in the
computer industry, it evolved from supplying integrated proprietary
systems to a modular industry open to specialization and entry at
different layers due to a management decision rewarded by the
selection mechanism of the market.9
will be an application or peripheral", but that in addition to this vertical
compatibility of complementary products there is also a dimension of horizontal
compatibility of "rival information platforms". See also Weiser, Law and Information
Platforms, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIG TECH. L. 1, 3 (2002).
8 Dana R. Wagner, The Keepers of the Gates: Intellectual Property,
Antitrust, and the Regulatory Implications of Systems Technology, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1073,
1081 (2000), uses this term specifically to denote technology that defines and governs
the computing environments within which people operate; it comprises both the
hardware (e.g., bus design or input/output interfaces) and the software (operating
systems, browsers) that define the parameters of the computing environment - the
"meta-technology" that frames the system.
9 On the transformation of the computer industry, see Joseph Farrell
& Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a
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Due to this modularization, function can now be placed freely
within the system. Consequently, each layer of functionality is
potentially open to new entrants which specialize in further developing
the components of the system. A more rapid improvement of these
parts is possible because innovation is now vested in many hands and
in a variety of layers.
But the danger in modularized systems - in the ones discussed
here but also in general - is that the control of one layer of the system is
leveraged onto an adjacent layer; that control of the infrastructure is
extended to the superstructure. This is highlighted by the fact that the
architecture of a platform is a decisive parameter for the possibilities of
an "application".
This danger of "leveraging" is directly addressed by antitrust
law. Therefore, antitrust is of special importance in modularized or
layered complex systems. This makes sense as antitrust operates with
the general or default assumption that the market is best in
coordinating decentralized and dispersed knowledge and that
intervention is necessary only when the very conditions for the
operation of the market itself are distorted by too much power, i.e.
control, in the hands of single players. The law provides a kind of
assistance to the evolutionary process by permitting each layer to
autonomously explore the range of its possibilities and its own mix of
openness and closure. This assistance is kept to a minimum because
the standard for triggering antitrust intervention is quite high. It will
only intervene when it is necessary; but then it should do so without
compromise.
The way antitrust intervenes is by enforcing access to platform
networks. Access, as construed in this paper, is a functional principle.
Its means differ according to the goals. In communication networks,
access means granting third parties the right to interconnect with and
to transmit through the given network. In virtual networks, access
means granting third parties the right to interoperate, that is to have as
much information about the standard platform as is necessary to build
a compatible product.
The actual justification for mandating access is the same in both
types of networks and lies in the essential dependence of the
superstructure on the infrastructure. This becomes a problem when
inter-platform competition is not working properly. In physical
communication networks this is often the initial situation, because
there are natural monopolies in the distribution infrastructure whose
replication would make no sense. In virtual networks, the need for
access occurs after the shift from inter-platform competition to intra-
platform competition (e.g., because of the emergence of a dominant
OTTOLIA & WIELSCH
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standard), and when the holder of this standard is not behaving in
accordance with the duties adhering to its monopoly position. 1
B. GOVERNANCE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES: ACCESS
As indicated, when we look at networks in the context of
modularized systems we are shifting the focus to the specific
interdependencies a given network has with the other modules or
layers of the system. Certainly, this involves considering the function
each module has within the operational design of the system (e.g. as a
platform for running higher applications). On the other hand, it would
be a shortcoming to conceive of these layers only as operative parts of
an individual system. The concrete technological device is the result of
the complex interaction of social processes. It depends on the
competitive structure of the industry and on successful R&D activity
which in turn depends on the parameters of the innovation
environment. Hence, when we look at the different layers of the
system we ask how the circumstances in one layer can affect the
evolution of another layer - with "layer" understood as a subset of
societal processes. Each layer represents a field of possibilities for
technological innovation or communication.
If we want to assess the appropriate policy for governing
networks in such contexts, we may ask how the authority to use such
networks is affected when they operate as a resource other processes
rely on. Principally, this authority resides in the owner.11 But in cases
of property in information resources, some modifications may apply
because of its important social function.
Insofar as a proprietary resource is a resource for
communication, the rules applying to property are to be adapted to the
rules pertaining to information. The right to control the property is
itself subject to control. This is because such property is used for a
special function and this function embodies an important value for
both the individual and society as a whole, as acknowledged especially
by the Constitution.
10 To be clear about this, the IP right which protects the technology of
the standard does not confer a monopoly to its holder. He will often gain his position
as a monopolist because and when his standard becomes dominant.
11 See ARMEN ALCHIAN, Some Economics of Property Rights, in
ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 130 (1977) (defining the creation of property rights as
a method of assigning to particular individuals the "authority" to select, for specific
goods, any use from a nonprohibited class of uses).
2003-2004
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For example, as far as the property rights in communication
networks are concerned, there is a history of compromises between
those who control such networks and seek to profit from this control,
and those who want to communicate and seek access to these
networks.12  Unlike most economic sectors where marketplace
competition is the mechanism chosen to negotiate compromises,
communication policy is a sector where the State traditionally has not
trusted markets fully to settle such arrangements, for two main
reasons.
First, the particular economics of communication networks
entail risks of runaway control. Features such as network externalities
and increasing returns often reinforce the power of those who control a
network, driving toward natural monopoly. Unchecked, this can lead
to pricing abuses, arbitrary exclusion and censorship.13 Second, the
democratic state considers access to communication a fundamental
right, a prerequisite of thriving democratic society. Freedom of
communication is at the heart of political liberty, but political liberty is
not identical with economic liberty. The relation between these two
kinds of liberty in the democratic state has been the subject of an
ongoing discussion since the time of the French Revolution,14 and
12 Franqois Bar & Christian Sandvig, Rules from Truth: Post-Convergence
Policy for Access 4 (Sept. 2000), available at http://www-
rcfiisc.edu/-,fbar/Publications/Ruies_-- from Truth.pdf (defining "network control"
as the ability to determine network layout, architecture, configuration, applications,
price structure, and access conditions).
13 Id.
14 JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 408 (William
Rehg trans., 1996), for example, assumes an internal relation between private and
political autonomy. He explains this in terms of a community's self-organization by a
system of rights:
Under Postmetaphysical conditions, the only legitimate law is one
that emerges from the discursive opinion-and-will formation of
equally enfranchised citizens. The latter can in turn adequately
exercise their public autonomy, guaranteed by rights of
communication and participation, only insofar as their private
autonomy is guaranteed. A well-secured private autonomy helps
,secure the conditions' of public autonomy just as much as,
conversely, the appropriate exercise of public autonomy helps
'secure the conditions' of private autonomy .... This is because
legitimate law reproduces itself only in the forms of a
constitutionally regulated circulation of power, which should be
nourished by the communications of an unsubverted public sphere
rooted in the core private spheres of an undisturbed lifeworld via
the networks of civil society.
OTTOLIA & WIELSCH
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there are good arguments why modem democratic society should not
let economic logic entirely determine access to the public sphere.I"
Similarly, intellectual property - which is directly related to the
innovation process - is subject to peculiar impositions. This parallel is
not by chance. As the process of innovation relies heavily on
information and its production in the communicative process, the
former may indeed be seen as a part of latter. Be that as it. What
matters here, is that also in this case - viz. under the specific
perspective of progress - property, because of its specific function for
an important social process, is governed by special rules reflecting its
social function. This becomes particularly manifest in the "functional
idea of intellectual property" in the United States. 6 Here, intellectual
property rights are designed as state granted exclusive rights conferred
in order to produce present and future public benefit.17 For the purpose
of achieving these goals, the "limitations" on the right are regarded as
just as important as the grant of the right itself with the consequence
that "intellectual property is a particularly inappropriate area to talk
about property rights as if they were both natural and absolute."18 This
idea of "conditioning" property, early expressed by Jefferson,19 is
enshrined in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution.
Uncharacteristically for Article I, this clause devotes much of its text
not to granting power, but to delimiting it functionally, both directly
("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts") and indirectly
by a temporal limitation ("by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors"). 20 By doing so, the Exclusive Rights Clause operates
15 A classic text is JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), which strongly
insists on a robust, diverse public discourse, warning not only against distortion of
this sphere by governmental action but also against the dangers posed by dominating
social forces.
16 Boyle, supra note 3, at 106.
17 See Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (describing that Congress "has been assigned the task of
defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to
inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product," and
stressing that the rights under Article I § 8 "are neither unlimited nor primarily
designed to provide a special private benefit"); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 245 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (underlining that the "reward" granted by the
Constitution "is a means, not an end").
18 See Boyle, supra note 3, at 106.
19 "Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society
may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to
men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done,
according to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint
from anybody." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813)
(quoted in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8 (1966)), available at
htp: / /www. tempIe edu/iawschool/dPost/mcphersonc1terhimi.
20 The question of temporal limitation recently arose in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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as a first threshold filter on congressional attempts to create exclusive
private rights in information. It is complemented by the filter of the
First Amendment, which operates as a second level of scrutiny.21
As can be inferred from this short comparison, the realization
of the mentioned special social function of such property as is
important for communication and innovation depends heavily on a
guarantee of access to this property. "Open access" is a crucial element
of policy in both the regulation of information infrastructure and
intellectual property. Construed as a material principle, "access" can
crystallize in different forms like open standards or compatibility.
Questions of open standards and compatibility have become
increasingly important during recent years because of the growing
implementation of the idea of modularization in technology. This
design principle has various facets. Its most interesting feature may be
that it separates the functionality of an application from direct control
over the hardware necessary to perform the application.22 But the
maneuver of modularization can only work when the involved
elements are interoperable. Modularization requires as a corollary
principle interoperability. As a consequence, technology, or rather,
technological design principles, are partly embodied in and rely on a
material open access principle.
It seems worthwhile to note that technological design here
relies on implementations of the same principle - open access - as is
applied in the law in order to guarantee certain social functions of
property (communication, progress).
A functional analysis of property in information platforms
recommends a rigid implementation of an open access principle.
Access under this analysis is not an absolute standard with fixed
requirements. It depends not only on the type of information platform,
but also has to be shaped in accordance with the peculiar
circumstances of each case. Access can be granted to physical facilities
as well as intangible information, the timing of access may play a role,
and there may be restrictions on the number of those eligible for
access. Forming part of the broader functional analysis of property, the
access principle is also interpreted functionally. Take, for example, the
question of access to systems technology in high-tech industry. Here, a
company can be said to have access to a technology if it can
manufacture commercially viable products that incorporate or are
21 See Yochai Benkler, The Public Domain: Through the Looking Glass:
Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 173, 176-80 (2003).
22 It may be said that functionality is freed from physical limitations.
OTTOLIA & WIELSCH
12
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 6 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol6/iss1/3
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
compatible with that technology.23 Under a functional concept of
access the ways of achieving this goal of compatibility are not preset;
they must be construed with respect to the applicable access standard.
The determination of an appropriate standard in turn depends on the
type of platform (part of a communication or a virtual network?), and
also on the layer level of the platform in a modularized system, 24 to
mention just two factors.
C. ACCESS TO THE CABLE PLATFORM
FOR BROADBAND INTERNET
At present, we are experiencing the formation of a third
Internet generation. The first-generation Internet (late 1960s to early
1990s) consisted in a network prototype of interest to military and
research organizations, and the second generation (from the early
1990s) saw the mass adoption and commercialization of narrowband
access. Third-generation Internet offers always-on broadband access
from private homes.
As the race to win subscribers for broadband technologies has
just begun, there are two major competing technologies offering
consumers broadband access to the Internet: digital subscriber lines
(DSL) and cable modems. They use the two data pipes currently
connected to most homes. DSL uses copper telephone circuits to
transmit a high-bandwidth digital signal; cable modems uses the cable
television line.
Thus, the Internet is starting to expand beyond the traditional
telephone network into the cable network.2' This type of network had
not been part of former Internet generations. It retained a broadcast
model in which ownership of the physical network itself had been the
key to programming control and profits. As cable moves from
"broadcast" to "broadband", there is an important policy choice to be
made: should the open access requirements developed in the telecom
world for previous generation Internet be extended to the new cable
broadband access infrastructure, or can competition among third-
23 See Wagner, supra note 8, at 1091.
24 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-
Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1902 n. 40 (2002) (stating that there is a
reasonable argument for open platforms at the lower or infrastructure layers even if
the higher software and content layers are proprietary).
25 Admittedly, the case can also be restated: the cable industry
discovered the Internet as a new application. From an antitrust perspective this might
even be the crucial point because it indicates that a given industry, operating in a
given market, is expanding into a different area with its own market structure.
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generation access networks serve as a substitute for open access and
continue to sustain wide-ranging innovation we experienced in the
earlier generations of the Internet?26
1. THE POLICY FRAME
(a) PRESENT REGULATION AND
FUTURE OPTIONS
Currently, the regulation of the provision of broadband Internet
access service is asymmetric. Telephone companies are required to
provide access to competing DSL providers on an open access and
nondiscriminatory basis. Incumbent local exchange carriers (ILEC),
who own the most significant portion of the local telephone network,
face the obligation to offer competitors the use of their network on a
wholesale (or, "unbundled") basis so that they may offer, in the retail
market, DSL services that compete with the ILEC's own retail offering
to customers. In contrast, a cable television operator is not regulated in
its sale of cable modem service. Most importantly, there is no general
provision which would prevent cable companies from bundling cable
modem service with Internet service provider (ISP) service.27
This situation of asymmetric regulation does not appear to be
the outcome of a deliberately chosen policy, but rather the
consequence of new technology "growing" into traditional regulatory
regimes organized around the different types of communication
service. As is generally observed in the regulation of the media, certain
policy goals were embodied in specific, technologically-dependent
rules and once this initial policy regime was chosen it persisted.2" The
result is a significant path-dependency in media services regulatory
26 Francois Bar et al., The Open Access Principle: Cable Access as a Case
Study for the Next Generation Internet 2, in THE ECONOMICS OF QUALITY OF SERVICE
IN NETWORKED MARKETS (Lee W. Knight & John Wroclawski, eds.) (forthcoming),
available at http:/7/www-rcfiisc. edu/-fbar/Drafts/OpenAccess-MITPress pdf.
27 But note the conditions on which the FTC approved the merger
between Time Warner and AOL. See infra II.C. 1.c.
28 Bar & Sandvig, supra note 12, at 16. One example is the television
broadcast regime. Under Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), a
scarcity rationale justifies a regime of licensing and content regulation for broadcast
spectrum on the grounds that a property rights and free-market model are
unworkable. But due to technological change (media convergence) and privatization
of spectrum (spectrum is increasingly recognized as a property right that is auctioned
off to the highest bidder) this is no longer convincing. See Philip J. Weiser, Promoting
Informed Deliberation and a First Amendment Doctrine for a Digital Age: Toward a New
Regulatory Regime for Broadcast Regulation, in DELIBERATION, DEMOCRACY, AND THE
MEDIA 11-19 (Simone Chambers & Anne Costain eds., 2000).
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regimes. This separate media governance is called into question by the
current tendency towards media convergence, fueled by increasingly
pervasive digital technologies which allow networks to carry virtually
any type of information traffic.
The alternative to this asymmetry is either symmetric
regulation or symmetric freedom from regulation. The latter would
place trust in competition between cable companies themselves, and
between different platforms.29 In contrast, the argument for symmetric
regulation recommends imposing an open access regime on cable
similar to that for the telephone network.3 °
(b) CONCERNS
(1) The opponents of open access requirements argue that
market forces will bring cable operators to open their networks because
it is in their interest to maximize the amount and diversity of content
available to their subscribers.31 They claim that cable platforms for
broadband Internet are generating indirect externalities (consumers'
demand for hardware goods is positively influenced by the variety of
software goods that are compatible with the hardware) and in this
respect differ from telecommunications networks which generate direct
externalities. Most residential purchasers of broadband Internet access
would not buy a higher speed connection solely for the purpose of
sending and receiving information at higher speeds. Rather, such
access is merely a component of the overall package of goods
consumers are purchasing (Internet access, video on demand, news
services, etc.). In this sense, broadband Internet access and the related
information services are hardware and software goods respectively. As
"producers" of a hardware good, the cable companies have an
incentive not to restrict the market for information services or the
availability of those services to its subscribers even if it had a
monopoly in the provision of broadband access, for the consumer
would respond by anticipating possible "lock-in" situations and choose
a broadband access provider which makes a comparatively wider
29 James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile? A Critique of
Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. REG. 39 (2000); Weiser,
Networks Unplugged, supra note 7; see also Robert W. Crandall, Hal J. Singer & J.
Gregory Sidak, The Empirical Case Against Asymmetric Regulation of Broadband Internet
Access, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 953, 984 (2002) (arguing that there is no economic
justification for regulating the ILECs' broadband services and that the FCC should
forebear from further regulation).
30 See supra note 26; MARK COOPER, CABLE MERGERS AND
MONOPOLIES (2002); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925
(2001).
31 See Speta, supra note 29, at 82-88.
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variety of information services available than others - just as
consumers are more likely to buy the operating system compatible
with a wider variety of application programs.
Moreover, it is argued that cable modems face sufficient
competition from other facilities-based broadband platforms like
telephone lines (DSL), wireless, and satellite.32 So if the cable
companies do not permit a variety of ISPs, they will simply be driven
out of the market for broadband access by other companies that do. In
addition to the intra-platform competition between different cable
companies offering Internet access there would therefore be a
competition among different platforms, i.e. inter-platform
competition.33
Other objections highlight the fact that an open access regime
will require regulators to set a price for wholesale access because,
unlike other tying arrangements where the tied product is sold
separately at a market price, there is no market for the relevant
broadband transport.34 Finally, regulatory oversight of the pricing and
technical arrangements for accessing cable facilities would not only
generate significant costs of regulation35 but also impact the incentives
for, and the process of, innovation.36
(2) In contrast, proponents of open access regimes see no
justification for treating cable modems any differently than telephone
networks. They are mainly concerned about the danger of cable
companies leveraging their control over cable lines into control over
adjacent markets.
For example, one type of market that would be affected is the
market for ISPs. In this case cable companies could dictate the
consumer's choice among ISPs, and thereby eliminate competition
among ISPs in the broadband market. As a consequence, not only
would prices increase and innovation be stifled, but an important
architectural principle of the Internet, the "end-to-end" design, would
also be compromised.37
32 See CABLE SERVICES BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, BROADBAND TODAY 43 (1999), available at
http:/ /wAwv.fcc gov/B-.reaiis/Cablei/Reports/broadbandtoday.pd, Weiser,
Networks Unplugged, supra note 7, at 29.
33 A distinction between inter-system and intra-system competition is
made in the case of system products by Langlois, supra note 5, at 210. For a view of
the Internet as a giant systems product, see infra p. 32.
34 See Weiser, Networks Unplugged, supra note 7, at 30.
35 See Speta, supra note 29, at 85.
36 See Weiser, Networks Unplugged, supra note 7, at 30.
37 See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 30, at 928.
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The fear is that cable operators might move into the
communications and Internet services markets, bringing along their
anticompetitive business model that relies on closed and restricted
access to the consumer. Their claim that high-speed Internet access is
just a cable service is seen as an effort to keep their networks closed
and to operate them on a proprietary basis, thereby extending their
anticompetitive business model from their previous core market, the
video market, into the new "product space.) 38
The key to achieve this "leveraging" strategy of the cable
operators would be their power to control access facilities. They are
able to use "first mile" pipeline control in order to deny consumers
direct access to, and thus a real choice among, the content and services
offered by independent providers. The concerns over this advantage,
together with the assumed export of the proprietary business model,
fuel the assumption that vertically integrated broadband providers seek
to engage in conduit discrimination against alternative transmission
media as well as in content discrimination against alternative content
suppliers.
Content discrimination involves an integrated provider
insulating its own affiliated content from competition by blocking or
degrading the quality of outside content. By denying unaffiliated
content providers critical operation scale and insulating affiliated
content providers from competition, this type of discrimination would
benefit the cable provider by enhancing the position of its affiliated
providers. Thus, the vertically integrated content provider could earn
extra revenues from its own portal customers who would have fewer
opportunities to interact with competing outside content.39
Conduit discrimination would occur if the vertically integrated
company refused to distribute its affiliated content over competing
transmission media. By doing so, such a company drives consumers to
its own transmission media and weakens its rival. Concerns of this
kind became relevant in the AOL/Time Warner merger. The fear of
the telephone companies was that once AOL became a cable owner it
would abandon the DSL distribution channel. Such an action
following the switch of AOL to cable-based broadband had the
38 See Cooper, supra note 30, at 74.
39 See Cooper, supra note 30, at 80-81 (pointing to tactics that a
vertically integrated broadband provider could use to put competing, unaffiliated
content providers at a disadvantage). First, it can give preference to an affiliated
content provider by caching its content locally so that affiliated content can be
delivered at faster speed than unaffiliated content. Second, it can limit the duration of
streaming videos of broadcast quality to such an extent that they can never compete
against cable programming. Third, a vertically integrated firm as such can impose
proprietary standards that would render unaffiliated content useless.
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potential to undermine the hoped-for competition between cable
modems and DSL.4 °
Further concerns are raised by the consideration that cable
facility owners can build their leveraging strategies on a lock-in of
consumers. High speed-access to the Internet is a unique product. As
the Department of Justice determined, the broadband Internet market
is a separate and distinct market from the narrowband market.
Moreover, there are significant switching costs in competing high-
speed Internet access platforms.41 Once a consumer has decided for
one, he is unlikely to switch the supplier. This constitutes a substantial
barrier to competition.
In sum, the concern on the side of the open access proponents
is that the cable network's owners have the ability and incentive "to
leverage network ownership into market power over network uses. ,42
They are worried that a resurrection of the "old economy" model of
facilities-based competition will take place in which the decision about
which content gets to the public is left to the cable operator-ISP
relationships that are developing in the marketplace. To allow cable
facilities owners to use their market power to squeeze out unaffiliated
ISPs is tantamount to giving up the model hitherto operating the
Internet, namely to profit from competition among thousands of ISPs
competing for customers. 43 This would not just reduce consumer
choice, as the danger of discrimination implies. It would, and this is
the more basic argument, return to a logic of communications
platforms in which it is assumed that the center of value creation
resides in the physical layer.
In the terms of this paper, the physical layer would be
determinant of the architecture of higher layers (in case of the Internet,
the code and content layer). The progress attached to modularization
would be in danger of being reversed. The "freed" higher application
layers would "freeze" again and become subject to control by the
owner of the lower, physical layer. This would be no mere
40 The FTC therefore required AOL to continue to make its service
available over the DSL conduit. See Cooper, supra note 30, at 82-83.
41 See supra note 26, at 9. Different requirements for inside wiring,
different terminal equipment, non-refundable connection charges, different computer
set-ups are among the factors of the hardware cost of switching between cable and
DSL.
42 See supra note 26, at 2.
43 This is indeed what the cable industry deems to be an outmoded
model because "an environment preserving thousands of small ISPs may be
unnecessary to ensure responsive consumer service, technological advancements,
and innovative content." Cooper, supra note 30, at 76 (citation omitted).
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technological backlash, but also would undermine the values allegedly
embedded in technological architectures.
(c) THE AOL/TIME WARNER MERGER
An interesting case study is the merger between AOL and Time
Warner, because it involved a vertical combination of the largest
Internet content provider and aggregator with one of the largest cable
systems operators. One of the main concerns was that the merged firm
might utilize its market power in one market to foreclose competition
in vertically related markets. Antitrust analysis applying econometric
methods suggested that, absent suitable remedies, the merger would
create strong incentives for the merged firm, AOL-TimeWarner, to
discriminate against both unaffiliated conduits and other content
providers.44
The consent decree finally ordered by the FTC consisted of
three main access provisions: First, AOL was required to provide
Earthlink45 effective access over Time Warner cables before AOL itself
could begin offering its service in major markets.46 In addition, it
required that, within ninety days of AOL's service debut on Time
Warner lines, two other ISPs must be given effective access within
major urban areas.47 Second, applying a "most favored nation" clause,
Time Warner was forbidden from striking a deal with another Internet
provider with less favorable rates and terms than those in the Earthlink
agreement, or any other accord that AOL negotiated to carry its
content on other cable systems. 4' Third, the agreement adopted
measures to ensure that the merged firm would not favor its cable
Internet access service over its service for DSL subscribers. 49 To assure
compliance with these regulations, the FTC appointed a "monitor
trustee" who would continously monitor AOL-Time Warner's
performance and report to the FTC. In sum, the FTC has taken on the
job of regulating the merged firm's open access going forward.
44 See Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Hal J. Singer, Open Access to Broadband
Networks: A Case Study of the AOL-Time Warner Merger, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 631
(2001).
45 Earthlink is the second-largest ISP in the United States after AOL
and it had signed a contract with Time Warner prior to the FTC approval of the
merger.
46 See Federal Trade Commission, Consent Agreement, In re America
Online Inc. and Time Warner Inc., 65 Fed. Reg. 79861, II.A.1 (Dec. 20, 2000), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/ os/2000/12/aoldando.pdf.
47 Id. at II.A.2.
48 Id. at I.C. 1.
49 Id. at IV.A.
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This remedy addressed some of the previously mentioned
concerns. The first and second provisions eased the worries of antitrust
scholars about content discrimination. Even if the merged company
elects to block all outside content, unaffiliated portals and content
providers can still reach cable customers through a competing ISP.
Thus, customers seeking access to foreclosed content will not have to
switch to another transport conduit with a lower rate of market
penetration.50 Scholars were optimistic that the third provision would
hinder conduit discrimination by the combined firm. Even if the
combined company elects to distribute its service only through cable
modems, competing, unintegrated portals can still take advantage of
cable's dominant position in the broadband transport market, leaving
competing conduit providers with enough content to justify continued
investment.51
Nevertheless, the consent decree did not convince all of the
access advocates. Access proponents with a broader vision than
antitrust scholars pointed to the fact that the FTC had created a kind of
"limited access" regime which falls short of the "open access" model
of the telephone network. These critics regard the adopted measures
merely as a policy experiment which may or may not work out with
respect to the innovation dynamics this limited approach sets up for
the third generation Internet.5 2 The task, then, is to "watch the
watchmen," and monitor the policy experiment of the regulatory
agency itself. Two shortcomings of the decree could provide guidance
for this second-level monitoring: 53
First, the decree still limits the number of ISPs likely to operate
on the Time Warner network and entrusts the cable owner with the
selection of the few ISPs that will be allowed alongside AOL. Hence,
AOL can favor ISPs that share its vision for the architecture of the
third generation Internet, and it can avoid ISPs whose strategy directly
challenge its own. In contrast, incumbent telecommunications
companies are explicitly denied such discretion as to who gets access
to their networks.
Second, the "limited access" policy regime assumes that ISPs
constitute an adequate proxy for other network users and will explore
the full range of possible network applications. Again with regard to
the situation in the telephone network this seems far from obvious.
There, open access does not simply mean that non-affiliated ISPs can
get access on equal terms with the telecom-affiliated ISP, but that any
50 See supra note 44, at 674.
51 See supra note 44, at 675.
52 See supra note 26, at 3, 21.
53 See supra note 26, at 22.
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network user can get access to unbundled network elements, thus
creating conditions for much broader exploration of network uses.
What was achieved then in the course of the AOL/Time
Warner merger was the drafting of an access policy limited to dealing
with the possible adverse effects on competition in the markets for
Internet service provision and limited to the partners in this particular
merger. No parallel conditions exist for other cable networks (e.g.,
AT&T's). Nor will every open access issue result in a merger review.
There was no comprehensive approach created for resolving the
current collision of two policy legacies: cable's monopoly and
restricted access origins, and the open access thrust of
telecommunication policy that ushered in user-driven innovation and
the Internet revolution.5 4 In particular, the more generic problem that a
closed architecture of the lower layer cable broadband could also
restrict the architectures on higher layers and their "network
performance features" such as "end-to-end," which are deemed to be
vital to innovation and other social values, was left unaddressed. It is
on these values which are allegedly embedded in technology that a
functional analysis of property in information platforms has to turn.
2. A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
As explained above, the control of property depends on its
function. A cable network can perform different functions. It can be
operated as a device to distribute multi-channel video programs. It can
also be used for advanced telecommunications, supplying broadband
cable modem service.55
According to the assumptions stated at the outset of this paper
the new use to which the cable grid is being put - namely to operate as
a (physical) platform for the Internet as a modularized or layered
network - requires a review of the rules for property rights in cable
facilities. The changed function of the property - from a one-way
passive carrier of video signals to a platform for a modularized
communication medium - might make necessary new rules of
governance. In order to assess the platform function of the cable
facilities the characteristics of the structure of the Internet cannot be
left unattended.
54 Id. at 23.
55 In fact, cable companies use the same technology to provide both
video and telecommunications services. The upgrades necessary to provide the
current generation of digital video service also make possible the provision of high-
speed Internet service, and cable companies have bundled the two services together.
See Cooper, supra note 30, at 1.
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The Internet is a system of communication between
autonomous individuals. It represents "a unique and wholly new
medium of worldwide human communication," as the Supreme Court
found in Reno v. ACLU,56 or, in the words of another court, a "never-
ending worldwide conversation."57
While resting on a platform, at the same time the Internet itself
is a platform for dynamic markets and a huge number of innovations.
Through the peer-to-peer exchange of information it enabled at the
same time a vast cultural production and new ways of democratic
participation. It enabled the end points to become "users" who can
play the roles of consumer and producer - as opposed to the traditional
conception of an information environment composed of a small
number of professional producers and a large number of passive
consumers. The acts of reception of these users are dialogic in the
sense that they can easily be mapped as moves in a conversation rather
than as endpoints for the delivery of a product.5"
Thus, the Internet is a communication medium of both great
economic and social value. It has opened a forum for human activity
in an extensive sense, allowing for interaction in terms of both
instrumentalistic and discoursive logic.
(a) THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE INTERNET
Technologically, the Internet is construed as a network of
networks.59 This super-network has a certain historical structure. It has
been argued that it is precisely this contingent architecture which
enables the great innovations related to the Internet and which lies at
the basis of its great economic importance.6 °
The peculiar mode of interaction enabled by the Internet rests
on a special design of the communication infrastructure. This
architecture in turn can be viewed as the realization of two principles:
network modularization and end-to-end design.
56 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).
57 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
58 See Yochai Benkler, VIACOM-CBS Merger. From Consumers to Users,
52 FED. Comm. L.J. 561, 564 (2000).
59 See Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado: The Internet and
Telecommunications Policy, 29 OPP Working Paper Series 10-12, 17 (1997), available at
http://w-ww.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPPi/wo.kng papers/oppwp29.pdf.
60 This is one of the central arguments in LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE
FUTURE OF IDEAS (2001).
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i. NETWORK MODULARIZATION
To describe the structure of the Internet it is helpful to use a
model that distinguishes several vertical layers.61
Various layered models have been proposed, each suited to the
purposes of a particular description (engineering, regulating). The
Open System Interconnect (OSI) model, developed in the 1980s by the
International Standards Organization, is used by network developers
and defines seven layers based on functionality.6 2 However, discussing
the policy for the Internet as a communications system, a three-layered
model seems to be sufficient.63 First, there is the physical layer: the
computers, wires, cable, spectrum, or other real world media that
actually carry data. Second, there is the logical or code layer. The code
runs the hardware and enables content to move along the wires (like
the TCP/IP protocols; the software upon which those protocols run;
the domain name system (DNS)). Third, at the top there is the content
layer: the data actually transmitted through the network.
This three layered model can be applied to other
communications systems besides the Internet, but before digital
networks came up there was no reason to do SO. 6 4 In earlier networks,
the management and routing functions that enable information flow
were "hard-wired" in the specific arrangement of electro-mechanical
devices that formed a particular communication network. The logical
architecture of the network precisely reflected its physical architecture.
One had to own the network to change the arrangement.
61 Traditionally, communication policy has been organized around
horizontal divisions between categories of service (wireline voice telephony, radio,
television) and between geographic regions (interstate, intrastate). See Kevin
Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37,
39 (2002).
62 See Martin P. Clark, NETWORKS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
DESIGN AND OPERATION, 194-199 (2d ed. 1997).
63 See Benkler, supra note 58, at 562; Yochai Benkler, Property,
Commons, and the First Amendment.- Towards a Core Common Infrastructure, 50-82 (White
Paper for the Brennan Center for Justice, 2001), at
http://'wwvwvlawnyucdu/benklery/Wh!tePaper.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2004);
Lessig, supra note 60, at 23; Werbach, supra note 61, at 57-64 (distinguishing four
layers by adding an applications layer); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REALIZING
THE INFORMATION FUTURE: THE INTERNET AND BEYOND 47-65 (1994)
(demonstrating that the Council also uses a four layered model).
64 Whether it makes sense to do this depends as mentioned on the
type of discourse and on the type of the network examined. It is not to decide here
whether "these three layers function together to define any particular
communications system." See supra note 60, at 23.
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The Internet, on the other hand, is a modularized network.
Here, the platform configuration depends on the ability to program the
network's control software. Control over network configuration thus
becomes in principle separable from network ownership. Multiple
network platforms (supporting a variety of communication patterns)
can simultaneously co-exist on a single physical infrastructure.65 In
modularized systems the logical layer therefore becomes the key. This
is where network configuration is defined, where interconnection
between separate physical networks is made possible or prevented, and
where co-existence of various service providers ("open access") is
permitted or denied.66
The same technique is common in many areas of technological
development. What was once a single piece of technology ("the
computer") becomes an assemblage of different functional parts. For
example, the operating system freed the application programmer from
the task of directly controlling hardware. The whole gambit looks like
another draw in the thriving process of differentiation. As once the
division of labor led to great progress (and enormously enhanced
productivity) by first splitting up the production process of single goods
and then recombining the different elements faster and in a more
sophisticated way, so too is modularization enabling the development
of more complicated systems.
ii. END-TO-END (E2E)
This new found separability between a network's logical
architecture and its physical layout has an important consequence.
Now the placement of function within a network is not determined
anymore. In a modularized network the technically correct level
within the network to locate certain functionality can be argued about.
Exactly this discussion took place among system engineers in
the 1980s. In a now-classic paper in network engineering, Saltzer,
Reed, and Clark elaborated a design principle for computer systems
called the "end-to-end principle".67 Although the principle was known
before, appearing along with the development of packet switching, the
authors recognized that the emergence of the data communication
network as a computer system component had sharpened this line of
function placement argument. The principle basically states that
65 See supra note 26, at 22.
66 See supra note 26, at 21-22.
67 See Jerome H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design,
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moving the functions and services upward in a layered design, closer
to the applications that use them, increases the flexibility and
autonomy of an applications designer. Conversely, the lower layer of a
system should support the widest possible variety of services and
functions, so as to permit applications that cannot be anticipated.6" In
other words, the "intelligence" in a network should be located at the
top - at its "ends", where users put information and applications onto
the network. The "pipes" through which information flows, the
communication protocols themselves, should be as simple and as
general as possible.69
Like other design principles, end-to-end arguments do not solve
a specific design problem. Instead they impose a structure on the
design space. The structure imposed by the e2e principle incorporates
two complementary goals: (1) Higher-level layers, more specific to an
application, are free to, and thus expected to, organize lower level
network resources to achieve application-specific design goals
efficiently (application autonomy). (2) Lower-level layers, which
support many independent applications, should provide only resources
of broad utility across applications, while providing to applications
usable means for effective sharing of resources and resolution of
resource conflicts (network transparency).70
(b) ARCHITECTURE AND VALUES
It might be that the e2e principle was first adopted mainly for
technical reasons, but the imposition of this certain structure on the
network has important social and competitive consequences.
i. COMPETITION
End-to-end expands the competitive horizon, by maximizing
the number of entities that can compete for the use and applications of
the network. As there is no single strategic actor who can tilt the
competitive environment (the network) in favor of itself, and no
hierarchical entity that can favor some applications over others, an
end-to-end network creates a maximally competitive environment for
68 Programmability in a lower layer can be seen as a means to defer
design choices upwards in the layering, closer to the application, and later in time.
See Reed et al., Active Networking and End-to-End Arguments, available at
htip: //web. mit.edui/Saitzerlwww/pubiicat ions /endtoend/Anc2ccomrnment.htrni.
69 See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 30, at 930-31.
70 See Reed et al., supra note 68.
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innovation, which by design assures competitors that they will not
confront strategic network behavior.71
Thus, the implementation of e2e enforces a kind of competitive
neutrality. The network does not discriminate against new applications
or content because it is incapable of doing so.72 An e2e architecture
promotes a type of competitive process and innovation that exhibits
the fundamental characteristics of audacious or atomistic competition.
And precisely this market structure is preferable when it comes to
innovation, as is argued by some in the debate about the relation
between market structure and innovation. According to these voices,
innovativeness is higher in competitive markets than in those with
monopolistic structure.73
This allows for a general proposition about the competitive
environment of systems products. Because of the complexity that
systems products normally exhibit, and because of the qualitative
uncertainty inherent in the process of innovation, multiple approaches
and numerous participants provide greater genetic variety than would
a simple innovator (or a small number of innovators), which leads to
more rapid trial-and-error learning.74 When the Internet is read as a
kind of giant systems product because of the above-mentioned
modularized structure, it becomes clear that the two design principles -
network modularization and e2e pattern - reinforce each other's
competitive tendencies. The first principle, by layering the network,
multiplies the breeding grounds for innovation vertically, and the
second multiplies them horizontally.
ii. CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION
Shifting function and "intelligence" to the ends of the network
and keeping the network simple and "insensitive" to the distributed
data has not only an anti-discriminative effect among inventors, but
also among speakers. When there is a lack of intelligence inside the
network, it is hard to discriminate among speakers and different types
71 See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 30, at 930-31.
72 See Lawrence Lessig, Innovation, Regulation, and the Internet, 11-10
THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (2000), available at htip: //www~prospect.org/print-
friendiy /print/V11 / 1 0/iessig-l.html.
73 This has been demonstrated by Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare
and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609-25 (Richard Nelson
ed., 1962); see also F. M. Scherer & David R. Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) (providing some cross-sectional
tests of this proposition).
74 See supra note 5, at 207.
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of speech. The e2e principle promotes the autonomy of the endpoint
by keeping out potential interference from intermediaries. Architecture
thus becomes a protector of free speech. As has been stated for the
larger context of the Internet's overall architecture (relative anonymity,
multiple points of access, no necessary tie to geography, no simple
system to identify content, tools of encryption), of which the e2e is a
significant part: "the architecture of cyberspace is the real protector of
speech there; it is the real 'First Amendment in cyberspace', and this
First Amendment is no local ordinance."75 An implementation of the
e2e principle appears therefore as a powerful catalyst for the exchange
of uncensored speech among autonomous persons - a goal supported
by both of the two main, and often conflicting, traditions of
justification for the protection of free speech, the "self-realization" and
"self-government" theories.76
To take this way of thinking one step further: Given its idea of
minimizing the influence and power of intermediaries, the e2e
principle reflects nothing less than a whole governance structure of the
kind envisioned by populist forms of democracy. In fact, it was a kind
of ide directrice among thinkers of the French Revolution to postulate
the social ideal of an intermediary-free interaction among atomized
individuals: "il n'y a que l'tat et l'individu". The goal was to establish a
direct and unfettered discourse among the citizens, uncorrupted by any
power of intermeddling social entities that could distort the chain of
legitimacy leading from the individual to the government.
Given this concept of society, the proper exercise of economic
liberty is not in tension with political liberty but instead supports it.
The economic characteristics of atomistically competitive markets
converge with democratic principles. By dispersing and decentralizing
private power, the atomistic competition limits this power and its
potential to influence the political process; it promotes a level playing
field for all voices to be heard in the process of democratic discourse.
Moreover, low barriers of entry in atomistically competitive markets
provide for the realization of autonomy and freedom of entry.77 There
is indeed an area of overlap between the significance of e2e for the
furtherance of democracy and autonomy, as the dissipation of power
75 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 166-
67 (1999).
76 For a concise account of these theories of the First Amendment, see
Daniel A. Farber, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-6 (2d ed., 2003).
77 See Scherer & Ross, supra note 73, at 18 (explaining that when the
no-barriers-to-entry condition of perfect competition is satisfied, individuals are free
to choose whatever trade or profession they prefer, limited only by their own talent
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reduces at the same time the possibilities of external control on the
individual.
The implementation of the e2e principle in the information
environment does not promote autonomy not just in a way that it
provides for the absence of impositions on it. In addition to this aspect,
which rests on the traditional liberal concept of "negative freedom"
from whatever constraints, e2e also promotes sustainable models of
self-governance. This becomes especially visible in the emergence of
peer-production which represents a change in the menu of options for
being productive in the information economy. In an economy where
corporate organizations control the production process, and the
market distributes these products, consumption is strictly separated
from production. Compared to that it, is an economic - and ultimately
a social - transformation when individuals organize themselves in
productive networks and communicate with one another about which
projects are worth pursuing and who might want to take them up.7" In
"peer production" thousands of individuals can collaborate on
complex projects relying on a low-cost continuous information
exchange which replaces the price signals and hierarchical commands
as the primary mechanism of cooperation and coordination.79 Given
the additional precondition of low-barrier access to existing
information, which is the raw material from which new information
goods are made, the individuals can creatively utilize materials to
shape their own information environment"° so that consumption and
production are integrated. A substantial part of this process is the
development of community standards and mutual monitoring, because
common efforts that lack such mechanisms for self-ordering will fail as
productive enterprises and as structures for organizing social life. 1 By
providing the appropriate institutional design the law could support
such self-ordering of distributed peer-production communities.
iii. CRITIQUE
78 See Benkler, supra note 21, at 190.
79 See Yochai Benkler, The Battle over the Institutional Ecosystem in the
Digital Environment, 44-2 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 84, 88 (2001).
80 One way to keep barriers low exists when users "share their
products in an economy of gifts, reputation, and relationally-based rewards."
Benkler, supra note 21, at 190. Such an approach would depend only on a consensus
among the participating users, supported by legal means such as "creative licensing."
However, the development of such a peer model of production into a viable
alternative to the old models of production would require that large-scale commercial
producers are not allowed to enclose much of the universe of useful information
inputs with the help of law and technology.
81 See Benkler, supra note 79, at 90.
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The value of the e2e principle is not beyond doubt. One might
also argue about the extent to which it is actually implemented and is
shaping the structure of the Internet today.
As far as the promotion of atomistic competition is concerned,
there is a long debate among economists whether it is indeed
competition that spurs innovation or, rather, monopoly structure. A
line of thought going back to Schumpeter12 argues that since
developing innovations is costly, the most innovative firms should
have a large stream of resources for R&D. Further, since the incentive
to innovate is greatest when there is little threat of imitation, the most
innovative firms should have few competitors. Finally, successful
innovation may itself lead to market power and excessive, i.e. supra-
competitive, profits. This implies three hypotheses: large firms are
more innovative than small firms, monopolistic industries are more
innovative than competitive ones, and firms will be more innovative
when they anticipate that they will be allowed to exploit the market
power created by their innovation. 3
Insofar as an implemented e2e principle may promote a society
of atomistic speakers, this might happen at the expense of social
competence, social responsibility and civic virtues. The concern is
about a kind of "overindividualized" society whose members'
preferences are served by "perfected" markets, for example, markets
for news, entertainment and information in which the individual will
receive information only on topics and views that he has sought rather
than reached out to discover. "Atomizing technology" may have a
transformational effect on two features deemed critical to a democracy
and a well-functioning system of free expression: the unplanned,
unanticipated exposure to material by citizens, and also common
experience within a society.14 Skeptics predict that the common public
places will become deserted and the resources of social cooperation
and solidarity will run dry. They are afraid that the public will be
82 See Joseph A. Schumpeter, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 87-106 (1942) (concluding that: "it is not sufficient to argue that
because perfect competition is impossible under modern industrial conditions or
because it always has been impossible the large-scale establishment or unit of
control must be accepted as a necessary evil inseparable from the economic progress
which it is prevented from sabotaging by the forces inherent in its productive
apparatus. What we have got to accept is that it has come to be the most powerful
engine of that progress and in particular of the long-run expansion of total output not
only in spite of, but to a considerable extent through, this strategy which looks so
restrictive when viewed in the individual case and from the individual point of time.
In this respect, perfect competition is not only impossible but inferior").
83 See Ellig & Lin, A Taxonomy of Dynamic Competition Theories, in
DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND PUBLIC POLICY 16, 19 (Ellig ed., 2001).
84 This is the concern discussed by Cass R. Sunstein, REPUBLIC.COM
(2001), reviewed by Stefan Bechtold, 3 EUR. BUS. ORG. L.R. 237 (2002).
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obliterated and the formation of cultural identity will be abandoned
since culture can only survive in an inhabited social space. This strand
of criticism argues that in the framework of modem western society,
individual and collective identity building was always a cooperation
between individualist and universalist 5 values on the one side and, on
the other side, local values as expressions of the fact that citizens are
socially embedded, historically determined and culturally formed.
Otherwise, it is argued, the political community would not have been
able to hold its standards and to reproduce itself on the normative level
which it has created for itself. 6
Finally, regarding the e2e principle's embodiment of the idea of
intermediary-free interaction, it has to be remembered that the Internet
always had intermediaries. Therefore some critics got the impression
that e2e proponents are just happiest with the intermediaries they
know (e.g. service providers - initially universities) and that they are
using the end-to-end argument as a way to stop new intermediaries; 7
that they oppose a respective change in the architecture of the higher
layers by arguing that such change would be technically incorrect.
Whoever would be able to define the historically "true" Internet would
be able to trump opposing ideas by referring to "objective correctness":
"those that can define the past get to define the future."8 8
This critique brings up an important aspect of the open access
debate: the normative status of technical principles. To apply technical
arguments as a proxy for normative arguments would indeed be very
problematic, but not all e2e proponents step into this normative trap.
They are well aware of the need to make deliberate choices.
Lessig's argument, for instance, runs like this: 9 (a) technical
codes/architectures can embed fundamental, sometimes even
85 The foundations of the organizational models, which the normative
individualism is arguing for, are universalist: capitalist economy, rule of law and
democracy are with respect to their legitimacy rooted in human rights
egalitarianism.
86 See Wolfgang Kersting, Global Networks and Local Values, in
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL NETWORKS ON LOCAL SOCIAL,
POLITICAL AND CULTURAL VALUES 9, 23 (Christoph Engel & Kenneth H. Keller
eds., 2000).
87 Christian Sandvig, Communication Infrastructure and Innovation: The
Internet as End-to-End Network that Isn't (forthcoming) (manuscript at 23), available at
http: //'wvvvspconn uiuc edu/iisers/csandv!g/research/Comrunicat on Infrastru
cture --andInhovation pdf.
88 Id. at 24-25.
89 See Lessig, supra note 75, at 59 (describing politics as the process of
deciding among values). For a concise account of Lessig's argument, see David G.
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"constitutional," values; (b) to choose among these technological
designs is, therefore, to make important choices among different
values; and (c) this choice among values is to be made by collective
decision-making - which means by politics, and not by markets.
This argument transforms the question of choices about
technology design into one of the appropriate selection mechanism.
Whereas the first two steps of this reasoning are widely shared, "net
liberals" quarrel with the notion that the choices to be made among
value-laden architectures are therefore political decisions that should
necessarily be subject to "collective" decision-making. These choices
should instead be made by the individuals. David Post, for instance,
underlines this by drawing on the similar function of the codes of the
new digital architectures (both the network protocols and the new truly
linguistic constructs like Java, HTML, C++) and human languages as
means by and within which we construct social reality and which
embed values throughout. Both semantic/syntactic structures and
technical architectures should not be subject to the collective for
decision making but rather evolve by an aggregated series of individual
and sub-group decisions.90  However, this "aggregation" or
coordination of dispersed individual wills is mainly mediated by the
market mechanism.
(C) CONCLUSION
The question of whether or not to impose an open access
regime on broadband cable modem service has to be answered by
considering the function the cable network is put into when used to
provide access to the Internet. At that moment it operates as the lowest
physical layer of a modularized communication medium. It becomes
part of a bigger architecture which embodies certain social values.91
This architecture is contingent. First, it is the product of
modularization which made it possible to decouple the identity of
physical structure and function. Second, it is the outcome of locating
function at the "ends" of the network. Third, free interaction among
these ends was unleashed by an open standard of interconnection
protocols (at the code layer) which enabled access regardless of the
specifics of the machines used at the ends.
90 See supra note 75, at 1456-58.
91 Note the functional character in Lessig's analysis: "[I]f cable wants
to carry TCP/IP, then the values of the Internet should trump the control of cable.
Any major network that wants to piggyback on the Internet's success should
piggyback with the values of the Internet kept in mind." Lessig, supra note 60, at 248.
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The realization of the first two factors seems to have taken
place after a rigorous open access policy was imposed on the telephone
network - beginning with the break-up of AT&T in 1984 and
culminating with the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Prior to these
regulatory steps, the owner of the telephone lines controlled the
network. Use of the network in ways not specified by and authorized
by AT&T was forbidden. For example, it was unlawful to attach
devices that performed services not offered by AT&T or to provide
services that competed with the services provided by AT&T.92 Under
the imposed open access regime the network owners are no longer
allowed to discriminate against other uses of their telephone lines. 93
The result was the evolution of a hyper-network whose architecture was
not determined by the owner of the real network it is based on. To be
clear, the claim is not that this was the only cause for the appearance
of the Internet. For instance, the mentioned establishment of an open
code was another very important factor. But removing control from
ownership opened the possibility of building network architectures on
top of physical facilities unrestrained by the will of the owner of these
facilities.
Interestingly, the architecture that actually evolved, end-to-end,
cannot - by technical means - discriminate among different uses of the
hyper-network. What happened was that the forced break-up of a
"bottleneck" facility94  (lower platform) led to a competitive
architecture on higher platforms.
Thus, two steps can be identified retrospectively: First,
regulation created the possibility of unrestrained, or at least much less
restrained, network design. Second, experimentation with an end-to-
end architecture in a hyper-network, an experimentation that again
92 See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 30, at 933 (referring to In re Use of
the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968), and Hush-A-
Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956)).
93 See Lessig, supra note 72 (stating that had it not been for the open-
access rules that the government imposed upon telephones, the telephone companies
would most likely have behaved just as every network owner in history has behaved
to control access and use architecture to minimize competition).
94 Some commentators read the implementation of open access in
telecommunication indeed as a consequent application of the antitrust doctrine of
"essential facility" which says that essential facilities that could not feasibly be
duplicated must be shared among rivals. See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Access k Access] +
Access2, 2002 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 677, 678 (stating that United States v. AT&T,
552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), was based entirely on the concept that the
telephone local access line (the local loop) was a bottleneck facility).
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was backed by considerable state action9", led to a result of high social
value.
Regulation could try to stabilize this evolutionary state by
preserving the principles that distinguish the Internet from earlier, less
successful networks. How much innovation was due to the
implementation of the e2e principle is as unknown to us as whether
the Internet would have grown as it did without e2e. But having
tripped onto "this environment of extraordinary innovation", it is
argued, we should be cautious before we allow it to be changed. The
burden should be on those who would compromise those principles in
which the Internet differs from former networks.96
Under conditions of uncertainty a cautious policy of
transitional stabilization of evolutionary gains seems reasonable.
Bearing in mind that there are always alternative policy options for
designing the network, the regulatory imperative might be to minimize
the power of intermediaries. Interaction among (atomized) individuals
would be normatively advanced as a certain network logic. The idea is
to stabilize a new design with some - not yet fully explored - merits so
that it is not reversed into an old design which, we know, had less
potential.
Building a certain network architecture is one thing, but it is
another thing to create the possibilities for building network
architectures. Here, it is not about fostering a kind of artificial stasis in
the process of network evolution, but about establishing the conditions
for network evolution to take place, whether it is more influenced by
collective decisions (Lessig) or individual ones (D. Post).
The evolutionary gain at stake in the debate about cable
regulation is greater because it is one of second degree. The enforced
"freeing" of function enabled the construction of "higher" platforms -
whatever values these platforms might embody. This was achieved by
reallocating the access and interconnection property right away from
the facility owner to third parties. The telephone line owners were
deprived of the power to control network design. As long as cable
facilities are bottleneck resources for broadband Internet access (like
telephone lines were bottleneck resources for narrowband
applications), there is no reason not to pursue a parallel policy. As of
today the market share of cable in Internet broadband access amounts
to approximately 70%. In the future broadband technology might
95 For the government's role in developing the Internet, see Edward L.
Rubin, Computer Languages As Networks and Power Structures: Governing the Development
ofXML, 53 SMU L. REV. 1447, 1449-52 (2000).
96 See Lessig, supra note 72.
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replace narrowband Internet access completely - with no signs of
decreasing market share of cable, rather the contrary.
The regulatory task in the process of network evolution then is
to prevent power in the physical platform from being leveraged into
higher platforms. This protects the evolutionary independence of the
distinct platforms. Each platform should be able to find its own
governance principles (collective v. individual decision-making) and its
own mix of openness and closure (open/closed standards;
open/closed DRM systems, etc.). Each platform should be able to
choose its own peculiar balance of freedom and control. What has to
be established then is a coordinated competition policy that accounts
for the fact that the competitive conditions on one platform can
influence the architectures on another.
A decision about a coherent access framework should not be
postponed.; however, it is another question whether the moment for
regulation has come just yet. On the one hand, it might be argued that
it should first be seen if market competition alone can protect open
access, bearing in mind that competition only needs to be workable,
not perfect. On the other hand, this must happen in a reasonably
timely way. Timeliness is a critical question here because "Internet
time" means that sometimes the regulator may not be able to forebear
several years to see if competition arises.97 Taking into account the
importance of the involved values, individual and public
communication infrastructure, the amount of time to allow might be
very short.
D. ACCESS TO VIRTUAL NETWORKS FOR
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
Modularized technology is not just a phenomenon of
communication networks. In fact, one might primarily think of it
instead in the context of computer technology.
In this context, the term "platform" has become synonymous
with operating systems. Operating systems function as platforms for
software applications by exposing routines or protocols that perform
certain widely used functions, so-called "Application Programming
Interfaces" (API). These functions do not then need to be duplicated in
97 See Cooper, supra note 30, at 3.
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the code of the application itself, but can instead be called upon from
the operating system.9"
A functional equivalent to operating systems are so-called
"middleware technologies," such as browsers, which also serve as
platforms. Still another example is that of microprocessor chips, or
CPUs, which control the central processing of data in computers and
are thus determinative not only for what operating systems can run on
a certain machine but also for other parts of the computer's hardware
architecture. 9
These platforms make up the bases of "virtual networks" whose
participants are linked by the platform's standard around which
complementary products must be developed.100 These standards in turn
are not physical things, but are constituted in the form of intellectual
property (IP) rights.
In contrast, the rights in networks at the physical layer of the
Internet were property rights in tangible property. Structurally, this
makes no difference, because all property rights are intangible,
constituted by a relational proposition. 1 1 The rights to exclude, use,
and sell have the same essential character regardless of the type of
property to which they are attached. 10 2 But the peculiarity of IP rights
is that they are just granted for a special purpose: "to promote the
progress of science." As a consequence, a clear conflict about IP rights
can be expected if they are employed in a way that inhibits the
innovation process. This is especially the case when the power those
standards confer on their "owners" is leveraged into adjacent
competitive segments, such as higher layers or modules, for instance
by restraining the development of complementary goods.
The broader, "framing" question then is how the function of
platforms in a modularized technological environment, in this case the
98 See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
99 See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1261 (N.D.
Ala. 1998) (explaining that computers manufactured by Original Equipment
Manufacturers ("OEMs") to use Intel microprocessors must be specifically designed
and manufactured to meet the precise physical and technical requirements of the
Intel architecture).
100 See infra II(A).
101 See Jeremy Bentham, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112-13 (4th ed.
1882) ("There is no image, no painting, no visible trait, which can express the
relation that constitutes property. It is not material, it is metaphysical; it is a mere
conception of the mind . . . The idea of property consists in an established
expectation; in the persuasion of being able to draw such or such an advantage from
the thing possessed, according to the nature of the case").
102 See Steven Semeraro, Regulating Information Platforms: The
Convergence to Antitrust, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 143, 159 (2002).
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computer industry, affects the property rights in these platforms. The
more narrow question again seems to be how to safeguard access to
these platforms - which have now become standards building virtual
networks so that the main form in which access will occur here is by
establishing interoperability between module products.
The answer must again be given by looking at the governance
mechanisms to which the platform property is subject. Unlike in
communication networks where the history indicates that markets
were never fully trusted to govern these networks, the default
assumption for governance in the field of computer systems
technology has been for the market. As is generally the case,
competition is counted on to limit the arbitrary or exploitative exercise
of private property rights. If markets cannot properly operate and
discipline the holder of the IP rights in a systems product because he is
a monopolist, the instrument of antitrust litigation is at hand.
Therefore, we will first look at recent antitrust cases and the
statements that can be extracted from them about open access and
interoperability respectively.
1. MANDATING ACCESS THROUGH ANTITRUST
(a) INTERGRAPH V. INTEL
Initially, Intergraph - an OEM (Original Equipment
Manufacturer), primarily producing graphics workstations - based its
computers on processors for which the company owned the patents
("Clipper" technology). Intergraph later discontinued further
development of its own Clipper processor and switched to using
processors from Intel who is a monopolist in the CPU market. 103 In
turn, Intel designated Intergraph with the status of a "strategic
customer," providing Intergraph with prototype CPUs and trade secret
advance technical information so that Intergraph was able to adapt
their computers to new Intel CPUs before their official release. Intel
103 At the time of the trial, Intel had a market share of 80% in the world
CPU market. Barriers to entry into the CPU market are high, because of a large
number of Intel and non-Intel patents on CPU technology; sunk costs of design and
manufacture; economies of scale; network effects, or the need to ensure compatibility
with complementary software products (such as Windows operating system), an
issue that Intel had mastered by virtue of Windows/Pentium intellectual property
cross-licensing arrangements with Microsoft (the "Wintel" alliance).
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did so, however, under non-disclosure agreements that were
terminable at will.
Later on, Intergraph claimed that Intel had infringed
Intergraph's Clipper patents. As negotiations about a license for the
patents failed, Intel cut off its supply of trade secret information and
prototypes. The purpose of this retaliation was to make Intergraph
cross-license its Clipper patent to Intel on a royalty-free basis.10 4 In
response to this, Intergraph began to sue Intel for infringement of the
Clipper patents and also moved to enjoin Intel from cutting off its
special benefits. As Intel opposed this motion, Intergraph amended its
complaint to charge Intel with violation of the antitrust laws.
The District Court held that Intel had misused its monopoly
power in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and granted a
preliminary injunction requiring Intel to continue its supply practice.105
This means that Intel retained the right to charge Intergraph for access
to its IP, as long as it did so in a nondiscriminatory manner, i.e., as
long as it provided access to Intergraph "at the same time," "in the
same manner," and on "the same terms" as it did to Intergraph's
"similarly situated competitors." 106
The court reasoned that because of its monopoly power in the
microprocessor market Intel had affirmative duties not to misuse its
monopoly power and to compete in a manner that does not
unreasonably or unfairly harm competition, and that Intel had violated
these duties on the grounds of several theories of antitrust liability.
Amongst other things, the court argued that antitrust laws impose on
firms controlling an essential facility the obligation to make the facility
available on non-discriminatory terms. Holding that reasonable and
timely access to critical business information that is necessary to
compete is an essential facility, the court concluded that timely access
to Intel's CPU prototypes and secret technical information about them
were essential facilities because they are not available from alternative
sources, cannot feasibly be duplicated and Intergraph could not
compete effectively in the relevant markets without access to them.
It further argued that Intel was liable under a monopoly
leveraging claim because it had unlawfully used its monopoly power in
the microprocessors market to foreclose or restrain competition by
Intergraph in the market for graphic subsystems. Intel had already
104 Note the contrast with the Xerox case: In the Intergraph case the
refusal to license was not absolute; rather, the license was conditioned on the
licensee's willingness to grant a royalty-free license to its intellectual property.
105 See Intergraph Corp v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala.
1998).
106 Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1291-92.
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entered that market and had clearly announced plans to expand in that
market while at the same time denying Intergraph access to the CPUs
and technical information it needed to compete. Finally, the court
emphasized that the fact that Intel's proprietary information and pre-
release products are subject to copyright and patents did not confer on
it a privilege to violate or an immunity from antitrust laws.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the injunction.1"7 The
decision was based on the overarching rationale that in order to incur
Sherman Act liability there had to be the presence of a competitive
relationship in the market where the monopolistic behavior was
alleged. According to the Federal Circuit, Intergraph and Intel did not
compete in any of the relevant markets, neither in the market for
microprocessors nor in the graphics subsystems market.1"' Nor does
the essential facility doctrine depart from the requirement of a
competitive relationship. A non-competitor's asserted need for a
manufacturer's business information does not convert the withholding
of that information into an antitrust violation.1"9 The same rationale
destroys the "leveraging" theory: that monopoly power in one market
provides a "competitive advantage" in another market is only a
violation of the Sherman Act when there is an adverse effect in the
second market. There is no per se theory of future antitrust violation
which would prohibit downstream integration by a monopolist into
new markets.
Although the Federal Circuit therefore overruled the District
Court's decision, it did not contradict the approach taken by the lower
court. Had Intel been an actual competitor to Intergraph in the
workstations market, the original decision probably would have had to
be affirmed, since the decision of the appellate court does not indicate
any other reasons to reverse the trial court.
The District Court's decision represents a well-founded balance
between strong property rights and open access to information, an
issue that pervades IP law in general.
107 See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
108 Id. Intergraph was not present in the processor market by virtue of
its Clipper patents. Intergraph had abandoned the production of the Clipper and
stated it had no intention to return production. Even if Intel was planning to enter
the workstation market, there was neither evidence nor suggestion of Intel's
monopoly power in that market.
109 The Federal Circuit emphasized that no court had taken essential
facility beyond the situation of competition with the controller of the facility,
whether the competition is in the field of the facility itself or in a vertically related
market that is controlled by the facility.
OTTOLIA & WIELSCH
38
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 6 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol6/iss1/3
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
First, it made clear that IP rights are not exempt from antitrust
scrutiny. Although these entitlements grant exclusionary rights to
innovators, they do not grant the right to engage in anticompetitive
behavior. This is important to note because some courts appear to
have declared that the anticompetitive effect of a patent or copyright
holder's refusal to deal can never give rise to antitrust liability, unless
the holder uses his statutory right to refuse to deal to gain a monopoly
in a market beyond the scope of the patent. 110 The courts in these cases
suggested that the scope of the patent defines an antitrust immunity for
IP holders that applies irrespective of the effect of the IP holder's
conduct on consumer welfare."'
In contrast to these decisions, the Supreme Court recognized in
Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. that a patentee's
refusal to deal is not immune from the antitrust laws.11 2 On the basis of
the Court's Times-Picayune decision, the Supreme Court concluded that
a patent holder cannot exploit its patent to expand its dominant
position into a different market. Accordingly, the Court has long
recognized that IP rights, such as patents, do not immunize the patent
holder from the antitrust laws, particularly where more than one
market exists. 3 The District Court's opinion on this is also in
accordance with the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of IP issued
jointly in 1995 by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission (IP Guidelines), which state that, regardless of the
form of property, "certain types of conduct . . . may have anti-
competitive effects against which the antitrust laws can and do protect.
Intellectual property is thus neither particularly free from scrutiny
under the antitrust laws, nor particularly suspect under them."
114
110 See In re Independent Service Organization Antitrust Litigation
(Xerox), 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (acknowledging the "right of the
patentee to refuse to sell or license in markets within the scope of the statutory patent
grant" and stating "that, absent exceptional circumstances, a patent may confer the
right to exclude competition altogether in more than one antitrust market" and
declining to "inquire into [the patentee's] subjective motivation for exerting his
statutory rights, even though his refusal to sell or license his patented invention may
have an anticompetitive effect, so long as that anticompetitive effect is not illegally
extended beyond the statutory patent grant"); see also Townshend v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1011, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that "because a patent
owner has the legal right to refuse to license his or her patent on any terms, the
existence of a predicate condition to a license agreement cannot state an antitrust
violation").
111 See supra note 102, at 153.
112 504 U.S. 451, 479 (1992).
113 See Ronald S. Katz & Adam J. Safer, Should One Patent Court Be
Making Antitrust Law For the Whole Country?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 702 (2002).
114 U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995), at § 2.1, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguideiines.pdf [hereinafter IP Guidelines].
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Having set aside any assumption of IP immunity, the District
Court in Intergraph defined the parameters within which IP rights
operated in that case. By its order to continue access to the critical
business information, the court established that Intel's proprietary
rights in its microprocessor technology would be protected only by a
liability rule, not by the usual property rule. Intel cannot prevent others
from exploiting its property without its consent but receives financial
compensation from those who do so. On this interpretation of the
court's ruling, the interplay of IP and antitrust can be described as
follows: when the denial of access to technology would raise serious
antitrust concerns, the proprietary rights in that technology relax
slightly, and the law shifts from a property-rule regime to a systems of
liability-rule protections.115
(b) IN RE INTEL CORPORATION
The FTC complaint against Intel adds another important
aspect.116 It pivoted around the finding that Intel had cut off its supplies
of chip samples and strategic information about its new products to
three of its main customers (Compaq, Digital and Intergraph) in order
to force these customers to grant Intel licenses related to processor
technology. The focus therefore was on the impact of Intel's refusal to
license in the markets for processors in which Intel was indeed
competing with other firms.117 What was alleged by the FTC was a
pattern of refusing to deal with multiple buyers unless they granted
blanket access to their IP rights.11
In the proceedings, Intel argued that an overabundance of
processor patents threatened to stifle innovation since a processor
manufacturer might be subject to multiple demands by holders of these
patents ("patent minefield"). This risk could only be neutralized by
pursuing cross-licensing policies. This position is not unsound. In fact,
This does not mean that there are no important differences between IP and other
forms of property. For the position that the antitrust laws should apply fully to IP but
that their application must take important special characteristics of IP into account,
see Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the
New Economy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2001).
115 See Wagner, supra note 8, at 1084-86.
116 In re Intel Corporation, No. 9288, Complaint (FTC June 8, 1998),
available at h ttp: / /www. ftc. gov/os/1998/9806/intelfin.cmp.him.
117 Other than in the litigation before the courts, the FTC complaint
was brought on the basis of a fuller factual record: Digital Equipment Corporation,
unlike Intergraph, was at the time a direct competitor of Intel in the processor market
through its Alpha chip.
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the law normally treats royalty-free cross-licensing agreements as pro-
competitive because they free both parties to compete on the merits
without being restricted by overlapping or blocking patent rights. To
the extent Intel really was attempting to avoid being "held up" by
patentees making unreasonable claims, its demand for a license was
regarded by some commentators not only as legitimate, but also as
pro-competitive.119
On the opposite side, the FTC argued that Intel's exclusionary
conduct effectively undermined the patent rights of firms dependent on
Intel and reduced their incentives to develop new technologies that
might compete with Intel processors. In a Section 2 argument, the
FTC reasoned that Intel had maintained its monopoly power in the
CPU market through exclusionary conduct that was not reasonably
necessary to serve any legitimate, pro-competitive purpose, with the
specific intent to monopolize both the current generation and future
generation of CPUs.
120
The FTC's argument becomes clearer when one considers that
the courts had focused only on the downstream market and simply
noted the absence of Intergraph in the upstream market for CPUs. But
it should not be overlooked that the CPU market is more complex than
a single market. 121 Instead, three distinct upstream markets can be
identified in accordance with the IP Guidelines: (1) the existing market
for CPU products; (2) the market for current CPU technology; and (3)
the innovation market in which future CPU technology is being
developed. 122 Intel's behavior was therefore anticompetitive because it
coercively extended its lawful monopoly power over existing CPU
products into the market for future CPU technology and goods, and
used its patents to prevent others from engaging in lawful follow-on
innovation.
The case was finally resolved by a consent decree in which Intel
agreed not to stop dealing with companies merely because they sought
to vindicate their intellectual property rights. 123
119 See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 118, § 13.4d.
120 See In re Intel Corporation, No. 9288, Agreement Containing
Consent Order (FTC March 17, 1999), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os' 1999/9903/dO9288intelagreement.htrn.
121 See Debra A. Valentine, Abuse of Dominance in Relation to
Intellectual Property: U.S. Perspectives and the Intel Cases (Prepared Remarks
before The Israel International Antitrust Conference, November 15, 1999), available
at http: / / wvwftc gov/speeches/other/dvisraclin htm.
122 See IP Guidelines, supra note 114, § 3.2.1-.2.3.
123 Nevertheless, Intel reserved the right to end relationships with
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However, the case raises the question of whether a proprietor
should be forced to license its IP rights on the grounds of the
"probable" anticompetitive effects of its refusal on the relevant market.
The answer depends on whether protection of future innovation is
conceived as a "good" deserving so much protection as to justify
setting aside the idea that an IP holder is entitled to any returns it can
get on its rights. If the FTC's approach is accepted, it follows that,
despite IP rights, there are situations in which a firm with monopoly or
market power may be required to create its own competition.124
Objections against this idea claim that antitrust complaints
must be based on empirical evidence and that neither the case law nor
economic analysis has yet articulated workable quantitative criteria to
calibrate the incentives to induce an optimal amount of innovation.125
(C) UNITED STATES V. MICROSOFT
The Microsoft case126 concerns possibly the most prominent
example of a platform, the operating system for personal computers.
Microsoft possesses, in form of its "Windows" products, monopoly
power over the market for operating systems. The lawsuit against the
company was brought on several grounds for antitrust liability, some
based on Section 2 and others on Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In
particular, Microsoft was charged of having violated Section 2 by
engaging in a variety of exclusionary acts to maintain its monopoly by
preventing the effective distribution and use of products that might
threaten that monopoly.
124 See David Balto, Protecting Competition from the Abuse of Monopoly
Power. The Intel Case, 16 COMPUTER LAWYER 4, 9 (June/July 1999).
125 Sergio Baches Opi, The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to
Intellectual Property Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual
Property Rights Still Sacrosanct?, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 409,
447 (2001). He argues that antitrust complaints must be based on empirical evidence
rather than on speculative assumptions about the "possible" or "probable" effects of
a refusal to license in the relevant innovation market. However, if what antitrust laws
are trying to protect is the process of innovation, and this process may take place
before a product has even been created and put into the market, then agencies and
courts will often have scant empirical evidence about innovation markets, since
companies prefer not to disclose much information on their innovations. Moreover,
the anticompetitive impact of a refusal to license on R&D is difficult to establish
because a negative effect can often only be determined after such work has been
completed.
126 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see
also 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (Conclusions of Law), 97 F. Supp. 2d 59
(D.D.C. 2000) (Final Judgment).
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(1) One of the charges brought under Section 2 was that
Microsoft placed certain restrictions in its agreements licensing
Windows to Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) which
prohibited the OEMs from removing any desktop icons, folders, or
"Start" menu entries; altering the initial boot sequence; or otherwise
altering the appearance of the Windows desktop. Using these
restrictions, Microsoft was able to control the usage share of browsers
competing with its own browser "Internet Explorer" (IE), since having
an OEM pre-install a browser on a computer is the most cost-effective
method of distributing browsing software. 127 By controlling the
browser market Microsoft was able to protect its monopoly in the
operating systems market.
The reason for the relation between the two markets is based on
the fact that browsers are middleware products which expose their
own APIs. If a browser reaches a critical mass of users it will attract
developers of application software who can begin to rely upon the
browser's APIs for basic routines rather than relying upon the API set
included in Windows. Ultimately, if developers write applications
relying exclusively on APIs exposed by browsers, their applications
would run on any operating system on which the middleware was also
present. Netscape therefore wrote its Navigator browser for multiple
operating systems. Now, if a consumer could have access to the
applications he desired, regardless of the operating system he uses,
simply by installing a particular browser on his computer, then he
would no longer feel compelled to select Windows in order to have
access to those applications; he could select an operating system other
than Windows based solely upon its quality and price. Therefore,
Microsoft's efforts to gain market share in the one market for browsers
served to meet the threat to its monopoly in the other market for
operating systems by keeping rival browsers from gaining the critical
mass of users necessary to attract developer attention away from
Windows as the platform for software development. 121
Since the license restrictions prevented OEMs from removing
visible means of user access to IE and since it is not practical for
OEMs to install a second browser in addition to IE, they prevented
127 One might also bundle the browser with Internet access software
distributed by an Internet Access Provider (IAP) a behavior Microsoft also engaged
in. In exclusive agreements with IAPs Microsoft promised to provide easy access to
IAPs' services from the Windows desktop in return for the IAPs' agreement to
promote IE exclusively and to keep shipments of Internet access software using
Netscape Navigator under a specific percentage, typically 25%. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision holding that Microsoft's exclusive
contracts with IAPs are exclusionary devices under Section 2. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at
68-71.
128 See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 60-61.
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many OEMs from pre-installing a rival browser. This conduct was
held to be anticompetitive. Microsoft reduced rival browsers' usage
share not by improving its own product but, rather, by preventing
OEMs from taking actions that could increase rivals' share of usage.
The court explicitly rejected Microsoft's argument that these license
restrictions were legally justified because the company would simply
exercise its rights as holders of valid copyrights. It made unmistakably
clear that intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to
violate the antitrust laws.129
Microsoft did not limit its effort to shut out rival browsers to the
means of managing its IP rights, but also pursued the same goal by
technological means. Among other things, it bound IE to Windows
technologically13 ° by commingling code specific to browsing in the
same files as code that provided operating system function, so that any
attempt to delete the files containing IE would, at the same time,
cripple the operating system. The court, sensitive to the fact that
technology can function as a substitute for legal arrangements,
condemned this practice as well. This bundling of separate functions
prevented OEMs from removing IE, and detered them from installing
a second browser which would mean increased product testing and
support costs and would amount to questionable use of the scarce and
valuable space on a PC's hard drive). Microsoft's general claim
regarding the benefits of integrating the browser to pursuing "deeper
levels of technical integration" appeared to be highly suspect because
of the danger it posed for an unrestricted evolution of different
technology modules.
(2) Furthermore, the court condemned Microsoft's actions to
prevent Sun's Java technology from developing as a viable cross-
platform threat. 3 ' The contracts the company had entered with
Independent Software Vendors (ISVs) conditioned receipt of Windows
proprietary technical information upon the ISVs' agreement to
promote Microsoft's Java Virtual Machine (JVM) exclusively. This
had a significant impact on the overall distribution of Sun's JVMs.
Like the actions against Netscape this was an attempt to minimize the
size and trajectory of a rival's product share, now in JVMs instead of
129 Id. at 63.
130 For instance, it also excluded TE from the "Add/Remove
Programs" utility, thereby discouraging OEMs from distributing rival products.
131 Java is a set of middleware technologies developed by Sun
Microsystems. They include a set of programs written in the Java language, called
the "Java class libraries", which expose their own APIs, and a Java Virtual Machine
(JVM) which translates bytecode into instructions to the operating system. Java thus
poses a potential threat to Windows' position as the ubiquitous platform for software
development, because programs calling upon the Java APIs will run on any machine
with Java class libraries and a JVM. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 74.
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browsers. The aim behind this was again to take away the incentive for
application developers to avail themselves of interfaces exposed by the
nascent Java platform.
Again Microsoft also used technological means to stifle
competition - this time by trying to eliminate the interoperability of
the middleware. It deceived Java developers by distributing software
development tools created to assist ISVs in designing Java applications
which included certain functions that could only be executed properly
by Microsoft's JVM. Thus, Java developers who were made believe
they wrote cross-platform applications ended up producing
applications that would run only on the Windows operating system.
(3) The District court chose a combination of structural and
conduct remedies as an appropriate remedy for these violations of the
antitrust laws. First, it ordered Microsoft to divide into two firms, one
selling Windows and the other selling applications such as IE. This
divestiture was certainly an extreme intervention into the company's
property rights. Hence, it was strongly debated whether the breaking-
up of Microsoft may be disproportionate compared to the
infringements found by the District Court. 132 Of greater interest are the
conduct remedies ordered. They appear to be a more appropriate and
proportionate consequence for Microsoft's use of its property rights.
For instance, decree section 3.b, entitled "Disclosure of APIs,
Communications Interfaces and Technical Information," requires
Microsoft to disclose to third-party developers, in a timely and non-
discriminatory manner, the APIs and other technical information
necessary to ensure that software effectively interoperates with
Windows. Section 3.c, entitled "Knowing Interference with
Performance," imposes a prohibition on modifying its operating
system to interfere with or degrade the performance of non-Microsoft
programs. Finally, section 3.e, entitled "Ban on Exclusive Dealing,"
forbids Microsoft from entering contracts which oblige third parties to
restrict their development, production, distribution, promotion or use
of non-Microsoft platform-level software.133 These provisions mandate
central elements of an open access regime: effective access and non-
discrimination. In the course of further proceedings the parties entered
into a settlement agreement which indeed sets forth a number of
132 Assuming that the objective of equitable relief is to restore the
competitive structure and consumer welfare that would have developed absent
Microsoft's anticompetitive conduct, it is reasonable to argue that the divestiture
goes beyond what is necessary to restore this status quo ante. See John E. Lopatka &
William H. Page, A (Cautionary) Note on Remedies in the Microsoft Case, 13 ANTITRUST
25, 27 (1999).
133 Microsoft, 97 F. Supp.2d at 65-69 (Final Judgment).
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restrictions upon Microsoft's conduct.134 Indeed, the conduct remedies
ordered by the trial court reappear as elements in the provisions of that
settlement (section 3.b is mirrored in III.D., section 3.c in III.H, and
section 3.e in III.A.)
Whatever the concrete form of an access regime may be, a
functional open-access regime required that Microsoft should not be
able to use its rights in the platform standard to deny other innovators
the ability to develop compatible products.135 Such rules appear to be
adequate mechanisms to protect the evolution of alternative platforms
in the field of module technology.
2. SAFEGUARDING THE PROCESS OF INNOVATION
(a) ANTITRUST AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
If the market for modularized information technology worked
like markets in which companies offer rival products and compete
purely on their respective merits, concerns about open access and
interoperability would be a less compelling question. But because
many of those markets are networks that lend themselves to a single,
dominant standard, the emergence of proprietary ownership of a
standard creates special concerns.136 In particular, the cases in question
show that network markets may require special approaches to ensure
that competition and innovation proceed free from harmful
disturbances. Competition and innovation are both necessary, because
those "customers" who are for example "locked-in" on these markets
are often business entities which build complementary products and
need access to the standard platforms in order to further develop their
products.
On the other hand, a complete commitment to openness may
undermine the very goal of an open access policy, viz. to promote
innovation. Imposing sharing requirements in whatever form on a
company's invention137 undermines ex ante incentives to invest.13 An
inventor must be allowed to appropriate the benefits of her invention,
134 See United States v. Microsoft, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22858
(D.D.C. 2002) (Final Judgment); Microsoft, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (court's approval of
the conduct restrictions).
135 See Wagner, supra note 8, at 1128.
136 See Weiser, Networks Unplugged, supra note 7, at 4.
137 Invention, as it is used here, refers to any product early in
development.
138 See Weiser, Networks Unplugged, supra note 7, at 7.
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lest he decides not to innovate at all. Moreover, sharing requirements,
or any other facilitation of cooperation, can also discourage other
companies' investment in the search for a rival standard.
These reservations recommend caution when limiting IP rights
through antitrust law.
(1) First, it has to be observed that the existence and
enforcement of IP rights by no means necessarily conflict with
competition. Such a view was common under the assumption that
goals of antitrust and IP are different and in permanent tension with
each other. Their relation was perceived as this: IP rights as conferred
monopolies, and antitrust is designed to prevent monopoly.139 This
static view programmed a structural conflict into the co-existence of
the two laws, and indeed this may have been the prevailing view in the
past.
However, both premises are inaccurate. IP rights do not by
themselves confer monopoly power. In most cases, a patent or
copyright creates no market power at all. Although the IP right does
confer the power to exclude with respect to the specific product (or
process, or work) in question, there will often be sufficient actual or
potential close substitutes for such products to prevent the exercise of
market power.140 And with respect to the goals of antitrust, it is not
accurate to say that antitrust law forbids monopoly. While it is true
that antitrust seeks to promote competition, the law has never made
monopoly itself illegal ("The successful competitor, having been urged
to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.") 141 Rather, it is
concerned with certain anticompetitive conduct intended to achieve
market power. 142
The Chicago School, with its focus on consumer welfare
maximization, sharpened the notion that both laws share the same
economic goal, namely: "to maximize wealth by producing what
consumers want at the lowest cost. In serving this common goal,
reconciliation between patent and antitrust law involves serious
problems of assessing effects, but not conflicting purposes".143 In this
approach antitrust laws are viewed as consumer welfare enhancing
statutes which do not blindly mandate rivalry, but require competition
139 See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 118, § 1.3a.
140 See IP Guidelines, supra note 114, § 2.2.
141 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d
Cir. 1945) (Learned Hand, J.).
142 See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 118, § 1.3a.
143 See WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 1 (1973).
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only to the extent that competition serves consumer interests. 144
Though the underlying reasoning may not be, this vision of common
goals is now popular among courts145 and agencies. 146 Antitrust and IP
are seen as complementary efforts to promote an efficient marketplace
and long-run, dynamic competition through innovation. 
147
(2) In this more differentiated approach it becomes clear that
enforcement of antitrust can be pro-innovation 14 as the use of IP can
be pro-competition. The latter happened, for example, in cases where
an IP owner had used its IP rights to ensure that software that used a
standard was interoperable, and to oppose efforts to "split" the
standard. 149 Such a use was made by Sun in its litigation against
Microsoft over the compatibility of Sun's Java platform.15 ° Microsoft's
development of its own proprietary version of Java that runs only on
Windows troubled Sun because a Windows-specific version of Java
would essentially allow Microsoft to destroy the cross-platform
compatibility of the Java platform.151 Such disruption of Java's
platform independence raised antitrust concerns because it
undermined the promise Java held for operating-systems competition.
Sun's reservation of its IP rights in Java therefore provided it with the
means to prevent unauthorized alteration of the standard and to
preserve the integrity of a cross-platform standard that might otherwise
be fragmented. 1
5 2
144 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1
(1984).
145 See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572,
1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (explaining that "the aims and objectives of patent and
antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at odds [but] the two bodies of law
are actually complementary as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry
and competition").
146 See IP Guidelines, supra note 114, § 1.0 ("The intellectual property
laws and the antitrust laws share the common purpose of promoting innovation and
consumer welfare.").
147 See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 118, § 1.3a.
148 See IP Gudelines, supra note 114, § 1.0 ("The antitrust laws promote
innovation and consumer welfare by prohibiting certain actions that may harm
competition with respect to either existing or new ways of serving customers.").
149 See Lemley, supra note 24, at 1938.
150 For Microsoft's action against Java, see also infra II.D. 1.c.
151 See Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 999 F.Supp. 1301,
1310 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
152 See Lemley, supra note 24, at 1939. Sun's approach of "proprietary
pollution control" is itself questioned by some proponents of open information
platforms because it carries the danger that a developer committed to maximizing
interoperability may change its tack if its technologies succeed in the marketplace
and suddenly impose new, restrictive terms ("intellectual property ambush"). See
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Cultivating Open Information Plaforms: A Land Trust
Model, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 309, 316 (2002).
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Besides this pro-competitive use of an IP entitlement itself there
is of course the arsenal of IP rules which work as limitations on the
granted exclusionary rights. They can be used by potential entrants to
break into closed standards owned by a dominant firm. To mention
just one example, IP law allows for "reverse engineering," a legal tool
that can facilitate the opening of a standard in order to enhance
competition on aftermarkets for applications of the dominant firm's
platform product.153
(3) The pro-competitive effects of IP rights indicate that
antitrust enforcement must consider the peculiarities of the industry
the IP rights are used in. Indeed, even though the two sets of laws
coexist in the service of long-run, dynamic efficiencies, and even
though they share the goal of encouraging innovation, they attempt to
do so in different ways. Antitrust operates by ensuring that market
forces provide firms with incentives to offer new (i.e. better) products
at lower prices, whereas IP laws directly create incentives to innovate
products (and processes) of higher quality at lower prices. Whether
these different means result in conflicts and how the regimes are
harmonized in such cases depends on the peculiar structure of the
industry in which the respective issues arise.
In fact, it is argued that antitrust enforcement in "new
economy" markets should be very cautious. In industries in which
continual innovation is important to social welfare, interfering with the
acquisition and enforcement of IP rights, while pro-competitive in the
short run, could actually harm social welfare in the long run by
reducing innovation. 15 4 The court in the Microsoft case was well aware
of this as reflected in a remarkable note on the extent to which
antitrust doctrines that evolved in the "old economy", for example the
Section 2 monopolization doctrines, should apply to firms competing
in dynamic technological markets characterized by network effects.155
The argument that inflexible enforcement of old economy
antitrust in the new economy could be harmful pivots around the
''serial monopoly" hypothesis which suggests that in the "new
economy," monopoly is the natural market structure, but technological
153 And yet, there will also be a number of cases where this IP "self-
help" option is not sufficient. At present, IP protection continues to protect a
dominant standard because the contours of the reverse engineering doctrine have not
been fully developed. And even where reverse engineering is legally permissible, it
may not be practically effective. Therefore a permissive intellectual property regime
might not be sufficient to facilitate a competitive market. Consequently, antitrust
oversight must remain a check on a firm's control of a dominant standard. See
Weiser, Networks Unplugged, supra note 7, at 16-17.
154 See Lemley, supra note 24, at 1938.
155 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 49-50.
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innovation ensures that all monopolies are just temporary. Innovation
in technology-driven markets is so rapid and revolutionary that no
market leader, even with strong network effects, can defend its position
for long against numerous new entrants with "killer applications."
Firms compete through innovation for temporary market dominance,
from which they may be displaced by the next wave of product
advancements ("leapfrogging").156 This Schumpeterian competition
proceeds sequentially over time rather than simultaneously across a
market; it is a competition "for the market," and not "within the
market."
From the perspective of IP law, such market characteristics
seem to recommend a robust IP regime because firms will be more
willing to invest when they anticipate that they will be allowed to
exploit their innovation. Their incentive to innovate is greatest when
there is little threat of imitation.
From the perspective of antitrust, these characteristics may
imply that the traditional market definition/market share antitrust
analysis is not appropriate in this sector. Such an "old economy" mode
of analysis is bound to find barriers to entry even when they are
necessary to fuel investment in innovation. This is because markets
subject to strong economies of scale and network effects based on risky
R&D investments do require high operating margins protected by
short-term barriers to entry, or else investment would dry up.157
Imposing "old economy" antitrust will deprive the successful firm of
its temporary monopoly rents. Indeed, inherent in the serial monopoly
hypothesis is the argument that an innovator needs a period of
monopoly in order to recoup its investment in innovation. If
competitors were able to immediately enter the market and become
fully competitive in the static sense, then prices would drop and profits
would be driven to zero, thus eliminating future incentives to
innovate.15 In this view, the period of monopoly for each innovator is
in fact a reward for such innovators and the temporary monopoly rents
are merely the quasi-rents to a social beneficial activity - much as
patent protection helps generate quasi-rents for a limited period of
time.159 The logic of this approach is then that antitrust enforcement in
the form of non-enforcement would substitute for IP.
156 Id. (citing Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust
Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2001)).
157 See DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, SOME ECONOMIC
ASPECTS OF ANTITRUST ANALYSIS IN DYNAMICALLY COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIES
(Natl. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8268, 2001), available at
htip: //www. n ber.org/papcrs/w8268.
158 See supra note 94, at 701.
159 See supra note 94, at 707.
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But such line of argument underestimates the risk that today's
platform monopolist will try to inhibit the rise of the next monopolist
and thereby turn itself into a permanent monopolist. He can do so by
distorting the process from which the threat of new entrants derives
from: the process of innovation. As seen in the Intel proceedings, one
strategy is to withhold access to the dominant platform unless the
inventor licenses its own know how. If the inventor agrees, this may be
an efficient solution after the fact, but the prospect of this outcome will
discourage efficient independent innovation. As seen in the Microsoft
case, another strategy is to undermine the distribution channels and
the technological interoperability of today's complementary
applications which might have become tomorrow's platform
competitors.
As post-Chicago proponents of a strategic analysis of
"predatory behavior" have pointed out against the Chicago School's
static view of neoclassical price theory under which a monopoly can
do no more than make the most of its existing monopoly (see "fixed-
sum" theory of monopoly), the danger is that a firm might try to
change the structural conditions it faces in order to that it may receive
greater profits in the future. By changing those underlying conditions,
the monopoly may well be able to leverage itself into a position even
more powerful than the one from which it started.16 ° In addition to
these active attempts at strategic foreclosure, there may well be
structural barriers to prevent (re)entry once a rival has been eliminated
or severely disadvantaged.
(4) The discussion of the peculiarities of "new economy"
markets built around IP rights reveals that it is not desirable to
promote rivalry through antitrust at any cost. On the other side, the
specifics of property rights "in" networks - in the double sense: as
(intellectual) property situated in network markets161 and as a right in
the standard that defines the network - do pose peculiar risks of
anticompetitive conduct.
The dilemma then is that inappropriate antitrust intervention in
the form of an early imposition of compatibility provisions and open
interfaces can thwart innovation and competition just as an overly
relaxed antitrust enforcement runs the risk that a firm uses the
dominance of its platform to extract considerable monopoly rents and
to leverage its power into adjacent markets viz. layers.
160 See supra note 5, at 199-201.
161 For the possibility that the nature of network industries creates
greater incentives for predatory strategies, particularly those that would raise entry
barriers, see A. Douglas Melamed, Does Regulation Promote Efficiency in Network
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However, the way in which the problem is articulated seems
already to point to a strategy for appraoching the issue. Competition
policy must know when to encourage rivals to compete for establishing
a standard and when to acknowledge that there cannot be competition
between standards, but only competition within a dominant one.
162
Where a particular standard has emerged on a platform, relying on
that standard seems the only commercially reasonable way to
compete. 163 To facilitate such competition antitrust needs to ensure
that interoperability is not denied as a means of precluding
competition 164 - at least in the given dimension of vertical relations to
modules on other layers. In this case, antitrust-mandated access rules
are adequate and can operate as elements of network governance.
This might be seen as the next step to be taken by antitrust.
After having realized that rivalry has not to be endorsed in every
circumstance, it would have to be recognized that antitrust may
impose positive obligations to cooperate when cooperation is essential
to enable the sort of rivalry that will benefit consumers most. This
stands in contrast to the still-dominant belief that antitrust imposes
only negative duties. 16' But a review of case law shows that there are
many examples in which firms have been required to cooperate in
order to facilitate competition. In this respect, cases like Intergraph and
Microsoft are in line with Terminal Railroad166, Associated Press167, Lorain
Journal161, Otter Tail Power169 , Aspen Skiing17 ° , MC 17 1 and AT&T.17 2 At
the same time, these decisions show that positive duties to cooperate
do not automatically require the expansion of the "essential facility"
doctrine which has been criticized on both legal and economic
162 See Weiser, Networks Unplugged, supra note 7, at 7.
163 See Joseph Farrell, Arguments for Weaker Intellectual Property Protection
in Network Industries, in STANDARDS POLICY FOR INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
373 (Brian Kahin & Janet Abbate eds., 1995).
164 See Weiser, Networks Unplugged, supra note 7, at 17.
165 See supra note 102, at 147 (citing Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp.,
222 F.3d 390, 400 (7th Cir. 2000)) ("affirmative duties to help one's competitors ...
do not exist under the unadorned antitrust laws"); USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies,
Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) ("There is a difference between
positive and negative duties, and the antitrust laws, like other legal doctrines
sounding in tort, have generally been understood to impose only the latter.").
166 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
167 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
168 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
169 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
170 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585
(1985).
171 MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.
1983).
172 United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. 1982).
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grounds.173 Antitrust does not have to rely on this doctrine when it
condemns improper uses of market power to maintain or extend a
dominant position either through an affirmative restraint of trade or a
refusal to deal. 174 It is not so much about relying on a certain doctrine,
especially since many of the issues in systems technology appear to be
transdoctrinal, 75 but about activating a certain logic in the discipline of
antitrust.
From this perspective, it may well be the case that the essential
facility doctrine"' is interesting because it sets forth a relation between
the quality of an entry barrier and the probability that it may be
overcome. In its pure form the doctrine says that a duty to provide
access to the facility arises when the dominant firm's competitor faces
an insurmountable barrier of access to the market if deprived of access
to the facility.177 In this formulation the relation is fixed: it assumes
that there is no other way to compete than by access to the facility, the
probability of a new entry is zero, and access has to be granted.
Especially in technology-driven markets this assumption is too static
(see text above on "killer applications"). In its broader logic, the
doctrine asks to what extent the type of facility itself creates a barrier
for the competitive process in which potential entrants experiment and
innovate (in order to surmount the barrier).
Now, the facility in question does not have to be a physical one,
but can consist in any kind of exclusivity position. Indeed, courts have
even acknowledged IP rights as essential facilities.17 But again, what
matters is not that courts enriched the doctrine itself. What is
173 See Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting
Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990). Interestingly, the principles Areeda sets
forth to limit the application of the essential facility doctrine are likely to be met in
the cases like Intergraph or Microsoft. See id. at 852.
174 See supra note 102, at 149.
175 See Wagner, supra note 8, at 1083, stating that the Intergraph court
could have dealt with the "transdoctrinal matter" other than in a antitrust
framework.
176 As stated in MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081,
1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983), the elements of liability under the "essential facility"
doctrine are: (i) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (ii) a competitor's
inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (iii) the denial to
grant access to the facility; (iv) the feasibility of providing the facility.
177 Additionally, the duty to provide access arises when lack of access
subjects competitors to a serious, permanent and inescapable competitive handicap
that would render their activities uneconomical. See Opi, supra note 125, at 420.
178 Aside from the Intergraph court, for example, see BellSouth
Advertising v. Donnelley Information Publishing, 719 F. Supp. 1551, 1566 (S.D. Fla.
1988) ("Although the doctrine of essential facilities has been applied predominantly
to tangible assets, there is no reason why it could not apply . . . to information
wrongfully withheld. The effect in both situations is the same: a party is prevented
from sharing something essential to compete.").
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important to see is that the proprietary ownership of a standard can
also be a property right that creates a barrier to entry. 179
Ownership of such a barrier to entry, as has been noted, is akin
to the possession of a patent and their "prospect function.""1 ' When
patents are sufficiently broad, they offer their holder a secure
opportunity to orchestrate the subsequent development of the original
idea. This analogy has led to the idea of the "scope" of an essential
facility which suggests that the degree to which antitrust policy should
concern itself with the ownership or control of a technical standard
ought to be proportional to the scope of the standard over which the
owner has de facto or de jure control. The owner of a standard that
controls the compatibility of a large fraction of the components of a
system is in a much better position to close off avenues of innovation
that threaten the rent-earning potential of the standard; whereas the
owner of a standard with relatively smaller scope is always in danger
of being "invented around" or made obsolete if it closes off access or
otherwise exercises its market power unduly.1"1 In the case of
modularized technology, one would have to add as another parameter
the location of the standard within the layered architecture. A platform
at the "code" level like an operating system is crucial for the
interconnectivity in more than one layer; its owner is much more likely
to be in control of the overall architecture of the system as a whole. A
closed platform at that level would raise more concern than for
example a closed application at the "ends" of the system for
example.18 2
179 For the notion that barriers to entry always boil down to property
rights, whether de jure or de facto, see Harold Demsetz, Barriers To Entry, 72 AM.
ECON. REV. 47, 49 (1982) ("the problem of defining ownership is precisely that of
creating properly scaled legal barriers to entry.").
180 See supra note 5, at 219.
181 See supra note 5, at 194, 209, 221.
182 This takes account of the model of innovation in complex systems
(like the computer). Because of the complexity that system products normally
exhibit, and because of the qualitative uncertainty inherent in the process of
innovation, multiple approaches and numerous participants provide greater genetic
variety than would a single innovator, which leads to more-rapid-trial-and-error
learning. See Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, In Search of Useful Theory of
Innovation, 6 RESEARCH POLICY 36, 70-72 (1977) (proposing a concept of different
"selection environments"). Precisely to the extent that a standard is complex and
reflects an underlying modularized technology, centralized control may actually limit
the development of a standard. To work properly, complex standards require
collaboration with users and with suppliers of the various components of the system.
As Hayek has argued, such complex standard sets as human languages or the
common law could only have evolved as "spontaneous orders". Even the proprietary
developer of a standard needs access to the knowledge of a wide variety of
collaborators, and even a proprietary standard is often something of a spontaneous
order. See Langlois, supra note 5, at 219.
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Modularized technology makes possible variation at the
component level. In such cases the structure of property rights is
crucial to the evolution of the technology and of competition. A
relational reading of the essential facility doctrine helps to highlight the
interdependency between competition and property rights, between
antitrust and IP. We cannot think of competition independently of the
property rights involved.
(b) PROPERTY MODELS FOR
TECHNOLOGICAL EVOLUTION
Antitrust law can constrain the scope of IP rights.183 When this
is the case IP rights are weakened. Indeed this "weakening" is called
for in situations where a dominant standard has evolved and there is
no longer competition for the standard, but only within the standard.
In these cases, it is argued, IP law should provide "relaxed protection
over interfaces" 18 4 (quasi as IP's counterpart for antitrust's supervision
that interoperability is not denied as a means of excluding
competition). In some sense it is even correct to say that to require a
party to open to others the standard it controls is effectively a taking of
intellectual property rights.185
To get a clearer concept of what happens if IP rights are
"weakened" it is helpful to make use of the "bundle of rights" model
of property. It defines ownership not as an all-or-nothing proposition,
but rather as a variable set of rights over a resource. 6 Each right
represents the relation between two actors over the use and control of a
scarce resource. Such a model of property is compatible with many
different theories of what particular rights are to be included in the
protected bundle and of how to protect those rights.187 In any case it
captures the idea that an owner may have imperfect control over his
private property.
183 See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 118, § 1.3d.
184 See Weiser, Networks Unplugged, supra note 7, at 17; see also Langlois,
supra note 5, at 222 (describing the "weakening of intellectual property rights" in
open systems).
185 See Weiser, Networks Unplugged, supra note 7, at 17; see also Langlois,
supra note 5, at 222.
186 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)
(describing an owner's right to exclude other people as a stick in "the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property").
187 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 75
(3rd ed., 2000); see also Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in
the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 662 (1998) ("At this level
of generality, the bundle-of-rights metaphor can describe any type of property
relationship, including private, commons, and anticommons property.").
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When ownership is thus resolved into a bundle of property
rights, a more precise description is possible of what happens when
access to a network is mandated, be it a communication network or a
virtual network: the property right to interconnect or to interoperate is
allocated away.
This has been described for industries with physically-
connected grids as an example of real networks. In the electricity
industry, the regulatory approach moved from price regulation
directed at the output market (electricity) to interconnection and
unbundling rules aimed at inputs (transmission service). A new
electricity merchant producer generates electricity but buys
transmission service from the grid owner, who is legally obliged to
grant access. Because access regulations shift the interconnection
property right from the grid owner to a third party, an entrant can
jump into the electricity market just by building a new power plant
without needing to build an additional (and redundant) transmission
grid.188
With respect to virtual networks and the function a platform
has for further technological innovation, there is a spectrum of
proposals for reconsidering the property regime of strong exclusionary
entitlements known from markets for the exchange of physical goods.
The problem can be approached from both sides, from IP law and
from antitrust.
(1) In the field of modularized systems technology some have
argued that IP law should not protect program elements that control
the interface between modules at all, thus allowing unlimited access to
such components by competitors l8 9 And at least to the extent that the
existence or scope of an IP right in a standard is undetermined, courts
have eventually considered network effects in deciding whether or not
to grant a new or stronger form of IP protection to the standard-
setter. 190
In Lotus, a case addressing the horizontal access issue, the First
Circuit decided that Borland could incorporate Lotus 1-2-3's command
hierarchy to build a rival spreadsheet program (Quattro), reasoning
that the command hierarchy was not copyrightable at all because it
188 See Randal C. Picker, Regulating Network Industries: A Look at Intel,
23 HARV. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 159, 167 (1999).
189 See Peter S. Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property
Protection for Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2644, 2652-53 (1994).
190 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of
Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 531 (1998).
OTTOLIA & WIELSCH 229
56
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 6 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol6/iss1/3
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
was a "method of operation" of the 1-2-3 program. 191 In his
concurrence, Judge Boudin, offering a competition policy rationale,
recognized that the establishment of a standard (here a user interface
and command hierarchy for spreadsheets) merited protection in order
to encourage innovation. At the same time he made clear that
complete protection could limit consumer welfare. 192 When a first
mover like Lotus had already received a substantial reward for being
first, IP protection may recede and allow others access to the industry
standard so as to allow for competition. 193 The way in which IP
protection "recedes" is of course variable. It might be by holding that
the standard is not protectable by copyright (as the majority did) or by
saying that the entrant's use of it is privileged by referring to the "fair
use" doctrine (as implied by Judge Boudin). What is relevant to note is
that IP treatment of interfaces crucially affects the nature of
competition and how it does SO.
194
As implied by Judge Boudin's concurrence, 195 if we were truly
to permit competition within de facto standards, we would have to
deny all forms of IP protection to the interfaces that allow access to
such standards.
196
191 See Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 49
F.3d 807 (1995).
192 See id. at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring):
But if a better spreadsheet comes along, it is hard to see why
customers who have learned the Lotus menu and devised macros
for it should remain captives of Lotus because of an investment in
learning made by the users and not by Lotus. Lotus has already
reaped a substantial reward for being first; assuming that the
Borland program is now better, good reasons exist for freeing it to
attract old Lotus customers: to enable the customer to take
advantage of a new advance, and to reward Borland in turn for
making a better product. If Borland has not made a better product,
then customers will remain with Lotus anyway.
193 See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property
Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 604-05 (2003).
194 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 190, at 533.
195 See Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 49
F.3d 807, 822 (1995) (Boudin, J., concurring) ("Indeed, to the extent that Lotus'
menu is an important standard in the industry, it might be argued that any use ought
to be deemed privileged.").
196 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 190, at 533; see also supra note
231. The authors themselves ask for a more nuanced approach taking into account
the nature of the network effect ("operating systems exhibit network effects because
application programmers need to write compatible software, while user interfaces
exhibit only the 'learning effect' of saving users from having to learn how to operate
multiple systems"), and the status of present IP protection ("it is much more difficult
to find a case considering network effects arguments as a reason to depart from or
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Indeed, the "open code" movement represents an attempt for
unrestrained access to software platforms. Under this model,
programmers collaborate on the creation of software programs and
allow all users free access to the programs' source codes. This does not
mean that IP is absent. In fact, the GNU/Linux software rests on a
license (GPL license) which conditions that one keeps it open, and that
one distributes it with its source as intact and open as one received it.
With the help of this gambit open access is implemented itself in a
network developing around the original version. There are no access
problems in such a network because access is institutionalized in the
network itself - with an open, instead of proprietary and closed,
standard. No actor can gain ultimate control over the open-source
code. The effect on innovation is that the developer on an open-code
platform is assured that the platform will not behave strategically, i.e.
that it cannot turn against him. 197
This idea of openness reflects the assumption that, at least in
the information sector, proprietary control is not necessary or desirable
to encourage innovation. It is supported by a literature that makes
clear that a large number of innovations would take place in the
absence of any IP protection.19 However, the open code movement is
part of a larger "commons" model which suggests that information
industries and the Internet function best when they are open and not
susceptible to control by a proprietary firm.
(2) As an alternative to an entirely open system with no
protection at all, others have pleaded for "incomplete entitlements" in
IP in the context of networks. They believe that flexible entitlements,
rather than strong exclusive rights, might better serve the need to
balance social costs and benefits when it comes to reconciling the
competing goals of promoting open standards and protecting the
property rights of innovators. They argue that flexible entitlements
may better accommodate diffuse societal values that would not be
internalized by bright-line property rules.199 This appears to be the
deeper rationale of a proposal which started from the insight of
economic theory that in situations where costs of locating, negotiating,
and valuing transactions are high (as is the case in cyberspace), unclear
entitlements may tend to facilitate bargaining.2 0  Under such
circumstances, clear rules will tend to facilitate innovative or informal
bargaining arrangements, whereas bright-line rules appropriate to low
197 See supra note 72.
198 See Weiser, supra note 7, at 570.
199 See Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 53 (2000).
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transactions cost situations may simply lock the parties into their
respective ownership positions, unable to reach a beneficial exchange.
Aside from cases of high transaction costs, such "muddy" entitlements
operate in much the same way as a divided entitlement which appears
whenever more than one entity has a claim to a given property, i.e.
where the property owner must share or cede some uses of the
property under certain circumstances. 20 1  However, the basic
observation is that real property law knows a variety of ownership
entitlements (property rules, liability rules, divided claims, "muddy"
standards etc.); that the same is true for IP law (for instance, the
copyright doctrine of fair use is operating as a muddy entitlement) ;202
and that this variety has evolved in response to different transactional
environments. 201
How this idea of incomplete entitlements works becomes clear
in its assessment of unsolicited email. Under an exclusionary rule such
as trespass, propertization in a networked environment encourages the
holder of the exclusive right to attempt to free-ride upon the external
benefits of the network, while at will avoiding contribution of such
benefits to others.20 4 In contrast, the "muddy" doctrine of nuisance
requires that the cost of the intrusive activity outweighs the benefit. So
a nuisance rule would allow server owners to exclude unreasonably
costly uses of their servers, while allowing access for socially beneficial
uses, even if the server owner might otherwise object. Nuisance would
require computer owners to remain legally networked when necessary
to generate beneficial positive network externalities.2 5
A similar rationale would justify the distinction that the owner
of a dominant standard in a platform, like Microsoft for the operating
system, cannot prevent others from accessing its interfaces when they
engaged in building compatible programs, but that he is protected
when somebody uses the access to interfaces just to build an imitating
product without any functional surplus. In order to profit from the
network effects its operating system platform is based on, Microsoft
would have to allow others access for socially beneficial uses of the
standard.
201 Id. at 128.
202 Id. at 135, 140.
203 Id. at 179 (warning that "we should therefore be suspicious of
arguments that promulgate only one type of rules desirable in every circumstance").
204 Consider the cases of Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 15 I.E.R. Cases (BNA)
464 (Cal. Super. 1999), and eBay v. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (C.D. Cal.
2000), in which Intel and eBay profited from its connection to the network but at the
same time hoped to make its systems unavailable for activities found objectionable.
205 See supra note 199, at 53.
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(3) Another expression of the concept of incomplete
entitlements - this time from the side of antitrust - is the previously
mentioned idea that under certain circumstances the imperative of
effective competition demands access to IP. That antitrust forces
access to the IP without the consent of the rights holder is interpreted
as a shift from property rules to liability rules in the protection of the
Ip.
20 6
Under a property rule regime, parties are able to contract
around the initial entitlement allocation and to set protections at their
preferred levels.2 °7 In contrast, under a liability rule regime, parties
may not transfer entitlements without paying state-mandated
penalties.20 ' Hence, the difference is also one of the decisional
authority that distinguishes the two systems. Under property rules, the
owner makes the decision to exclude or not; under liability rules, the
option to take or not rests with outside the parties.20 9
The idea is that systems technology, i.e. "architectural" or
meta-technology that determines what can connect to the system and
what can operate within it (in this case platforms in modularized
systems), is to be protected only by liability rules - as cases like
Intergraph or Dell21° indicate. This is as justified because of the
combination of four characteristics of the markets for this technology:
network externalities, interconnectivity, rapid innovation, and
excludability. 211 Network externalities cause systems technology to
become standardized, which makes access to the technology vital to
industry participants. The high level of interconnectivity increases the
number of participants that require such access, and the rapid pace of
the market necessitates that they obtain access as quickly as possible.
Further, the nature of systems technology enables its producers to
exclude others easily, even without the assistance of the legal system.
Exclusion through secrecy is possible because the development of
compatible products requires detailed internal information about the
platform technology, which is hard to obtain from outside. Even where
reverse engineering is legally permissible, it may be too time-
206 See Wagner, supra note 8, at 1086, 1090.
207 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1092 (1972) ("An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that
someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him
in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the
seller.").
208 See id. ("Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if
he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected
by a liability rule.").
209 See supra note 200, at 127.
210 See In re Dell Computer Corp., No. 931-0097 (FTC 1996).
211 See Wagner, supra note 8, at 1096, 1101.
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consuming with respect to the rapid technological change (as the
interface might have already changed again in the meantime). And
exclusion is also possible through technological design which can be
engineered strategically not to accept or even to disadvantage other
technology.
In the presence of these market characteristics, it is legitimate to
confine the protection of such technology to liability rules which
would ensure access to it. It should be noticed, however, that the
access regime created by allowing antitrust to partially constrain IP is
less invasive than other forms of restricting property rights through
liability rule protection. In compulsory licensing, which also operates
as a liability-rule system,212 for example, the receiving party's ability to
control and exploit is generally co-extensive with that of the original
owner. Another example is the eminent domain power of the state,
under which the private owner affected looses all rights to the land,
and the state gains complete control of it. In contrast, the access
regime neither deprives the owner of the right to control the
disposition and dissemination of his technology, nor does it transfer
the right to full information about a given platform technology. It
grants access only to those parts of information about the platform
which are crucial to building a compatible product. Thus, the owner of
the platform standards retains significant exclusive rights in his
technology.213
Speaking within the metaphor of property as a bundle of rights,
it might be said that we are extracting a "stick" from an owner's
bundle or protecting that stick with a liability rule rather than a
property rule. It appears then that a "hybrid" liability and property rule
regime is appropriate for platform technology which displays the
characteristics in question.214
(4) The above discussion should have demonstrated that
property in (dominant) platforms, which are not just "located" in but
actually constitute virtual networks, should not be governed by
principles that are built on a concept of property as an impenetrable
right of exclusivity. It is a particular merit of those who argue against
the allegedly unavoidable "tragedy of the commons" that they have
highlighted the misconception that property is either totally privatized
as "that sole and despotic dominion over the external things of the
212 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1308-17
(1996).
213 See Wagner, supra note 8, at 1093.
214 Such a hybrid liability rule and property rule protection has also
been proposed for physical communication resources. See Daphne Keller, A Gaudier
Future That Almost Blinds the Eye, 52 DUKE L.J. 273, 319 (2002).
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world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe" (Blackstone), or totally under government control. Instead it
should be recognized that there is a "variety of property systems". The
observation has already been mentioned that a variety of ownership
entitlements in real and IP law has evolved in response to different
transactional environments.
A variety of property systems can be found not just at the level
of states, but of groups or communities which autonomously organize
the relations among their members. Their systems resemble private
property in some respects, while retaining at the same time features
that resemble open access. Some aboriginal tribes, for instance, have
private household property in land in the winter, but collective
property in land in the summer, due to the relative advantages of
collective hunting during the summer. In other communities, river
sites for the construction of fishing weirs were privately owned, but the
weirs were village property, whereas the platforms on top of the weirs
were again private property.215
For the commons proponents, these examples confirm that our
own property system should not be so rigid that we miss intermediate
bundles of property rights which may work most efficiently for certain
resources and situations.216
In the given context of modularized platform technology, the
lesson to learn from the commons movement is not that we should
adopt a commons model in this case. Rather, it should draw our
attention to the notion that there is not just one pre-fixed, strong form
of property with one type of protection. For property "in" network
environments, a flexible concept of property rights appears to be
adequate in response to the described concerns about the competitive
and innovative process.
E. IMPLICATIONS
In the examples discussed here, antitrust is crucial for the
building of an open access regime for both types of networks. But
antitrust is just one instrument for implementing access on information
platforms. It only comes into play in the presence of market power,
and this is often at a late stage, i.e. when competition has already
shifted to intra-platform competition because a certain platform has
215 See Stuart Buck, Replacing Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum
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evolved as dominant. IP law is different. It has its own means to
facilitate and to mandate access. The tools it offers can confer on
potential competitors a significant self-help option.217 Moreover, it can
influence the process at an earlier stage, but in doing so it should be
cautious not to discourage the search for alternative platforms.
Allowing all firms immediate access to the initial standard at the outset
of a potential standards competition may seduce potential rivals into
taking advantage of an already developed standard, as opposed to
creating their own. It also risks entrenching a single standard and
precluding valuable competition.218
Constitutional law also comes into play where values other
than competition or innovation, free speech for example, counsel for
access to an information infrastructure. 21 '9 As has been described
220above, °, it can even recognize that certain technological architectures
can serve as protectors of free speech. In this way constitutional law
might support "access by architecture", so that access-providing
architectures would have to be preferred to others on constitutional
grounds.221
In their application of mandating access to information
platforms both laws, antitrust and IP law, are reshaping property
rights.
Drawing on the insight that there is not just one pre-fixed,
strong form of property with one type of protection, but a variety of
property systems, it was found that different types of transactional
environments require different types of proprietary entitlements. In
markets where goods are exchanged, strong property rights may be the
best choice for institutional design. In this case, a clear demarcation
between the proprietary status "before" and "after" the transaction is
required. The transaction marks who profits from the use inherent in
the good. In contrast, platforms are not exchanged. With respect to
platforms use adds value. The value for the owner is increased by the
uses made by others. These uses in turn depend on the options
available on other layers of the modularized system. Such a peculiar
217 See Weiser, supra note 7, at 600.
218 See Weiser, supra note 7, at 590.
219 See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 657
(1994) (emphasizing that "[t]he potential for abuse of ... private power over a
central avenue of communication cannot be overlooked .... The First Amendment's
command that government not impede the freedom of speech does not disable the
government from taking steps to ensure that private interests not restrict, through
physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free flow of information
and ideas.") (citation omitted).
220 See infra II.C.2.b.ii.
221 Also constitutional law is of importance in coordinating and
resolving conflicts between the different values involved.
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environment raises specific concerns with regard to the competitive
and innovative process, concerns in response to which a "flexible"
property rights concept appears to be more appropriate than
intransigent exclusionary entitlements.
In other words, if the property rights in platforms are conceived
of as flexible, they can best serve the different social functions the
platform has. This insight would have to be extrapolated into a more
general "property model for networks" which takes account of the fact
that network property is "located" in a variety of social processes:
competition, innovation, communication, and others. In this respect,
platform property is multi-functional. A manifestation of this is the
involvement of the named different sets of law, each of which might be
seen as representing peculiar types of rationales corresponding to the
peculiarities of the social processes they are structuring.
The envisaged adjustments of central legal institutions indicate
a co-evolution of architectures and institutions. Constitutional law
plays an important role in this process.
For example, the design of a comprehensive access regime for
networks composed of the contributions from different sets of law
would have to be in accordance with the protection the constitution
provides for certain values. In some respects, this would indeed be a
"constitutionalization of technology law,"222  because it is
constitutional law that is responsible for the ultimate resolution of
possible conflicts between the values involved.
In such an engagement of constitutional law, the First
Amendment operates as a kind of first among equals. First, speech is a
central value not just for communication networks which transmit
speech by their very definition, but also for virtual networks
themselves. They often build around dominant standards in software,
which can also merit First Amendment protection, although the scope
of such protection is not yet fully explored.223 Second, the First
Amendment seems able to deal with the fact that the process of
designing legal institutions becomes self-reflective when applied to the
technological infrastructure for speech, insofar as shaping this
infrastructure means determining the possibilities for free speech.
Here, we are not dealing with the protection of any right to free
222 See Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 534 (2000) (using the phrase differently in his critique of
the increase of constitutional review of technology law due to expanded regulatory
efforts of congress in this field).




Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 6 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol6/iss1/3
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
speech, but with ensuring the conditions for exerting the right to free
speech.
In this last sense, we might actually need not just an
"environmentalism for the net, ,224 but an environmentalism for the
nets, which would be sensitive to the many functional dimensions of
networks in layered systems and the fact that architectural design of
one layer can affect the conditions of evolution in adjacent layers.225
The way in which this approach would proceed resembles the method
of "constitutional economics" which inquires into the relation between
the order of rules and the order of actions that result from the adaptive
behavior of individual agents within those rules in order to inform
about what kind of rules may serve the common constitutional
interests best.226 "Constitutional architecture," by contrast, would try
to determine how constitutional values are promoted in the interplay
of institutional design and technological architecture.
Il. DIGITALIZATION OF INFORMATION AND
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
A. SHIFTING ISSUES ON DRM
224 See Boyle, supra note 3 (demanding a comprehensive political
economy of intellectual property in the age of digitalization and the Internet).
225 Just as we must conceive of ourselves as part of an "ecosystem" and
recognize that its preservation as a functioning whole ensures the conditions of our
life.
226 See Wolfgang Kerber & Viktor Vanberg, Constitutional Aspects of
Party Autonomy and Its Limits: The Perspective of Constitutional Economics, in PART
AUTONOMY AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET 50-53
(Grundmann et al., eds., 2001).
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Digital Rights Management 227 (DRM) systems 22 seem to
represent an effective model for distributing information and creative
content in the "digital ecosystem." Due to their peculiar role, these
systems receive recognition and protection both at the national and the
international/conventional level.229  Several commentators have
227 In its most general form, a Digital Rights Management system is an
automated system whose technology is designed to govern the users' behaviors with
regard to certain content. From a technical point of view, such a system might be
characterized in different ways, for example, "how" it protects, "what" it protects
and "where" it protects. Regarding the "how," a DRM may consist of a system
essentially designed to impede certain behavior over the content. Following the new
Chapter 12 of Titled 17 of U.S. Code, added in 1998 by the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, it is possible to distinguish between "access control" measures that
allow the DRM to function as a conditional access system and "rights controls"
measures that allow the user that has obtained the access to undertake certain uses
on it. DRM systems may enforce rules either through "rights control" or "access
control" measures by different degrees of complexity. For example, a DRM may
take the form of a subscription service to a database, charging by hour or month, or
it may have several delivery options such as: start and expiration times ("use
computer program for one hour," or "play on these three hosts"); limits on the
number of times a file can be played ("play once"); or regulations of certain
behaviors, for example copying the file to a CD or portable device. In such
instances, a range of technologies are available to identify the legitimate user and to
allow him or her to enjoy the digital work according to certain rules. DRM systems
potentially allow a "super-distribution" of the digital works, rendering information
providers able "to market documents that disallow certain types of uses (e.g.,
copying) and provide continuing revenue (e.g., charging 2 [cents] per access)."
Regarding "what" is protected, a DRM may be designed to protect personal
information (e.g., medical or financial data), corporate information (e.g., legal or
business documents), or commercial content (e.g. copyrighted material or other non
copyrightable information). From the perspective of the "where" such a system
would operate, it is possible to distinguish technologies that are "hardware based,"
hybrid "software/hardware" based, and "software (and/or online)" based.
228 The difficulty in defining the breadth of the content that might be
considered characteristic of such systems turns on the difficulty of finding an
agreement in their name. Some names specifically characterize the "what" as
"Electronic Copyright Management" (ECMS), "Copyright Management Systems"
(CMS), "Intellectual Property Rights Management" (IPRM); other definitions are
more "neutral" referring to the content as "Automated Rights Management"
(ARM), or "Electronic Rights Management Systems" (ERMS) or the more common
Digital Rights Management (DRM). On the inadequateness of the expression
"DRM," see Pamela Samuelson, Digital Rights Management {and, or, vs. } the Law, 46-
4 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 41, Apr. 2003, who points out that "[g]iven that
DRM permits content owners to exercise far more control over uses of copyrighted
works than copyright law provides, the moniker 'DRM' is a misnomer." Id. at 42. It
is also to be noted that Lawrence Lessig distinguishes from (or within) DRM, the
"DRE" as Digital Rights Expression, whose function would be to "express" rights
rather than enforcing them. See generally Creative Commons, at
http: / /creativecommons. org (extending the principles of the GPL license to creative
works) (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
229 A general legal status of DRM has been recognized by the WIPO
Copyright Treaty of 1996, and by the thirty-nine nations that are parties to that
treaty. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996,
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nevertheless pointed out how such systems may inevitably lead to a
"trade off' between the ability to "control" and a fundamental
doctrine of copyright law as "fair use., 230 Under this model of
distribution (and regulation), users might be unable to enjoy the same
amount of freedom that copyright law traditionally provides them for
the very reason that it protects the copyright ownership: "to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.) 231
We consider DRM to be enforcement systems that at the
existing stage of evolution of the regulative scenario carry a peculiar
character of imposition. On the one hand, this model of enforcement
leads to the creation of "private" legal sub-systems; on the other, the
nature of the digital enforcement may lead the courts and the
legislature to shift toward a more propertized model of copyright law,
36 I.L.M. 65 (1997). Art. 11 of the Treaty states, "Contracting Parties shall provide
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of
effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the
exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict
acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or
permitted by law." Id. at 71. Identical language characterizes the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76, 86, art. 18
(1997), by replacing "authors" with "performers and producers of phonograms." A
legal "reinforcement" for technological measures is also contained in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 1201) (1998). A similar reference is contained in the European Parliament
and Council Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society. Council Directive
2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10-19. Article 6.3 of the Directive defines such
measures: "For the purposes of this Directive, the expression 'technological
measures' means any technology, device or component that, in the normal course of
its operation, is designed to prevent or restrict acts, in respect of works or other
subject-matter, which are not authorised by the rightholder of any copyright or any
right related to copyright as provided for by law or the sui generis right provided for
in Chapter III of Directive 96/9/EC." See also EU COMMISSION STAFF, DIGITAL
RIGHTS: BACKGROUND, SYSTEMS, ASSESSMENT, (Working Paper, 2002), available at
http: //europa.eu'..nt/infornation-society/topics/rn'lhi/digital-rights/doc/wotrksho
p2002/drrn wordngdoc.pdf. For a discussion of the legislative origins of DRM
systems, see Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and
Laws Designedto Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161 (1997).
230 Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights
Management Systems, 15 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 41, 48 (2001) (stating that the
control allowed by DRM "will allow copyright owners to appropriate far more
protection than copyright law now provides"). Fred von Lohmann considers Digital
Rights Management intrinsically inconsistent with the fair use doctrine stating that
"it is plain that DRM technologies, backed by laws like the DMCA, pose a serious
potential threat to fair use. While technical refinements may address or minimize
some of the social costs that stem from an erosion of fair use, it is unlikely that they
will entirely resolve the tension." Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use and Digital Rights
Management.- Preliminary Thoughts on the (Irreconcilable?) Tension Between Them,
Electronic Frontier Foundation, at
http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/fairuseand drm.htn-i (last visited Feb. 28 2004).
231 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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where information would become a mere commodity. We will refer to
the former phenomenon as "Privatization of Law" and to the latter as
"Propertization of Information." Nevertheless, we argue that the
character of imposition is contingent with respect to DRM and
therefore it may be possible to remove it by reshaping the legislation in
a way that would preserve users' rights "within" the DRM model. In
this Part of the paper we investigate the way such imposition takes
place. Nevertheless, aside from the matter of possible regression to a
system of imposition and the discussion over the solutions to it, what
the DRM model more structurally presents is the shifting of content
regulation - and possibly of the legal system - to more complex and
unsystematic relations between private will and public sovereignty,
that is between who creates the legal constraint and who enforces it.
This not-necessarily negative outcome seems to be inevitable as it
depends on the "digitalization of information" and on the capability of
the global society to rely on what might be described as a "juridical
DNA.".
B. DRM AS SYSTEM ENFORCING (IL ?)LEGAL RULES
The rules and behaviors imposed on the user by a DRM system
may affect the individual in several ways; they affect the user's
relation with both "personal information," '232 and "non-personal
information." With regard to "personal information,", DRM may
pose a threat to users' privacy rights not only in the sense of violating
a condition of "inaccessibility" - by constraining behaviors that take
place in "private places" - but also in the sense of recording the
activity of intellectual exploration233  that occurs under such
conditions.234 With respect to "non-personal information," DRM may
be used to control uncopyrightable information and materials in
232 Characterizing the relation of an individual with personal
information is the object of vast debate. The debate is outside the scope of this work.
It has to be noted that such a relation can be imagined in a series of forms. For the
analysis of such relation, in particular for an analysis of the private property
approach, see Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1125 (2000).
233 "DRM technologies that monitor user behaviors create records of
intellectual consumption. Indirectly, then, they create records of intellectual
exploration, one of the most personal and private of activities." Julie E. Cohen,
DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 585 (2003); see also Julie E. Cohen,
A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace,
28 CoNN. L. REV. 981 (1996).
234 As Julie Cohen points out, privacy is "not only a condition of
(relative) inaccessibility, but also a zone of noninterference with individual choice."
Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 233, at 582.
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public domain. 235 The ability to extend control over any use of the
contents may also threaten fair use.236 The fair use doctrine,
237
probably the most important exception to the copyright holder's
rights238 - and the most troublesome 239 - plays a fundamental role in
mediating between copyright law and the freedom of expression
which is constitutionally protected by the First Amendment.24°
Consistent with the principle of freedom of expression, fair use
provides a breathing space for criticism, commentary, or parody2
41
with respect to the works that fall within the realm of the copyright
owner. Consistent with the mirror principle of freedom to access
information, it also represents a means of separating the control of
copyright ownership and the free use of the copyrighted material. For
example, some courts have referred to fair use to justify the temporary
and unauthorized copying of computer programs in order to
235 "Public domain [is] a commons that includes those aspects of
copyrighted works which copyright does not protect . . . ." Jessica Litman, The
Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 968 (1990); see Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to
Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 354 (1999) (describing the relationship between public domain and the First
Amendment); Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1108
(noting that the limited exceptions permitting the circumvention of access control do
not contain a general exception that would allow extraction of facts from a
copyrightable database arrangement, and and argues that this behavior could only be
covered by the "enormously creative judicial construction" of the exception allowing
circumvention to extract unprotectable elements of computer programs in reverse
engineering); Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and
Opportunities, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (2002).
236 The line between public domain and fair use might be drawn by
saying that where public domain covers uses that are unprotectable in principle, fair
use is appropriate to those cases where "the law refuses an owner of copyright a
remedy, even though the work and the aspect of it used are protectible in principle."
Benkler, supra note 235, at 361.
237 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003).
238 See Burk, supra note 235.
239 Judge Learned Hand described fair use doctrine as "the most
troublesome in the whole law of copyright .... ." Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc.,
104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
240 For the relationship between free speech and fair use, see L. Ray
Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987); Harry
N. Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimensions of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 790, 796-98 (1975); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the
First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1190
(1970). For an analysis on the European legal systems, see P. Bernt Hugenholtz,
Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe, in INNOVATION POLICY IN AN
INFORMATION AGE (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al., eds.) (2001).
241 See Richard A. Posner, When is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 67 (1992); Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market
Failure and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305 (1993). The role of fair
use to promote parody was emphasized in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569
(1994); see also Burk & Cohen, supra note 230, at 43-45.
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undertake reverse engineering. 242 It also shields actions that are taken
by users of a copyrighted work in their private spaces, such as time
and space shifting.243 An example of such derogation is the CSS
system that prevents the person who legally acquired a DVD from
copying it."'
DRM may still pose a threat to fair use's "cousins, such as first
sale or limited term."245 The first sale doctrine246 establishes the right to
dispose of one's copy of a work after its "first sale," without requiring
the copyright owner's approval, and "rests on the belief that a
copyright owner has no cognizable interest in a broad range of post-
purchase user activities or in the spaces where they occur." '247 Finally,
242 See e.g., Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d
596, 602-08 (9th Cir. 2000); DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs., 81 F.3d
597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law
& Economics ofReverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002).
243 See Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 233.
244 See Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir.
2001).
245 von Lohmann, supra note 230; see also Cohen, supra note 233. The
application of first sale doctrine is highly problematic in the digital environment. For
an early consideration of the effects of the Clinton Administration White Paper
"Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure," see Pamela
Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, 4.01 WIRED, Jan. 1996; see also Mark A. Lemley,
Copyright Owners' Rights and Users' Privileges on the Internet. Dealing with Overlapping
Copyrights on the Internet, 22 DAYTON L. REV. 547 (1997). European Council
Directive 2001/29/EC expressly addresses the problem of excluding the application
of the doctrine to the Information Society: Recital 29 states that:
The question of exhaustion does not arise in the case of services and
on-line services in particular. This also applies with regard to a
material copy of a work or other subject-matter made by a user of
such a service with the consent of the rightholder. Therefore, the
same applies to rental and lending of the original and copies of
works or other subject-matter which are services by nature. Unlike
CD-ROM or CD-I, where the intellectual property is incorporated
in a material medium, namely an item of goods, every on-line
service is in fact an act which should be subject to authorisation
where the copyright or related right so provides.
2001 O.J. (L 167) 12. Quite interestingly, recently proposed legislation would
address such problem by making the enjoyment of the first sale doctrine conditional
on the elements that traditionally justify its application. The "Digital Choice and
Freedom Act of 2002," submitted by Reps. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) and Mike Honda
(D-CA), addresses this issue stating that "[s]ection 109 of title 17, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: '(f) The privileges prescribed
by subsections (a) and (c) apply where the owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord of a work in a digital or other nonanalog format, or any person
authorized by such owner, sells or otherwise disposes of the work by means of a
transmission to a single recipient, if the owner does not retain his or her copy or
phonorecord in a retrievable form and the work is sold or otherwise disposed of in
its original format.'." H.R. 5522, 107th Cong. §4 (2002).
246 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2003).
247 Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 233.
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"DRM can be used to compel users to view content they would prefer
to avoid (such as commercials and FBI warning notices), thus
exceeding copyright's bounds. ,
248
Given that DRM systems are capable of affecting some
traditional copyright law doctrines,249 before assessing in more detail
the threat that DRM poses for the boundaries of such law, it is
necessary to choose the method by which those constraints should be
analyzed. One possible approach might be to consider them from a
meta-legal perspective. In this context, "meta-legal" describes the view
of an observer standing outside the "lenses" of the law who is able to
see how the law influences individual behavior compared to other
constraints such as market, architecture and technology. We will use
"legal" to describe the perspective of an observer who always looks at
phenomena from the point of view of the law. From the "meta-legal"
perspective, a DRM system may be described as consisting of the
"intersection of technology, law and commercial licenses., 250 The
technological protection written and carried out by anti-circumvention
rules is accompanied by a contractual protection.25 1 A contract may be
used to protect the content - or the security of the DRM system itself -
in the form o licenses resembling the shrink-wrap licenses used for
computer software. The technological and the contractual layers may
be accompanied by a further protection in the form of technology
licenses. 25 2 It is important to note that the first two layers of protection
(technology and contracts) are further enforced by law and
technology: the technology is protected by the re-enforcement rules of
the Anti-Circumvention provisions.253
248 See Pamela Samuelson, supra note 228.
249 As some commentators have noted, the term fair use may be
misleading because it implies that the uses not covered by this doctrine are unfair.
As Julie Cohen points out, "[flair use and other copyright limitations are not outer
limits on permissible uses of copyrighted works and/or the things embodying them.
They are simply outer limits on a copyright owner's statutory rights." Cohen, DRM
and Privacy, supra note 233, at 594 n.52.
250 Dean S. Marks & Bruce H. Turnbull, Technical Protection Measures:
The Intersection of Technology, Law and Commercial Licenses, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 198, 204 (2000).
251 Even if the contractualization of copyright law has not been object
of wide debate in Europe some landmarks are offered by EC Directives. See infra
note 276.
252 For the strategic use of such licenses, see infra note 294.
253 For an analysis of the DRM systems based on this approach, see
Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 AM. J.
OF COMP. LAW (forthcoming 2004); and The Present and Future of Digital Rights
Management - Musings on Emerging Legal Problems, in DIGITAL RIGHTS
MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS,
(Eberhard Becker et al. eds., forthcoming summer 2003), available at
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Consistent with this meta-legal approach, the "lex infornatica"'254
embedded in the DRM may be seen as a unique system of
"alternative" rules to copyright law: rules which are embedded in a
technology that replaces the law255 in its typical power to constrain
behavior. The supporters of such alternative technological rules might
regard DRM as positive and might support256 and require them to be
mandated in all digital media devices.257 Others, however, may regard
such systems as creating a not auspicial "alternative" copyright law
and may shift toward other models of the protection and management
of digital works that seem more respectful of the copyright model.25
Even within the metalegal approach, it is undoubtedly possible to
recognize attempts at mediation where, given the DRM model, further
users' protections are considered possible by initiatives undertaken at
each metalegal layer.259 Nevertheless, a "legal approach" seems quite
http:/ i/,wv.jura.uni-tuebingen.de/bechtold/ pub/2003/Fuure.__DRM.pdf
[hereinafter Bechtold, The Present and Future].
254 See WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS: SPACE, PLACE, AND THE
INFOBAHN (1995); Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds and the First Amendment. Virtual
Doorkeepers in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 335, 338 (1996); Joel R.
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998); ANDREW L. SHAPIRO & RICHARD C.
LEONE, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: How THE INTERNET IS PUTTING
INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW (1999);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). According to
Tom W. Bell the "[o]wners of conventional sorts of property do not rely on the law
alone to protect their assets. They also deploy fences, locks, and guards. Automated
rights management provides the owners of intangible assets with similar defensive
mechanisms, albeit ones built into computer hardware and software and
implemented via firewalls, encryption, and passwords." Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs.
Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine,
76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 564 (1998).
255 "The development of rights management systems powerfully
demonstrates the ability of technology to regulate behavior." Burk & Cohen, supra
note 230, at 50.
256 See Derek Slater, Valenti's Views, HARV. POL. REV., Jan. 25, 2003;
see also WIPO One Year Later. Assessing Consumer Access to Digital Entertainment on the
Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and
Consumer Protection, 106th Cong. 10-16 (1999) (statement of Jack Valenti, Motion
Picture Assoc. of Am.).
257 See Pamela Samuelson, supra note 228. The general use of DRM
might be the result either of standard-setting processes or legislation. An example of
the former was the agreements reached between motion picture and consumer
electronics industries about the application of CSS. An example of the latter is Sen.
Fritz Holling (D-SC)'s Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act
of 2002, S. 2048, 107th Cong. (2002), which gave the copyright industries, the
consumers' representatives, and makers of digital media devices twelve months to
agree upon a DRM standard. Alternatively the bill gives the FCC the power to
require DRM technology be added to consumers electronics devices.
258 Alternative solutions to the DRM model include the levy system
and the compulsory licenses model.
259 See Bechtold, The Present and Future, supra note 253.
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appealing. First, it would clarify the scenario and would be more
adequate to providing solutions. Second, by not taking for granted the
substitution between the technical code and the juridical code, it would
make it easier to distinguish, in content regulation, between a
contingent matter of imposition and the structural matter of "Juridical
Particularism."
The idea that technology is able to replace the law ("code as
code") and not just its enforcement function ("code as enforcement")
is undoubtedly based on reasonable considerations. First, most of the
problems that digital technology creates arise from the way technology
is written. Second, the way certain laws are written, anti-
circumvention provisions for example, renders the writer of the
technology a writer of legal rules ("para-copyright" rules). Here we
argue that the process by which technology replaces the law ("code as
code") is a "fact." Technologists have a peculiar power to write into
the DRM systems rules that constrain users' behaviors. As a matter of
fact, the "code as code" approach is well suited for describing the way
the system as a whole is evolving. Nevertheless, this "replacement" is
exogenous to the nature of a DRM system and possibly exogenous to
the phenomena which characterize the "information society., 260 The
substitution may be viewed as a contingent result of the way rules are
enforced by digital systems. The endogenous element is the peculiarity
of the enforcement. It is because of this peculiar enforcement that,
absent sufficient limits on the designers of the enforcement, the
"technical code" begins to become the "juridical code." Certainly
when an "enforcement system" is left free to act it may take over the
legislative function: "[w]here technological constraints substitute for
legal constraints, control over the design of information rights is
shifted into the hands of private parties, who may or may not honor
the public policies that animate public access doctrines such as fair
use." 261 If it is true that "[m]uch as physical barriers and spatial
relations constrain behavior in actual space, technical standards
constrain behavior in cyberspace,, 262 the types of constraints that the
code represents do not substitute for the law but its enforcement.
260 The expression "Information Society" is used to describe the
Internet in the laws of European Union. The expression "Information
Infrastructure" is more successful in the U.S. legal documents. We might use
Information Society as an ideal target characterized by a typically "human" design.
As the most "human" constraint is the law, the "Information Society" is an
equilibrium where technological constraints are governed by law, in part with the
mechanisms described in this work: by requiring an overlapping between contractual
or public legal rules and technological rules, and by embedding "imperfections."
261 Burk & Cohen, supra note 230, at 51.
262 Burk & Cohen, supra note 230, at 51.
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The peculiarity of the digital technology (or we might say, the
peculiarity of the digitalization)263 consists in the perfection of the
enforcement that it provides and the consequent capability of
combining the "super-diffusion" of the digital technology with the
"super-distribution" allowed by the digital enforcement. Unlike the
traditional "heteronomous" '264  mechanical enforcement systems,
where the enforcement layer is put over the object of regulation and
can be distinguished from it, the "non-heteronomic" digital
enforcement is of the same nature as the object of regulation - the
digital work - and merges with it. This peculiarity affects only the
nature of enforcement and is in itself neutral with respect to the type of
rules that are enforced. The merger between the rule enforced and the
object has an analogue in nature in the structure of DNA. The rules
are perfectly enforced as the language of DNA is embedded in the
object in which such rules are to be enforced. Due to this merger, the
designer of the system has a peculiar power: choosing these rules
grants a peculiar control over the reality that is regulated. The analogy
of digital enforcement as a "juridical DNA" serves also to distinguish
the perfection of the enforcement from the possibility of
circumvention.265
The fact that this enforcement system becomes a "lex
informatica" is an exogenous element and rather than a starting point of
view, it may be regarded as a possibly illegal effect. If the rules written
in the digital DNA lay outside the boundaries of the law - the law
created by institutions established in the constitution or decided,
within certain boundaries, by the freedom of contract - they are illegal.
263 The aspect looked at in this work is digital technology as
"enforcement." Digital technology as a system of enforcement or digitalisation
should be distinguished from digital technology with regard to historical design of
the internet. These prongs of digital technology give rise to different and possibly
opposite tendencies.
264 We consider heteronomous mechanical enforcement systems in
which the enforcement is not merged with the object regulated. An heteronomous
system enforcing private rules is like a newspaper vending machine, enforcing
contractual rules over an object, the newspaper, whose identity is clearly separated
from the system. Heteronomous systems which enforce public rules are, for
example, certain types of security controls that apply rules over an object. Non-
heteronomous enforcement systems are ones in which the enforcement system
merges with the object of regulation. Even if the perception of the creative works is
different, digital enforcement and digital works are written in the same language. As
described later, we offer human DNA as an example of a non-heteronomous
enforcement system.
265 Where the enforcement is perfect in its capacity to apply rules, it is
highly imperfect in the sense of being technically undefeatable. Such differential
imperfection is the best argument for claiming that a DRM model of digital works
management is unworkable. See Peter Biddle et al., The Darknet and the Future of
Content Distribution, 2002 ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management (2002),
available at http: / icrypto stanford.edu /DRMvt2002 /darknet5.d oc.
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If the "lex informatica" does not respect such legal framework it is an
illegal rule. The substitution between law and "lex informatica" is
therefore the "result" of a contingent shifting. The reason for such a
shift can be found in the enforcement, both in the peculiar enforcement
provided by digital technology and in the rules that re-enforce such
technology. When technological enforcement or those legal rules
produce effects that are inconsistent with the legal system, they are a
form of illegal enforcement or illegal rules. If technology has replaced
the law, this replacement should be partially 26 regarded as a
usurpation, rather than an intrinsic and unavoidable feature of this
environment.
In our analysis, we describe the DRM machinery as a
technological system enforcing (il?)legal rules. Like a traditional
mechanical system, DRM may enforce either copyright law267 or other
rules written in express clauses and expressly accepted by the user,268
or legal rules contained in implied contractual clauses and impliedly
accepted by the user269 (legal rules). 270 However, these systems may
also enforce other rules that haven't been even impliedly accepted by
users (illegal rules).271 It is from the peculiarity of such enforcement
that the privatization of law and propertization of information arises.
C. DRM AND PRIVATIZATION OF THE LAW
By "privatization of the law" we refer to the peculiar
phenomenon resulting from the way DRM's enforce the rules
derogating copyright law. On one side, the effects of the derogative
rules that have an (express or implied) contractual basis spill out of the
traditional privity of contract due to the superdiffusion of the DRM
systems. On the other, the rules that are not even implicitly agreed
upon by the user can be unilaterally imposed by the technical systems
due to the re-enforcement of the Anti-Circumvention provisions.
266 In fact, as it has been noted, there are aspects of such substitution
that are positive: the shifting of enforcement into the technology makes it possible to
apply "legal" rules.
267 See Pamela Samuelson, supra note 228, at 42 (stating that DRM is
said to be a "mechanism for enforcing copyright," such as where it is able to prevent
the violations of copyright law, yet it can also easily prevent users from undertaking
tasks that should be allowed under copyright law).
268 A contract or a license might be provided and signed by the user
while acquiring the DRM.
269 The user pursuing content with a commonly known DRM system
might be seen as accepting an implied contractual clause derogating copyright law.
270 These rules are still derogating the copyright law.
271 For example a rule, completely unknown to the buyer, impeding
the use of the content by a consumer electronic device of another state.
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1. DRM ENFORCING "EXPRESS" CONTRACTUAL
DEROGATIONS TO COPYRIGHT LAW
The rules "derogating" copyright law 2 2 may arise from a usage
contracts273 agreed upon by the user at the moment of pursuing the
technology embedding the DRM, or while accessing the digital work.
The contractual derogations enforced by DRM may take as a model
the shrink wrap license.274
The law is silent about whether and when parties may contract
around rights and limitations provided by copyright law. The validity
of contractual derogations of copyright law, has been object of a much
discussion in the U.S. legal system, 275 and has led to some legislative
initiatives in the European Union.276 Further doubts over the validity
272 Pamela Samuelson underlines that as "DRM permits content
owners to exercise far more control over uses of copyrighted works than copyright
law provides .... These technologies are not really about the management of digital
'rights' but rather about management of certain 'permissions' to do X, Y, or Z with
digital information." Samuelson, supra note 228, at 42.
273 Such a contract binding the user to the use of the content, might
provide a contractual basis also for the protection of the system in itself, for example,
forbidding the user from tampering with its security.
274 Licensing has traditionally constituted a way for copyright owners
to avoid the limits that copyright law imposes over their realm. For example, the
first sale doctrine does not apply where the copy of work is leased rather than sold.
See David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV.
17 (1999). Further, a licensing agreement may require the user to renounce a right to
fair use. See Burk & Cohen, supra note 230.
275 See infra, notes 277-78.
276 In Europe this debate is much less developed probably due to the
different role and nature of the "exemptions to copyright law." Within the
legislation of the European Union there are, nevertheless, some important
landmarks affecting the digital environment. In particular European legislature has
been the first to enact copyright limitations of a mandatory nature. In the highly
harmonized area of software and database, the exemptions are set forth in closed
lists and most of them cannot be contracted out. The Computer Programs Directive
lays down a list of mandatory exceptions. Council Directive 91/250/EEC, 1991
O.J. (L 122) 42. Article 5(2) of the Directive states that "[t]he making of a back-up
copy by a person having the right to use the computer program may not be
prevented by contract insofar as it is necessary for that use." Id. Article 9(1) and
Article 5(3) state that the observing, studying or testing of a computer program may
not be contractually restricted. Similarly mandatory are the exemptions covering the
running of a program and error correction, Article 5(1), and decompilation (reverse
engineering). Article 9(1), Article 6, and Recital 17. A similar outcome is provided
by the Database Directive, containing mandatory exemptions. Council Directive
96/9/EC, art. 15, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 1; see also art. 6(1); art. 8. Exceptions set forth in
the Copyright in Information Society Directive are not of such an imperative nature.
Directive 2001/29/CE, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10-19. In the Directive, not only are the
exceptions to be voluntary adopted by Member States (leaving open the possible of a
totally privatized model of copyright law), but also no provision states that they are
mandatory once adopted. In particular, Recital 45 states that "[t]he exceptions and
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of such derogations are raised when the agreement is "obtained" by a
shrink wrap license. At first, U.S. courts denounced such licenses.277
Recent cases, however,278 have upheld their validity279 and the
"Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act" (UCITA) - whose
application depends on a voluntary decision by each State to amend
UCC with a new article 2B - seems to adopt such model2: 0 as a
general model for exchanging content.2 1
One of the strongest arguments against the validity of these
contracts is based on the application of the Constitutional doctrine of
preemption: state contract law may not undermine federal copyright
law. 82 The best argument against such approach has been built on the
principle of the privity of contract, but it is the maintenance of this
latter argument to be troublesome within the DRM ecosystem. In
ProCD, Judge Easterbrook stated that:
limitations ... should not, however, prevent the definition of contractual relations
designed to ensure fair compensation for the rightsholders insofar as permitted by
national law." Id. at 14.
277 Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91,
98-100 (3rd Cir. 1991); Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F.
Supp. 759, 764-66; Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Center, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218
(D. Utah 1997); Morgan Laboratories, Inc. v. Micro Data Base Systems, Inc., 41
U.S.P.Q.2d 1850 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
278 As an example of private contracts unaffected by preemption when
derogating copyright law, see American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
See also Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int'l, Inc., 661 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1981). On
the validity of Shrink-wrap licenses, see ProCD, Inc., v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,
1450-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
279 For a critique of the "sanctity of private property and freedom of
contract, the sharply delimited role of public policy in shaping private transactions,"
see Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights
Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 464 (1998) (also discussing what we have
referred to as the "propertization" of information).
280 For the debate over the relationship between contract and copyright
law, with particular reference to the proposed article 2B of the UCC, see Nimmer et
al., supra note 274; Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 119-21 (1999); Charles R.
McManis, The Privatization (or "Shrink-Wrapping") ofAmerican Copyright Law, 87 CAL.
L. REV. 173 (1999); Pamela Samuelson & Kurt Opsah, Licensing Information in the
Global Information Market. Freedom of Contract Meets Public Policy, 21 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 386 (1999); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and Contract Law for
The Information Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the
Future of Information and Commerce, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1999); J.H. Reichman &
Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling
Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875
(1999).
281 For a possible application of the article 2B model to personal
information, see Samuelson, supra note 232.
282 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2003).
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301(a) preempts any 'legal or equitable rights [under
state law] that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified
by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and come within the
subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102
and 103' . . . . But are rights created by contract
'equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright'? ...Rights 'equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright' are rights established by law - rights that
restrict the options of persons who are strangers to the
author. . . .A copyright is a right against the world.
Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties;
strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not
create 'exclusive rights.'
283
Where the validity of such contracts is recognized, it seems to
be, even in the words of its supporters, the result of a "case by case"
analysis of the nature of the derogation:
Like the Supreme Court in Wolens, we think it prudent
to refrain from adopting a rule that anything with the
label 'contract' is necessarily outside the preemption
clause: the variations and possibilities are too numerous
to foresee. National Car Rental likewise recognizes the
possibility that some applications of the law of contract
could interfere with the attainment of national objectives
and therefore come within the domain of § 301(a). But
general enforcement of shrink-wrap licenses of the kind
before us does not create such interference.2 4
The possibility of one contractual party playing a role
equivalent to a sort of legislator - and therefore the shifting of the
contractual rule toward something "equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright" 25 - has been raised by
some commentators. They have described how certain types of
contractual model (such as standard contract or shrink-wrap licenses)
inevitably tend to have an impact on consumers which affects the
traditional boundaries of the privity of contract, carrying a character of
private legislation. The reason that these contractual derogations carry
such "erga omnes effect" - resembling an alternative legislation under
control of a private party - is that such licenses are unilaterally drawn
283 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
284 Id. at 1453.
285 Id. at 1455.
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by the copyright owner and their diffusion leads, in certain markets, to
a situation where anybody who wants to access a certain type of
content must enter into a contractual relationship with that party.
Some commentators argue that certain types of contractual derogation
to copyright law should be always void,z86 while others ask for a case
by case judgment.27 Robert Merges,28 concerned that they are not
negotiated and particularly widespread in a certain market, has
suggested that these derogations should be void when they resemble a
kind of private legislation: 29 "[s]tandard form software licensing
contracts by virtue of their very uniformity and the immutability - in
other words, non-negotiability - of their provisions, have the same
generality of scope as the state legislation that is often the target of
federal preemption., 290  In certain circumstances, therefore, the
contract loses its negotiable nature and is "equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright., 29 1 Moreover,
these contracts "have the same effect as offending state legislation:
wholesale subversion of an important federal policy."2
9 2
This criticism - resembling (and referring to) the similar
criticism that Friedrich Kessler 93 had for standard contracts - may be
useful in the context of Digital Rights Management. These systems,
indeed, strengthen those phenomena 29 4 as the peculiarities of their
enforcement make the contractual derogations that they impose spill
over the traditional boundaries of the privity of contract. First, the
286 Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial
Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MicH. L. REV. 1570, 1612 (1995).
287 Apik Minassian, Comment, The Death of Copyright. Enforceability of
Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REV. 569, 570 (1998) (arguing that a
case-by-case analysis should be undertaken in order to verify whether or not the
contract should be preempted).
288 See supra note 286.
289 Merges proposes that such contracts might be preempted if their
uniformity within an industry would turn them into a form of private legislation.
290 Merges, supra note 286, at 1613.
291 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
292 "There is something wrong with the wholesale undermining of a
statutory right. I disagree, however, with the implicit premise that the right to
reverse engineer is an immutable right, one that a prospective licensee cannot
surrender in a transaction. Instead, I believe that preemption should occur only
when the practice of contracting away a statutory right has become pervasive and
perpetual in a particular industry setting." Merges, supra note 286, at 1611; see David
A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software
License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543 (1992).
293 Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
294 "[The] paradigm shift resulted from the rise of consumer mass
markets decades ago. Technologies for indicating 'consent' online simply underscore
what we already know to be true: that in mass markets, the idea of a 'meeting of
minds' is little more than a pleasant fiction." Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note
233, at 617 n.86.
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super-diffusion is due to the character of the digital technology which
allows it to be embedded in content and/or in consumer electronic
devices. Second, such diffusion is paralleled by the DRM technology
license agreements.295 The strategic use of the license agreements
makes that even if content providers are not involved in the process of
producing DRM systems or consumer electronic devices, they make
producers of consumer electronic devices to enter into license
agreement with DRM manufacturers producing a high level of
protection for the contents.296 Third, even if in order to access certain
content in the digital environment the user has to enter into a
contractual relation, the contractual relation enforced by the DRM
does not exactly express the limitation of the contractual rules, as it
would under a typical contractual scenario. Even a user that is not
part of that contract would still be bound by such rules because of the
protection provided by the Anti-Circumvention provisions. Whereas
traditionally a third party was not bound by a shrink wrap license,297
the third party of a DRM system would be bound by the enforcement
of an access control or a merged access/rights control as an effect of
the Anti-Circumvention provisions.
Therefore, due to an interaction between the enforcement
provided by technology and the re-enforcement provided by the law,
even when the contractual rules derogating copyright law can be
described as originating from a contract, they seem to have a private29
legislative effect.
295 See Bechtold, The Present and Future, supra note 253; see also
Jonathan Weinberg, Digital TV, Copy Control, and Public Policy, 20 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 277 (2002).
296 Such agreements indirectly serve the interests of the content
provider in the diffusion of consumer electronic devices which respect their DRM
and the rules that they enforce.
297 Even Judge Easterbrook in ProCD stated:
A copyright is a right against the world. Contracts, by contrast,
generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please,
so contracts do not create 'exclusive rights.' Someone who found a
copy of SelectPhone (trademark) on the street would not be affected
by the shrinkwrap license though the federal copyright laws of
their own force would limit the finder's ability to copy or transmit
the application program.
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454.
298 On the issue of representation in cyberspace, see John Perry
Barlow, Private Life in Cyberspace, 34-8 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 23 (1991).
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2. DRM ENFORCING "IMPLIED" CONTRACTUAL
DEROGATIONS TO COPYRIGHT LAW
It is still possible to find a DRM enforcing a contractual
derogation where contractual clauses may be said to have been
implicitly agreed to by the purchaser. 299 The existence of implied
derogations is troublesome from two points of view. First, such
derogations are characterized by the above-described spill-over
effects.300 Second, it is difficult to draw a line between rules that are
implicitly agreed to and known to the consumer, and rules that are not
known but still enforced by the technology.
3. DRM ENFORCING "NON-CONTRACTUAL"
DEROGATIONS TO CONTRACT LAW
In addition to the effects of the "mass contractualization" of
copyright law brought about by the multi-layered DRM enforcement,
this technical legal enforcement challenges the equilibrium between
copyright and contractual derogations in a more unusual way. 01
This other phenomenon depends on the impact of Anti-
Circumvention provisions. These provisions can be schematised by
two intermeddling elements: the object of the ban and the object of the
protection. 3°2 As for the object of the ban, Anti-Circumvention
provisions outlaw the act of circumventing technical measures0 3 or
the trafficking of devices made to circumvent technical measures.30 4 As
for the object of protection, the technical measure protected by the law
can be either an access protection measure or a rights control measure.
299 For example, in the Boucher Bill, requiring information on CD
about rules derogating copyright law DVD, Audio discs and Super Audio CDs are
exempted from the labelling requirements because the marketing and packaging of
these formats already notify consumers that they are not traditional audio compact
discs.
300 See supra notes 289-91.
301 For the analysis of the constitutional issues, see Pamela Samuelson,
Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations
Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999); Anti-Circumvention Rules
Threaten Science, 293 SCIENCE 2028 (Sept. 14, 2001); Burk & Cohen, supra note 230;
Dan L. Burk, Anti-Circumvention Misuse, supra note 235; R. Anthony Reese, Will
Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine the Structure of Anticircumvention
Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 619 (2003); Joseph Liu, The DMCA and the
Regulation ofScientific Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501 (2003).
302 Such a protection results from a double negation: the rules legally
disable what some technology technically tends to disable.
303 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2003).
304 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (2003).
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The interaction between banned behaviors and protected technology is
not symmetric. While the trafficking ban protects access control
measures and right control measures by nearly identical provisions,3"5
the circumvention ban relates only to the circumvention of access
controls.3"6 In the four boxes of the interaction, the box for the
circumvention of right control measure is empty.3"7
The DMCA access control Anti-Circumvention provision does
not have a breathing limitation referring to "other legitimate
purposes." Rather, the provision is limited by a closed set of
exemptions,30 that does not provide a logic for accommodating
unpredicted fair uses30 9 and is inadequate to cover exemptions that
already exist under copyright law.310
305 It is important to note that "while the basic prohibitions on
manufacture of and trafficking in circumvention technologies make no distinction
based on the type of control measure being circumvented, certain of the exceptions
to those basic prohibitions on devices do distinguish between access controls and
rights controls." R. Anthony Reese, supra note 301, at 622 n.7.
306 "Subsection 1201(a)(1) differs from both of these anti-trafficking
subsections [in Sections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)] in that it targets the use of a
circumvention technology, not the trafficking in such a technology." Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 441 (2d Cir. 2001).
307 The Senate Report on the DMCA explains the absence of a rights-
control circumvention ban: "It is anticipated that most acts of circumventing a
technological copyright protection measure will occur in the course of conduct
which itself implicates the copyright owners['] rights under title 17. This subsection
is not intended in any way to enlarge or diminish those rights. Thus, for example,
where a copy control technology is employed to prevent unauthorized reproduction
of a work, the circumvention of that technology would not itself be actionable under
1201, but any reproduction of the work that is thereby facilitated would remain
subject to the protections embodied in title 17." S. REP. No. 105-190, at 29 (1998).
308 There are seven exemptions to Section 1201(a)(1)(A): (a) Non-
profit "shopping" privilege, (b) legitimate law enforcement/national security, (c)
necessary program interoperability, (d) legitimate encryption research, (e) protection
of minors toward harmful material, (f) protection against collection of personal data
(surveillance without notice), and (g) computer security testing.
309 Such an approach would be better fit to serve the interests of other
copyright systems based on a closet rules approach, such as in Europe. It should be
noted that even this character is not really correct.
310 The actual design of the exemptions is ill-suited to cover a series of
exemptions. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why
the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519
(citing several examples). Among these are the following: the case of a copyright
owner who has reason to believe that an encrypted work contained an infringing
version of one of its works; the case of a firm which circumvents a technical
protection system to stop software it had licensed from monitoring certain uses of
the software in ways not contemplated in the license agreement and which the
licensee regarded as unwarranted and detrimental to its interests. See Burk, supra
note 235 (emphasizing that the new access control rights might be used to break the
time limit on copyrighted materials). For an analysis of the inadequateness of the
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These characteristics give rise to a "paracopyright, '311 in which
the new access right is designated by a closed set of exemptions.
Outside these cases, the only way to gain access to technically-
protected works is by the permission of the content owner.312
Therefore, when a user engages in the circumvention of an access
control, and the post-circumvention acts also amount to a copyright
infringement, the copyright violation is accompanied by the illegal act
of circumventing an access control. Even if the post-circumvention
behavior is not a copyright infringement, it might still violate the Anti-
Circumventing rule. The dimension of the fair use provided by the
copyright law is therefore reduced at the layer of the Anti-
Circumvention rule that provides only a limited set of exemptions.
The act of circumventing a right-protection measure is not
outlawed by statute. The legality of the act of the circumvention
depends on the post-circumvention activity.313 Unlike the previous
case, such legality, not being covered by a different layer of
"paracopyright," will be assessed under the general copyright law.
The type of asymmetry characterizing these rules was probably
the result of an (imperfect) attempt by the legislature to preserve the
application of the fair use doctrine. The differential treatment of access
control measures was based on the idea that lawful access is a
prerequisite for fair use rights.314  Such a requirement, some
commentators say, can be understood by an analogy to private
property where there is no right to break and enter a dwelling in order
to gain access to public domain information.315 Dan Burk and Julie
Cohen have pointed out that even following such an argument316 the
research exemption, see Joseph Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific
Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2003).
311 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 24 (1998) (quoting a letter
where 62 law professors define DMCA Anti-Circumvention provisions as
"paracopyright"); see also Burk, supra note 235, at 1106 (stating that "DMCA anti-
circumvention provisions . . . enable a new form of exclusive right, a right of
access").
312 See Burk, supra note 235, at 1109 (stating that "[t]his new right of
access facilitates not merely the licensing of copyrighted materials copyright law
standing alone would enable such licenses but also allows licensing of access to
unprotected materials. Just as in the case of any other intellectual property right, the
owner of technologically controlled materials may authorize or deny access, which
is to say that he may license access."
313 Reeves, supra note 299.
314 See Samuelson, supra note 228.
315 See David Friedman, In Defense of Private Orderings, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1151 (1998); Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between
Contract and Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827 (1998).
316 This argument is not easy to agree to as "both the economics of
intangible information and the scope of state-granted rights in informational works
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owner of a private real estate cannot fence in public domain
property.317 Therefore, the access limitation should be legitimate as far
as the fence does not apply to public property.
The legislative history of DMCA reveals that the legislature
was willing to preserve this balance. The Report of the Committee of
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives accompanying the
DMCA stated: "[a]n individual [should] not be able to circumvent in
order to gain unauthorized access to a work but [should] be able to do
so in order to make fair use of a work which he or she has acquired
lawfully." '318 Such an asymmetry as we have pointed out would have
addressed this need.319 If this was the purpose of the legislature, the
problem shifts to how access control and copy control measures are to
be distinguished. Copyright owners have a strong incentive to use
access protection systems rather then copy protection systems and to
sustain a broad interpretation of the access control provisions.32 ° In the
course of interpreting these rules, some courts have widened the
concept of access protection by recognizing it in cases of merger
protection.321 The result is that technology writers use access control to
fence in as much content as they can. The strategic use of access
control outside the boundaries of copyright law, even in absence of
consent the derogation of general law, becomes an essential
instrument of private legislation.
Consequently, the copyright owner may cause the consumer to
contractually relinquish his rights. Outside the perimeter of these
already troublesome contractual clauses, the use of access controls or
merged controls allows the technology writer to limit behaviors which,
even if legitimate under copyright law and not given up by contract,
nevertheless constitute infringement of re-enforcement rules.
differ markedly from the economic and legal bases for private rights in real
property." Burk & Cohen, supra note 230, at 52.
317 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061, 1063 (2003); Camfield v. United States, 167
U.S. 528 (1897); Stoddard v. United States, 214 F. 566 (8th Cir. 1914); Hanley v.
United States, 186 F. 711 (9th Cir. 1911).
318 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 15 (1998) (Section-by-Section
Analysis of § 1201(a)(1)).
319 The anti-circumvention rule of 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) "does not
apply to the subsequent actions of a person once he or she has obtained authorized
access to a copy of a work protected under Title 17, even if such actions involve
circumvention of additional forms of technological protection measures. In a fact
situation where the access is authorized, the traditional defenses to copyright
infringement, including fair use, would be fully applicable. So, an individual would
not be able to circumvent in order to gain unauthorized access to a work, but would
be able to do so in order to make fair use of a work which he or she has acquired
lawfully." H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18.
320 See Reese, supra note 301.
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4. 'JURIDICAL PARTICULARISM'
The digital enforcement of preemptive rules - undertaken by
the described distribution/regulation model - leads to a derogative
system which is "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright. 3 22 The idea of "private legislation" - used
before and outside of DRM,3 23 but here referring only to the peculiar
characteristics of DRM 24 - might make it possible to think of this
model of distribution/regulation as a form of neo-feudalism. Working
in the context of adhesion and standard contracts, Friedrich Kessler3 25
analyzed the regression of several contractual relations away from the
nineteenth-century model, which was based on bilateral relationships,
toward a model in which status predominated over will and "powerful
industrial and commercial overlords ... impose a new feudal order of
their own making upon a vast host of vassals."
When considering DRM, the metaphor of feudalism seems
inadequate for two reasons. First, the feudal model was an organic
system that developed before the existence of the modern state. In
contrast, the privatization of the law phenomenon does not give rise to
an organic system, but rather to an unstructured coexistence of
subsystems which is based on a dynamic and tense relationship with
legislation (copyright law). Second, the image of feudalism highlights
the unfair imposition of overlords on vassals (copyright owner and
users).326 Quite differently, the effects of the privatization of law do not
necessarily create a system of imposition but instead, perhaps more
neutrally, a different model of regulation. Private law might be looked
at as a peculiar and possibly inevitable way to regulate the digital
environment. Even though it is characterized by a different
322 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
323 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Expanding Boundaries of the Law:
Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 1570 (1995) (reviewing PETER A. ALCES & HAROLD F. SEE, THE
COMMERCIAL LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1994)); see also J.H. Reichman &
Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling
Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875
(1999). See also the older view expressed in Kessler, supra note 293.
324 "Plaintiffs seek, through CSS, to write their own copyright laws, to
put legal force behind any restrictions chosen by a copyright holder, without respect
for time limits on copyright, the amount of uncopyrightable material within the
protective envelope, or the doctrines of first sale and fair use." Brief of Professor
Charles R. Nesson as Amicus Curiae, Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001), available at
htp: //cyberlawhavard.edui/openlawi/DVD ifilings/iN Y/05 1 0-amicus.htm].
325 Kessler, supra note 291, at 640.
326 For the use of the feudalism as a model of imposition in the digital
environment, see Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?." Metaphors and
Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207 (2002).
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equilibrium between law enforcement and will, this new approach
may not structurally lead to a system of imposition.3 27
Based on such considerations, it would be preferable to refer to
Juridical Particularism,328 a concept used by nineteenth-century
French and Italian Juridical Positivism3 29 to describe the structure of
the legal systems in continental Europe (particularly in France)
between the seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries. The
situation to which historical Juridical Particularism referred was
characterized by the existence of a multitude of sub-legal systems,
some inherited from the feudal era, which intermingled with other
legal systems. These multiple layers interacted within a legally-
decentralized monarchy. The uncoordinated and intermingled systems
coexisted with a multitude of different iurisdictiones,33 ° in which
independent authorities were able to produce and to apply the law.
The iurisdictiones did not produce and enforce the law solely on behalf
of the monarch, but also as an expression of private sovereignty.
The model of distribution/regulation arising from DRM can be
contingently characterized by the imposition undertaken by private
parties through meta-legal constraints, and the model may result in the
substitution of technical code for the legal code. This Article deals
327 If this possibility were not true then the existence and the use of
DRM and their erga omnes effects might be regarded as structurally illegal under the
traditional principles of copyright law.
328 See GIOVANNI TARELLO, STORIA DELLA CULTURA GIURIDICA
MODERNA (1976).
329 The doctrine was not popular in Germany, and it is still
characterized by a tendency toward corporativism and historicism.
330 The word iurisdictiones, used in this context, cannot simply be
translated as jurisdiction. lurisdictiones are those private or public entities capable of
applying rules, and at the same time of undertaking a certain legislative production.
Enforcement and private legislation are also characteristic of DRM systems.
Whereas the first element is highly troublesome from a legal point of view, the
second is, to a certain extent, neutral. Its legality depends on the way it is
undertaken and on the rules that are enforced. See Julie E. Cohen who, referring to
the Reporter's Notes and the prefatory memorandum accompanying Proposed
Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), points out:
[B]oth ... make clear their belief that even mass market contracts
that are inconsistent with copyright are not necessarily invalid ....
Such material could be repossessed or 'depossessed' electronically
only if the licensor first gained physical possession of the copy
(subject to the 'breach of the piece' limitation) or if the license
authorized the repossession and the licensor gave at least ten
business days' notice."
Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of SelfHelp, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1089 (1998). See also the Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 5211, 109th Cong. (2002),
introduced in July 2002 by Reps. Howard Coble (R-NC) and Howard Berman (D-
CA), which would release copyright owners from liability for hacking the file
systems of suspected peer-to-peer copyright infringers.
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with such problems of imposition. Nevertheless, even if we solve the
threat of imposition, it is not possible to avoid recognizing the other
structural features of this model, including its Juridical Particularism.
In the DRM context, and more broadly in digital enforcement, we do
not use this notion to describe the possible regression to a system of
imposition. Instead, it refers to the structural, and not necessarily
negative, shifting of digital content regulation - and of the legal system
- to more complex and unsystematic relations between private will
and public sovereignty - between who creates the legal constraint and
who enforces it.
D. USERS' PROTECTION MODEL AND THE
PRIVATIZATION OF INFORMATION
Another aspect of the imposition that DRM and the
digitalization of information may produce does not emerge from an
attempt by copyright owners or DRM developers to rewrite the
copyright law, but instead from a certain interpretation of copyright
law which tends to shift the law toward a stronger propertarian model.
In such a model, aside from a closed set of exemptions, there is no real
space for a fair use doctrine. Such a phenomenon, which we describe
as the "propertization of information," is grounded in a variety of
approaches, and represents not a derogation of copyright law, but an
alleged clarification of it.331 This process of clarification particularly is
strengthened by the advent of digital enforcement.
The two phenomena, propertization of information and
privatization of law, may partially overlap.33 2 On the one hand, the
ability of the copyright owner to rewrite copyright law might be
justified by arguing that fair use was invalid in the first place. The
same strategy can be pursued by sustaining the legitimacy of the para-
copyright provisions which allow DRM producers to impose and
enforce private legislation.333 On the other hand, it is true that the same
331 See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, who describes the "[a]ttempts to expand
(or, more subtly, 'clarify') the scope of copyright protection" in the European and
international contexts. P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Fierce Creatures, Copyright Exemptions:
Toward Extinction?, Rights, Limitations and Exceptions: Striking a Proper Balance,
IFLA/IMPRIMATUR CONFERENCE 30-31 (Oct. 1997).
332 Some commentators in fact treat such phenomena in the same
context. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy
of 'Rights Management,' 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998).
333 The anticircumvention rules structurally allow copyright owners
and technology writers to develop and impose on the user certain behaviors which
are limited not by copyright law but by a closed set of exemptions. In Corley, the
constitutional challenge to anticircumvention rules was based on the alleged
restriction of fair use. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d
Cir. 2001). The court rejected the challenge in part not by demonstrating that fair use
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forces that support the models of private legislation also support a
rewriting of the copyright laws.334
The phenomena nevertheless seem to differ in the sense that
assuming a model of propertized information would affect the possible
user behaviors beyond the boundaries of the technical enforcement.
Congress might allow users to enjoy only the uses that the technology
and a wide - but limited - set of exemptions allowed.
The propertization of information represents a threat to the
future effectiveness of the breathing exemption that a users' protection
approach is intended to preserve.335 It is also a potential threat to the
existence of other limitations on copyright, such as the limited times
clause336 and the first sale doctrine.337 It is a phenomenon involving the
legislature,33 but one which is also developed by commentators,339 and
applied by courts.
1. FAiR USE AS A CONTINGENT
RESPONSE TO A MARKET FAILURE
A first argument consistent with a propertarian model of
information can be found within the interpretation of the fair use
which is unpredictable in practice was not threatened, but by shifting to the
argument that even assuming constitutional relevance of such a doctrine, there was
not a fair use to be breached in the case described. "[W]e know of no authority for
the proposition that fair use, as protected by the Copyright Act, much less the
Constitution, guarantees copying by the optimum method or in the identical format
of the original." Corley, 273 F.3d at 459.
334 Both the ability to unilaterally derogate copyright law and to
interpret copyright law in the digital environment so as to nullify the impact of fair
use doctrine serve the interests of copyright owners. See Cohen, supra note 279, at
468 (referring to a peculiar "Convergence of Economic Imperatives and Natural
Rights").
335 As the propertization of information can affect other traditional
limitations on copyright law, it is relevant even in systems based on a droit d'auteur
tradition. For the expansion of copyright law affecting the European system, see
Hugenholtz, supra note 331, at 30-3 1.
336 The process of stretching the constitutional limit of limited times, is
not new to copyright law. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
337 See supra note 245.
338 An instance of the propertization of information may be seen in the
design of Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 245, which provides a list of exemptions
which a member state can decide whether or not to adopt.
339 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure. A Structural and
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doctrine as a legal response to a market failure.3 40 Since some uses are
not profitably controllable by the copyright owner, the legal system
allows such uses to be freely enjoyed by users. By this reasoning, when
technology is capable of perfect control (as with the enforcement
undertaken by DRM) and it can eliminate such market failures, it is
also potentially capable of eliminating the justification for fair use. In
this scenario, what might still be called copyright law would result in a
law of privatized information limited only by a closed set of
exemptions, chosen by the legislature.
The basis of this approach, the foundation of which was laid
before the wide advent of digital technology,341 is the fact that the
existence of high market barriers - such as transaction costs,
externalities, and non-monetizable benefits - leaves the copyright
owner with a structural inability to profit from certain uses of his or
her creative content. Due to the impossibility of creating a profitable
market for these uses, the legal system requires the copyright owner to
give them away. The renewed possibility of making a profit would
eliminate this justification. 3 42
The assumption of this approach is that the copyright owner
initially has legitimate control over all the covered information and
that it is only due to a contingent market failure for such goods that the
otherwise illegal use becomes fair.3 43 This argument has been
challenged. The Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 344
found a fair use defense for parody even if a licensing market was
340 Market failure, as defined by economists, refers to a situation where
voluntary market exchange cannot achieve the socially optimal allocation of
resources. See Cohen, supra note 279, at 471 n.25. One of the justifications for
copyright protection is as a response to a market failure. According to Gordon, "[i]f
the creators of intellectual productions were given no rights to control the use made
of their works, they might receive few revenues and thus would lack an appropriate
level of incentive to create." Gordon, supra note 339, at 1610. For the different
justifications of copyright law, see WILLIAM FISHER, THEORIES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY. The market failure approach to fair use seems to be more troublesome.
For the market failure justification of fair use explanation, see Gordon, supra note
339, at 1627. See also Burk & Cohen, supra note 2; Raymond Shih Ray Ku,
Consumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 539 (2003) (critiquing the market failure approach to fair use).
341 See Gordon, supra note 339, at 1627.
342 Gordon proposes a three-pronged approach for assessing the need
for fair use, which would require: (a) the existence of a market failure; (b) the social
desirability of the transfer of the use to the defendant; and (c) the absence of
"substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copyright owner." Gordon, supra
note 339, at 1614.
343 See Gordon, supra note 339, at 1615 ("An economic justification for
depriving a copyright owner of his market entitlement exists only when the
possibility of consensual bargain has broken down in some way.").
344 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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likely to develop.345 However, the described tendency has nonetheless
been followed by courts and commentators.346
In the courts, this approach has arisen within the interpretation
of the fourth factor set out in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003), 347 which requires
an assessment of the effect of the alleged infringing use upon the
potential market for the copyrighted work. 34 If the ultimate
justification of fair use lies in a market failure, then as long as a
profitable market for the alleged fair use exists, it is very likely that the
potential market would be affected.
In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,3  the court dealt
with the issue of whether to apply the fair use defense to the
photocopying by Texaco researchers of articles originally published in
a scientific journal.350 In order to resolve this issue the court considered
345 The Court found the adaptation of a song by the group 2 Live Crew
to be fair use. Commentary, criticism, and parody are seen as a "second type of
market failure in which the value of socially beneficial uses of copyrighted works is
not fully internalized." Burk & Cohen, supra note 230, at 44; see also Merges, supra
note 241.
346 Gordon claims that both the Williams & Wilkins and the Betamax
cases are confirmation of his approach. Gordon, supra note 339; see Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affTd, 420 U.S. 376
(1975); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(Betamax case). One critic claims that the possibility of licensing and a new market
for time-shifting was not relevant to the majorities' fair use analyses. See Shih Ray
Ku, supra note 340, at 555.
347 The test used to assess fair use consists of the follow four factors: 1)
"the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;" 2) "the nature of the copyrighted
work;" 3) "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole;" and 4) "the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003); see Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nat'l Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
348 As the Court pointed out in Harper & Row, the fourth factor was
regarded as "the single most important element of fair use." Harper & Row, 471 U.S.
at 566. Since Acuff-Rose, which stated that "all [four factors] are to be explored, and
the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright," 510 U.S. at 578,
courts seem to have abandoned the idea that the fourth factor enjoys any primacy.
349 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
350 The relationship between the extension of fair use and market
failure had been previously raised in Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), where the court considered copying to be not protected
by a fair use defense, as the sale of anthologies or packets to students would have
had significant impact on the sale of textbooks, since the copy shop was a for-profit
operation. The court nevertheless seemed to attempt to draft a balance, stating that
"[w] hile it is possible that reading the packets whets the appetite of students for more
information from the authors, it is more likely that purchase of the packets obviates
purchase of the full text." Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1534. The court did not
engage in an analysis of the potential market, but rather concentrated on the damage
to the existing market. A reaffirmation of the principle was provided by Princeton
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the relationship between the fair use defense and the actual or potential
existence of marketable control over such uses.351 The district court's
decision had regarded the existence of a possible licensing/royalty
market as a ban on the recognition of a fair use defense.352
The Second Circuit claimed that the rigid and extensive
application of such a principle might lead to troublesome outcomes
because "were a court automatically to conclude in every case that
potential licensing revenues were impermissibly impaired simply
because the secondary user did not pay a fee for the right to engage in
the use, the fourth fair use factor would always favor the copyright
holder." '353 In an attempt to re-shape and limit this approach,35 4 the
court stated that, in order to be relevant under the fourth factor, the
character of the potential market had to be either "traditional,
Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). In Princeton
University Press, the court held that for-profit copying of academic readers could not
be a fair use. For reasoning on the cases, see Lloyd Weinreb, Fair's Fair.- A Comment
on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (1990).
351 Certainly one important factor in the decision was that what might
constitute a fair use for an individual user, might not be fair use for a multitude to
practice. Louise Weinberg has pointed out that:
Copyright proprietors claim that even if each individual act of
library photocopying constitutes a "fair use," the problem is so great
in the aggregate as to effect a shift from a fair use to infringement
.... What may be fair use in the individual case may seem less so
when advanced technology can multiply the transaction endlessly.
Louise Weinberg, The Photocopying Revolution and the Copyright Crisis, PUB. INT. L.
REP. 99, 108 (1975). Such an argument might be applied to the assessment of fair
uses and the mass effects of circumventing devices.
352 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). The Second Circuit commented that:
[I]f Texaco's unauthorized photocopying was not permitted as fair
use, the publishers' revenues would increase significantly since
Texaco would (1) obtain articles from document delivery services
(which pay royalties to publishers for the right to photocopy
articles), (2) negotiate photocopying licenses directly with
individual publishers, and/or (3) acquire some form of
photocopying license directly with individual publishers, and/or (3)
acquire some form of photocopying license from the Copyright
Clearance Center Inc.
Texaco, 60 F.3d at 929.
353 Id. at 930 n. 17.
354 In Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 592, the Supreme Court noted that there
was no recognition of a derivative market for critical works only because of the
unlikelihood "that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or
lampoons . . . ." In Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d
1366, 1377 (2d Cir. 1993), the exclusion of the impact of the fourth factor on fair use
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reasonable, or likely."3 ' In Texaco, the market was recognized and this
justified the exclusion of the fair use defense.3"6 Even the dissenting
judge did not challenge this approach and evaluated the three
requirements of likelihood, reasonableness, and traditionality as
adequate for reshaping and limiting the impact of the fourth element
(impact on the potential market).357 However, the dissent argued that
the possible market in Texaco did not have such characteristics,
because "the CCC scheme is neither traditional nor reasonable; and its
development into a real market is subject to substantial
impediments.""3 The principle stated in Texaco, when applied within
as perfect a system of control as digital enforcement, would put a wide
range of traditional fair uses back into their - allegedly - "natural"
position: under the control of the copyright owner. This effect again
would not depend on the initiative of technologists and copyright
owners, but would flow from a "clarification" of the copyright law.
Such an interpretation might result in a propertization of
information in the digital ecosystem in a way that might have different
degrees of application. In an advanced application of such approach,
Trotter Hardy suggests a total proprietization of information in the
digital environment by abandoning copyright law.359 Tom Bell36
imagines a world where lawmakers "should allow information
consumers and providers to exit freely from copyright law into
contract law." '361 The contract in this case, even if it might appear to be
a derogation of copyright law, would simply be the result of
negotiation over a good: the information.362 Unlike in the Hardy
355 Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930 ("[O]nly an impact on potential licensing
revenues for traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets should be
legally cognizable when evaluating a secondary use's 'effect upon the potential
market' . . ..").
356 The Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) collects photocopying
royalties.
357 Texaco, 60 F.3d at 932 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
358 Id. at 937.
359 Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 217.
360 Bell, supra note 254. Among others, Bell refers to the approach of
the report of the U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS (1995), available at
htap: //Nwvvuiispto.gov/web/offices/com/dociipnii/ipnii.pdf [hereinafter NII
WHITE PAPER], which refers to a possible reduction of fair use rights in the digital
environment as a consequence of the diffusion of DRM, saying that fair use doctrine
"does not require a copyright owner to allow or to facilitate unauthorized access or
use of a work." Id. at 231.
361 Bell, supra note 360, at 562.
362 See Bell, who points out that "[i]ncreasingly, consumers in all
probability will find that access to information in digital intermedia comes subject to
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model, in the Bell approach copyright law would still play some
minimal role.363 Such privatization would result in a benefit for the
users, as it would make available, in the digital environment, valuable
content at a low price. According to Bell, "[e]ntrepreneurs can create a
world where information costs less than it does under fair use, and
perhaps even one where the public gets paid to consume
information. 36 4 Paul Goldstein365 highlights the way in which the
increased potential for control created by technology should allow
copyright owners stronger control over uses.366 "Lawmakers should be
quick to extend copyright to encompass ...[such uses], even if the
rules are construed as private." '367 Consistent with this view, the rule
preventing Congress from extending copyright control over private
uses is seen as justified only by contingent transactional costs.368 Under
this model, the criterion of a discipline without exceptions to liability369
would still be limited due to the existence of the express exceptions
chosen for their social value by the legislature.370
The main criticism raised against the Texaco approach has been
one of circularity. If the core of the fair use assessment is to verify the
fairness of a use and the consequent impossibility of a copyright owner
controlling and licensing such a use, then the existence of a potential
contractual provisions that aim to secure rights more broad than those provided by
the Copyright Act." Bell, supra note 360, at 577.
363 See Cohen, supra note 279, at 477 (stating that Bell still considers
copyright law as a sort of source of default legal rules).
364 Bell, supra note 360, at 562
365 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY, THE LAW AND LORE
OF COPYRIGHT FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 200 (1994).
366 See GOLDSTEIN, supra, at 200 ("[S]ince the statute of Anne,
copyright has aimed at subjecting the production of literary and artistic works to the
discipline of market forces; because the celestial jukebox can keep a record of every
selection a subscriber makes, and the price he paid for it, copyright owners will have
a far more precise measure of the demand for their products than they do today.").
367 Id. at 200.
368 Id. at 217.
369 Goldstein points out:
[A]s these costs dissolve, so, too, should the perceived need for
safety valves such as fair use. Indeed, the economic logic of the
celestial jukebox, when superimposed on the text of the Copyright
Act, might produce a law that contains no exemptions from liability
at all. Even if not repealed, these exemptions will atrophy as
suppliers obligate their subscribers contractually to pay for now
exempted uses of copyrighted material.
Id. at 224.
370 See id. ("[O]ne problem with this logic is that the celestial jukebox
will not entirely displace traditional copyright markets, where exemptions will still
be needed. Also, some of the 1976 Act's exemptions are there, not because of
transactions costs, but because certain uses and users serve socially valuable ends.
The statutory exemption for classroom performances of copyrighted works in non-
profit educational institutions is one example.").
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market might be the result in the the negation of fair use rather than its
justification. The circularity criticism is valid where the adopted
concept of fair use is based on the assumption of a continuing balance
between freedom and control as existing in the functional
constitutional propertarian model. If the existence of propriety over
information is only justified by the need to stimulate creativity, the
ability of fair uses to foster such innovation must also be recognized.371
However, if the reasoning is based on a market failure model, then it is
not circular. If the ultimate justification of fair use is a failure in the
market mechanism for a certain use, the existence of a market for such
a use, undertaken without the copyright owner's consent, impedes its
qualification as fair use. The court in Texaco seems to retain such a
market failure approach. The limits put forth on such an approach -
"traditionality," "reasonableness," and "likelihood" - are not
inconsistent with it.
Even if this market failure reasoning is not itself vitiated by
circularity, similar circularity seems to arise when this reasoning is
regarded as a demonstration of what the market failure approach itself
implies: the commodified nature of information.372 The market failure
model of fair use implies a market constituted by uses of the
copyrighted works which are mere commodities belonging to the
copyright owner.373 Applying such an approach to perfect digital
enforcement would mean creating a model of a privatized information
market. The circularity of the market failure model374 arises not when
it is used as a descriptive model for calculating the role of given values,
but when it is suggested as a tool capable of focusing and choosing
among those values.375 On the contrary, such an approach is logically
371 Referring to the public domain, Jessica Litman argues that "[t]he
public domain should be understood not as the realm of material that is undeserving
of protection, but as a device that permits the rest of the system to work by leaving
the raw material of authorship available for authors to use." Jessica Litman, The
Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 968 (1990).
372 It is true that under a market failure approach, where the control is
perfect then fair use is likely to be limited. It is also true that when applied to digital
enforcement, under such a doctrine fair use may disappear. The theory does not add
anything to the discussion of the nature of information, as its very premise is that
information is a good.
373 See Cohen, supra note 279, at 510 ("Hardy's 'pie' is incomplete, in
that it omits the slice consisting in 'no-protection,' . . ").
374 Although not the circularity of the reasoning which is based upon
that model.
375 See Cohen, supra note 279, at 510 (criticizing the application of the
Gordon argument by Hardy). Cohen states that:
[F]or Hardy's model to be accurate, we must know what sort of
access regime would maximize the production and distribution of
creative and informational works over the long term, and know that
assigning absolute property entitlements to copyright owners would
lead to implementation of that regime more cheaply .... Even if it
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inconsistent since the privatized nature of information is not its
conclusion but its premise.
2. NON-EXISTENCE OF A GUARANTEE TO ENJOY A
FAiR USE BY THE "PREFERRED TECHNIQUE"
While the above approach leads to the privatization of
information based on a market failure model of fair use, another type
of argument leads to a similar result by a clarification of the
application of fair use doctrine in the context of a new technology. In
Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001), the court
dealt with a constitutional challenge based on an alleged DMCA-based
violation of the fair use doctrine. In its reasoning about the application
of the anticircumvention provisions, the court analyzed the impact of
the digital technology on fair use doctrine. The appellants, accused of
violating the DMCA, contended that "fair use extends to works in
whatever form they are offered to the public," referring to the need for
the user to be able to enjoy the content of a DVD in digital form.3 76
After expressing numerous doubts as to the constitutional basis of the
doctrine, the court rejected the characterization that the fair use
doctrine, as protected by the Copyright Act, guarantees copying by the
optimum method or in the identical format to the original, and pointed
out that it has never been held that the fair access to copyrighted
material must be undertaken "by the fair user's preferred technique or
in the format of the original. 3 77 Therefore, the court found that the
possibility of enjoying such use through other available technologies,
even those of inferior quality, would have fulfilled the users' fair use
demands. "The fact that the resulting copy will not be as perfect or as
manipulable as a digital copy obtained by having direct access to the
DVD movie in its digital form, provides no basis for a claim of
unconstitutional limitation of fair use." In the court's view, then, other
available reproduction methods such as analog copying can provide
sufficient fair use.
The Corley appellants' arguments presupposed the idea that the
enjoyment of fair use was an inherent feature of copyright law which
evolves along with changing technology in order to address the
constitutional purpose of promoting progress and useful arts.
Consistent with such an approach, copyright law has always
results in increased consumer access to digital works, a private law
regime designed to maximize control will not necessarily result in
more or better creative progress.
See Cohen, supra note 279, at 497.
376 Corley, 273 F.3d at 459 n. 35.
377 Id. at 459.
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represented a balanced response to technological change. In the
Betamax case,37 the Supreme Court noted that when a new technology
arises, the assessment of the balance between control and freedom
must be considered very carefully by the courts:
[A]s new developments have occurred in this country, it
has been the Congress that has fashioned the new rules
that new technology made necessary .... In a case like
this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our
course, we must be circumspect in construing the scope
of rights created by a legislative enactment which never
contemplated such a calculus of interests. 379
If the legislature had decided to change this balance in the
digital environment, it might have done so on the grounds that such a
choice would have been the result of the demonstrated higher ability of
a commodified information model in such an environment to address
the need to foster innovation. There is no such claim in the DMCA,
however, 3 ° and the history of the statute demonstrates the absence of
such a legislative intent.
If this is true, it should have been necessary for the Corley court
to consider whether the anticircumvention rules constituted a threat to
the fair use doctrine, considered under the traditional assessment.
However, the court declined to assess whether the DMCA
anticircumvention provisions would limit the extension of the doctrine
in the digital technology environment.3 1
Instead, the court shifted to an argument which was only
partially different from the one stated by the appellants.3 2 The court
built its reasoning on the principle that the Constitution does not
ensure the enjoyment of a certain quality of fair use. This argument
not only fails to address the impact of the anticircumvention provisions
on fair use, but also widens the application of the argument that the
Constitution does not guarantee the best technology available to enjoy
fair use. If widely applied, this argument would subvert the role of fair
use doctrine in digital enforcement. Since alternative technologies are
available, even if they are of inferior quality, the consumer would
378 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984) (Betamax case).
379 Id. at 430-31.
380 On the contrary, the DMCA expressly states the unwillingness of
the legislature to alter the assessment of fair use. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2003).
381 Corley, 273 F.3d at 451.
382 One long-standing judicial strategy is to re-characterize the
opponent's premise as a weaker position which cannot objectively be agreed with.
This seems to be the strategy used by the Corley court.
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always be provided with a "sufficient" amount of fair uses. From the
point of view of the consistency of this reasoning with the nature of the
doctrine, the argument seems to destabilize the traditional relationship
between copyright law and technological change stated in Betamax.
Furthermore, the Corley court did not consider the cost of acquiring the
alternative technology through which the alternative fair use may be
enjoyed. Even if we exclude the existence of a guarantee to enjoy a
best available quality fair use, we must still distinguish between an
alternative fair use - of inferior quality - which can be provided by the
same technology, by one reasonably accessible to the user, or by a
different technology that involves undue efforts, as in Corley.
3. FAIR USE V. DROITD'AUTEUR: NATURAL RIGHTS
AS THE SHAPE OF ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES
Another form of the propertization of the law may consist of a
shifting of the copyright model toward a system resembling a droit
d'auteur approach. Several commentators have discussed both the
tendency toward shrinking the enumerated exemptions in the droit
d'auteur systems" 3 and the reduction of fair use in copyright law. What
is interesting to note, particularly considering the worldwide
application of the DRM model, is that the phenomenon of
privatization of information, where it is challenging the very nature of
the fair use exemption,34 may find convenient intellectual
justifications under the droit d'auteur systems. The droit d'auteur model,
born as a shield against privileges," 5 may give the copyright owner a
perfect tool of power. In the digital environment, natural law might
383 For a European commentary, see Hugenholtz, supra note 329.
384 See Von Lohmann, supra note 230; see also Samuelson, supra note
228, at 42 (discussing the need for an open exemption for "many legitimate
reasons").
385 In the European legal tradition, the existence of absolute rights is
the traditional instrument used to avoid privileges. In copyright law, such design of
the law might have a chilling effect as the absoluteness of the natural right tends to
positively affect the real owner of the rights that is, producers. This function of the
natural right which resembles a privilege itself on the other side of the Atlantic is
in fact consistent with the development of continental European thinking. The end
of juridical particularism and the system of intermingling privileges and private
legislation was in fact due to the process of juridical centralization undertaken by
absolutism. This process, carried out by the monarch, and supported by legal
thinkers, was the basis of the codification of laws. In different contexts, such a
process was theorized by Samuel von Pufendorf, Gottfield Wilhelm Leibniz, and in
France by Jean Domat and Robert Joseph Pothier. See, e.g., SAMUEL VON
PUFENDORF, ELEMENTA JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS (1660).
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become the best ally for the economic imperatives which ground part
of the process of privatization of information.386
Copyright law may be seen as grounded in an attempt to defeat
privileges and monopolies. Under the droit d'auteur model the same
purpose results in the enjoyment of an absolute right. In the copyright
model, the property right is not recognized as a private interest.38 7
Even if that property right may be considered a fair return for the
author's labor,388 the return itself is not the reason but instead the
means by which the legal system provides an incentive to foster
innovation and creativity. 3 9 Fair use is a fundamental part of this
scheme. The copyright balance between fair use and property can in
fact be regarded as a balance either between the two different purposes
of creation and diffusion 390 or between two different means to reach
the same end - innovation. 39 1 Fair use is based on a constitutional
386 See Cohen, supra note 279, at 468 (arguing about "[t]he
[c]onvergence of [e]conomic [i]mperatives and [n]atural [flights").
387 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (Betamax case) ("The monopoly privileges that Congress may
authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private
benefit."). Furthermore, "[t]he sole interest of the United States and the primary
object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public
from the labors of authors." Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)
(Hughes, C.J.).
388 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nat'l Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 546 (1985) ("The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure
contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors." (citing
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975))).
389 The Harper & Row Court, referring to Betamax, underscored that:
[This] limited grant is a means by which an important public
purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors and investors by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their
genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546 (discussing Betamax, 464 U.S. at 429); see also
Betamax, 464 U.S. at 477 ("[T]he monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the
individual author in order to benefit the public.") (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
390 According to the American Committee for Interoperable Systems:
The United States Copyright Act embodies a compromise between
two competing goals: encouraging the creation of new works, and
encouraging the widespread dissemination and use of works. To
reconcile these competing interests, Congress in passing the Act,
and the courts in applying it, have struck a delicate balance between
the rights of authors and the privileges of users in a wide range of
context. Any departure from this balance may have devastating
consequences for producers and consumer welfare.
Brief Amicus Curiae American Committee for Interoperable Systems, ProCD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
391 According to Professor Ball:
[The] author's consent to a reasonable use of his copyrighted works
[had] always been implied by the courts as a necessary incident of
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principle. In fact, although the constitutional relevance of the doctrine
itself has been an object of controversy,39 2 the interest that the doctrine
is intended to protect has an express constitutional foundation.393 Since
the droit d'auteur model is not grounded on constitutional freedom of
expression,39 4 nor justified by a utilitarian model, any limitation is
regarded as state intervention with the natural right of the author over
his or her creation, and must be interpreted as narrowly as possible.
Such a model, based upon an absolute right and a closed set of
exemptions, is well suited for translation to the design of technology.395
The convergence between DRM and a droit d'auteur model may be
appealing in the information age.
the constitutional policy of promoting the progress of science and
the useful arts, since a prohibition of such use would inhibit
subsequent writers from attempting to improve upon prior works
and thus ... frustrate the very ends sought to be attained.
H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944). Professor
Charles Nesson has stated that:
[A]s the Court has noted, "Copyright law restricts speech," and the
fair use doctrine serves as a crucial counterweight. "[C]opyright is
intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge."
Fair use, for commentary, criticism, and scholarship, including
commercial use, helps to assure that copyright remains the engine
of free expression congress is authorized to fuel, "to promote the
progress of science and useful arts."
Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Charles Nesson, Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citations omitted).
392 This was in fact criticized in Corley.
393 Jefferson clearly refers to the idea that the freedoms embedded in
copyright law are not the result of a public right to access a private commodity, but
are instead due to a deeper reason based on the nature of information and
guaranteed by the Constitution. Referring to the field of patents, Jefferson said that
ideas:
[S]hould freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the
moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his
condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed
by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space,
without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in
which we breath, move and have our physical being, incapable of
confinement or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in
nature, be a subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right
to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men to
pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be
done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without
claim or complaint from any body.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 19; see also Benkler,
supra note 235; Litman, supra note 235.
394 On the relations between copyright and freedom of expression, see
H. Cohen Jehoram, Freedom of Expression in Copyright Law, [1984] EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 2. See also Hugenholtz, supra note 240.
395 See von Lohmann, supra note 230.
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The possible influence of a droit d'auteur model would depend
on the internal evolution of the copyright doctrines inside the
European Union. There might be several alternative ways to an
absolute right in droit d'auteur countries. Some scholars from the droit
d'auteur tradition, such as Tullio Ascarelli,396 argued decades ago for
the necessity of adopting a utilitarian model by which to assess the role
of such limitations.397 The adoption of this model should account for
the substantial differences that characterize most of the droit d'auteur
systems: the absence of judicial power engaged in a creative
interpretative role, and the existence of an exemption by general clause
which allows the judiciary power to undertake such role.39 These two
features of the American system (one characterizing the role of the
judiciary, the other pertaining to the copyright discipline), provide the
best framework for the functional nature of copyright ownership, that
is, the dynamic instrument of the utilitarian approach. In droit d'auteur
legal systems, even where civil law judiciaries are considered
substantially flexible, the lack of a general clause of the type of the fair
use model might constitute a fundamental ban against a substantial
application of a utilitarian model. A possible solution would be to refer
- as currently occurs in the German system - to other flexible
limitations existing in the proprietarian tradition, such as the concept
of the "social function of private property." The use of this or other
intellectual tools might constitute a way to realize a utilitarian model,
while remaining consistent with the strongly proprietarian character of
the droit d'auteur tradition.
396 Ascarelli highlighted how the limitations to copyright law should
not be considered as flowing from the proprietarian model of the droit d'auteur, but
instead are consistent with the very reason that property is contingently and
limitedly recognized. See TULLIO ASCARELLI, TEORIA DELLA CONCORRENZA E DEI
BENI IMMATERIALI (1956).
397 It nevertheless should be noted that the application of the utilitarian
model is also peculiarly strengthened in the United States legal tradition by the
existence of a strong tradition of freedom of expression. Therefore the adoption of
such a model in different systems would face different types of constitutional values
which could undermine the impact of such an interpretation. Particularly in
European culture, the concept of equality has a primacy over the concept of identity
and expression. The reason for this is that the freedom created in Europe is a
freedom in the State rather than outside the State; whereas the First Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States is founded on the assumption of the freedom of
the individual against the State. The strand of enlightenment thought that more
closely resembles the concerns of the First Amendment is that of Voltaire. Voltairian
thought is based on the principle of tolerance and the idea of freedom "from" the
State, on which the First Amendment is grounded.
398 The concept was first introduced in Germany by the Weimar
Republic Constitution, which stated that since property confers duties, the owner
should use it for the sake of the common best. See WEIMAR REPUBLIC CONST. art.
153(3) (Aug. 14, 1919).
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E. SHIFTING DRM REGULATION FROM
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TOWARD AN
'INFORMATION SOCIETY'
It has been said that ubi societas ibi ius - where there is a society,
there is the law.399 Both society and law are typical human expressions.
If we agree with the humanism concept of "perfection" as
"consistency" with human nature - and therefore with a model of
embedded "imperfection, 40 0 - we may observe that among the
different types of constraints, the law is the most perfect, since it is the
most human. The legal constraints are in fact expressed by human
language and therefore carry language's "imperfection," as well as the
consequent flexibility required by the unpredictable evolution of the
human society. Furthermore, law is better designed to constitute a
democratic constraint since it is capable of consisting of transparent
and substitutable rules.
In this Part we have considered how the phenomenon of
digitalization may upset the role of this human constraint. While
providing peculiar benefits, technology may be used to privately
impose behaviors through a non-human, non-flexible language. Such
process may lead or may be paralleled by a system where information
becomes a mere commodity and loses the constitutional guarantees
leading to an environment of "knowledge without freedom."
In such a context, the threat that digitalization - and in
particular DRM - poses to fair use doctrine is a paradigmatic example
of how the "Information Infrastructure" created by technology needs a
399 The Ubi societas ibi ius, ubi ius ibi societas theory is set forth by Santi
Romano, Istitutionalism, L'ORDINAMENTO GIURIDICO (1918), and MAURICE
HAURION, TEORIE DE L'ISTITUTION ET DE LA FONDATION (1925).
400 See GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, DE HOMINIS DIGNITATE
ORATIO (1486). The Oratio, written as an introduction to an international conference
on philosophy which took place in Rome in 1487, contains some central picanian
thoughts, and is regarded as being a central foundation of Humanism. In the Oratio
the centrality of the human being is based on his freedom. Such freedom derives
from the consideration that while every entity of nature is constrained by a certain
design, the human being is free to shape his own design since unlike those entities he
lacks of an original design (or we might say, code): "non esse homini suam ullam et
nativam imaginem." Quite interestingly, where at the layer of the system of
communication the information infrastructure of the Internet has been (at least
originally) designed to lack an intrinsic function, the digital technology when used as
enforcement is highly constrained by its "perfection." We might say, through the
point of view of the meta-legal picanian concept, that the phenomena of information
society are highly inconsistent in nature. From one side, the digital infrastructure is
inspired to a humanistic model of unpredicted design or function (the end to end); on
the other, the digital technology as an enforcement system is incapable of
unpredicted and broad application, and is therefore peculiarly non-human.
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response from the law. If such a response will maintain the benefits of
technology within a scheme where rules are grounded in the law and
are made flexible to contain constitutional values, the constraints that
will affect individuals will still have a human nature and the aggregates
of the individuals will have the "human shape" of an Information
Society.
IV. CONCLUSION
The two phenomena discussed here - modularization and
digitalization - interact closely. Modularization of technology has
freed functionality from physical limitations. Information - as the form
of functionality in the digital environment - was enabled to
"concentrate" on itself. Digitalization supports this process. By
resolving information into a chain of Is and Os, the information is
freed from the specifics of the respective physical carrier; it becomes
media-unspecific. This fuels the convergence of the media, a
development which poses new challenges to media regulation and
makes necessary a review of past policies in this area.
The normative consequences of modular design have been
largely unexplored. Certainly, specific modular structures should not
be protected as such. On the contrary, since the mode of innovation is
constantly changing, there is a need for continuous and flexible re-
modularization. But rearranging modules is different from shifting
towards de-modularization. Under de-modularization, hitherto
separated spheres collapse, whether they are the different modules of
multi-layered information systems, or the distinction between private
rights and their State-mediated enforcement. There are peculiar
dangers attached to this, particularly the fact that de-modularized
structures are prone to concentration of power, a phenomenon for
which liberal society has always been on alert.
As we have described, the merger of rights and their
enforcement in DRM systems is likely to result in a juridical
particularism, driven by private actors who can advance to function as
private legislators. One response to this is insistence on the material
balances of copyright law as prescribed by the Constitution; but a
functional approach, as has been applied several times throughout this
Article, might counsel for additional safeguarding of public values.
When private entities assume quasi-public functions, it may be
justified to subject them to principles similar to those which govern the
State when acting in that same function. So it might be necessary to
transfer selected principles of State action, including formal ones, to
arrangements of private legislation. As far as the application of the
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Constitution to private action is concerned, the doctrine of State action
may have to be reviewed. Of special interest might be considering
private standard-setting organizations from such a perspective, since
they operate as a medium for the private rights-holders in their efforts
to build viable DRM systems.
We have also pointed to the dangers attached to vertical
integration of companies doing business on different layers of
modularized information systems. In the case of the Internet, the
leveraging of power from one layer to another is likely to result in a
distortion of the (linked) processes of communication and innovation.
In the case of computer systems products, the leveraging of a dominant
player's power from one layer to another is also likely to result in
impediments to the process of innovation. Besides the problems of this
leveraging within modularized systems, it seems worthwhile to also
pay attention to leveraging across modularized systems. Such a cross-
leveraging of power can be detected in the Microsoft case. Microsoft
allegedly engaged in anti-competitive behavior in the browser market
by (mis-)using its dominant position in the operating systems market.
Microsoft thus captured the market for Internet browsers, which can
be viewed as functional equivalents of operating systems. It thereby
leveraged its power not just from one market to another but from one
modularized information system to another. This implies that we
should pursue a comprehensive competition policy for information
systems and carefully assess potential impacts across systems.
Ultimately, it draws our attention to the connectedness and
interdependence of the phenomena in the information environment.
However, the consequence cannot be to fight those
developments in principle but instead to accompany this process by
insisting on the balances and mandates prescribed by the Constitution.
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